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Truth, consequences, and the Evil-god challenge: a response to Anastasia Scrutton

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2018

ASHA LANCASTER-THOMAS Open the ORCID record for ASHA LANCASTER-THOMAS [Opens in a new window]
ASHA LANCASTER-THOMAS*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
*
e-mail: asha.lancaster-thomas@cantab.net
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Abstract

In her 2016 article in Religious Studies, Anastasia Scrutton attempts to undermine Stephen Law's Evil-god challenge by arguing that belief in a good god is more justified than belief in an evil god, despite the alethic similarity of the two hypotheses. Drawing on the epistemological theory of pragmatic encroachment, Scrutton claims that is it more reasonable to believe in a benevolent deity than a malevolent one because belief in the latter (i) is detrimental to one's well-being and (ii) has worse moral consequences, whereas belief in the former (i) is good for one's well-being and (ii) has better moral consequences. In this article, I critically respond to Scrutton's argument by proposing that even if belief in a good god results in better consequences than belief in an evil god does, pragmatic encroachment does not undermine the Evil-god challenge. I further argue that pragmatic encroachment potentially undermines itself in this instance.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 447 - 454
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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