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The Political Economy of the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Ben Baack  and
Edward Ray
Ben Baack
Affiliation:
Ben Baack is Associate Professor and Edward Ray is Professor of Economics at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
Edward Ray
Affiliation:
Ben Baack is Associate Professor and Edward Ray is Professor of Economics at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
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Abstract

Despite the attention given by scholars to the military-industrial complex few studies have attempted to pinpoint and explain its origin. In this paper we argue that the coalescing of business, military, and political interest groups in support of a military build-up in the United States during peacetime occurred in the years between the Civil War and World War I. It was during this period that we observe the roots of institutional arrangements between the military and industry for the purpose of large-scale weapons acquisitions.

Type
Papers Presented at the Forty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , June 1985 , pp. 369 - 375
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1985

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