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Second-order languages and mathematical practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Stewart Shapiro
Stewart Shapiro*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University at Newark, Newark, Ohio 43055
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Extract

There are well-known theorems in mathematical logic that indicate rather profound differences between the logic of first-order languages and the logic of second-order languages. In the first-order case, for example, there is Gödel's completeness theorem: every consistent set of sentences (vis-à-vis a standard axiomatization) has a model. As a corollary, first-order logic is compact: if a set of formulas is not satisfiable, then it has a finite subset which also is not satisfiable. The downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is that every set of satisfiable first-order sentences has a model whose cardinality is at most countable (or the cardinality of the set of sentences, whichever is greater), and the upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is that if a set of first-order sentences has, for each natural number n, a model whose cardinality is at least n, then it has, for each infinite cardinal κ (greater than or equal to the cardinality of the set of sentences), a model of cardinality κ. It follows, of course, that no set of first-order sentences that has an infinite model can be categorical. Second-order logic, on the other hand, is inherently incomplete in the sense that no recursive, sound axiomatization of it is complete. It is not compact, and there are many well-known categorical sets of second-order sentences (with infinite models). Thus, there are no straightforward analogues to the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems for second-order languages and logic.

There has been some controversy in recent years as to whether “second-order logic” should be considered a part of logic, but this boundary issue does not concern me directly, at least not here.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 714 - 742
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1985

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