We examine the effect of financial advisor reputation on wealth gains in corporate takeovers. In view of the adversarial nature of a takeover, we construct a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor. We document that the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the bidder (target) increases (decreases) as the reputation of the bidder's advisor increases relative to that of the target. We also find that the total wealth created in the takeover is positively related to the reputation of bidder and target advisors. While bidder advisor reputation is positively related to the probability of bid success in our sample, we also present some evidence to suggest that bidders with better advisors are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers.

Our analysis explains how vulture investors (vultures) can maintain and exploit their reputations for toughness. Vultures leverage their reputations to extract concessions from stockholders in debt restructurings. To profit from these concessions, vultures must first acquire debt from incumbent bondholders. Buying only the tranches most likely to render them marginal creditors maximizes vulture leverage in debt-purchase negotiations. Vulture profits are proportional to the degree of uncertainty regarding the identity of the marginal debt class.

Recent theoretical models show that irrational expectations can generate return predictability consistent with apparent violations of weak-form market efficiency documented in the empirical literature. These behavioral models constrain rational investors' ability toexploit inter-temporal predictability by assuming that rational agents face high transactions costs, are myopic, or are non-existent. This paper presents a model in which there are two types of irrational expectations, one that causes momentum and another that creates reversals. I investigate whether these types of predictability will persist in the presence of fully rational agents who face no transactions costs, are long lived, and trade dynamically to optimally exploit any predictability due to irrational mispricings. I show that weak-form market efficiency will be violated under two very weak conditions: rational investors are risk averse and the fundamental value of the asset is risky. The paper also investigates the accumulation of wealth by trader type and shows that irrational agents will survive under a large set of parameters.

This paper develops an expected utility model of a multinational firm facing exchange rate risk exposure to a foreign currency cash flow. Currency derivative markets do not exist between the domestic and foreign currencies. There are, however, currency futures and options markets between the domestic currency and a third currency to which the firm has access. Since a triangular parity condition holds among these three currencies, the available, yet incomplete, currency futures and options markets still provide a useful avenue for the firm to indirectly hedge against its foreign exchange risk exposure. This paper offers analytical insights into the optimal cross-hedging strategies of the firm. In particular, the results show the optimality of using options in conjunction with futures in the case of currency mismatching, even though cash flows appear to be linear.

We study how minimum trading unit changes on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange impact a stock's trading activity, price volatility, and value. The value effects are consistent with Merton's (1987) model, i.e., an increase in the investor base (trading volume) and a decrease in price noisiness affect stock value positively. Our results extend Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno's (1999) tests of Merton by demonstrating a clear relation between price noisiness changes and stock value changes, and by showing that the response to a minimum trading unit decrease becomes less favorable (and arguably even negative) in the thinnest trading stocks.

This paper examines the degree of anonymity—the extent to which a trader is recognized as informed—on alternative market structures. We find evidence that is consistent with less anonymity on the NYSE specialist system compared to the NASDAQ dealer system. Specifically, when corporate insiders trade medium-sized quantities (500–9,999 shares inclusive), NYSE listed stocks exhibit larger changes in proportional effective spreads than NASDAQ stocks. Taken together, these findings are consistent with Barclay and Warners (1993) contention that stealth (medium-sized) trades are more likely based on private information and insider trades are more transparent on the NYSE specialist system relative to the NASDAQ dealer system. The results support the hypothesis by Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) that the unique relationship between specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE leads to less anonymity.

We use a unique set of equities in the when-issued market to provide new tests of the law of one price in financial markets. We compare the prices of when-issued and regular way shares of publicly traded subsidiaries and their parents around the time the subsidiaries are fully divested and we find that the when-issued shares of the subsidiary trade at a discount. Pricing differences stem from measurement factors such as exchange location and bid-ask clustering that bias the observed when-issued pricing differential away from zero. The remaining difference is due to asymmetric movements in bid and ask quotes in the two markets. We also find evidence of temporary price pressures on the date of execution of the spinoff of the subsidiary firms that bear resemblance to the pricing in the when-issued market. We interpret the evidence as consistent with the law of one price in the presence of transaction costs and microstructure phenomena.

We empirically compare a wide range of term structure models used in the pricing and, in particular, hedging of caps and swaptions. We analyze the influence of the number of factors on the hedging and pricing results, and investigate the type of data—interest rate or derivative price—in combination with the estimation technique that should be used to obtain the best hedging and pricing results. We use data on interest rates, and cap and swaption prices from 1995–1999. The empirical results show that, if the number of hedge instruments is equal to the number of factors, multi-factor models outperform one-factor models in hedging caps and swaptions. However, if one uses a large set of hedge instruments, one-factor models perform as well as multi-factor models. We find that models with two or three factors imply better out-of-sample predictions of cap and swaption prices than one-factor models. Estimation on the basis of current derivative prices leads to more accurate out-of-sample prediction of cap and swaption prices than estimation on the basis of interest rate data.

Patterns of clustering in IPO gross spreads can be identified not only in the U.S., but also in many other markets across the world. The evidence indicates, however, that these clustering patterns are not necessarily collusive. Clustering is widespread in many countries with low gross spreads. In fact, the amount of clustering observed is negatively related to the gross spread level of a country. Additionally, an analysis of abnormal gross spreads following Hansen (2001) indicates that few clusters contain abnormal positive surpluses.