1 In 1967 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom merged their executives organs. Since that time it has been customary to refer to the system formed by these three communities as the “European Community” or the “European Communities.”

2 Haas, Ernst B., “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization 30 (1976), 173–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See especially p. 174.

3 Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1964)Google Scholar; Haas, Emst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Lindberg, Leon N., The Political Dynamics of European Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar, especially chaps. 1–3; for a discussion of various theories of integration see Pentland, Charles, International Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free Press, 1973)Google Scholar; Sewell, James Patrick, Functionalism and World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 For summary of the “encapsulation” concept see Haas, Emst B., “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” in Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A. (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3–42Google Scholar. See especially p. 11.

5 Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 82Google Scholar.

6 For examples of such refinements see the various articles in Lindberg and Scheingold, Regional Integration.

7 Russett, Bruce M., Community and Contention (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., Political Community at the International Level (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954)Google Scholar.

8 Cooper, Richard N., The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968)Google Scholar; Cooper, Richard N., “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” World Politics 24 (1972): 159–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 These are Cooper's definitions. See Cooper, Economics of Interdependence.

10 Morse, Edward L., “The Politics of Interdependence,” International Organization 23 (1969), 311–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 The concept of “sensitivity” is discussed in Copper, Economics of Interdependence.

12 The case for subsuming integration studies into an interdependence approach is made in Haas, “Turbulent Fields”; also see Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “International Interdependence and Integration,” in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), Handbook of Political Science (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 8, 363–414Google Scholar.

13 Keohane and Nye, “International Interdependence and Integration.”

14 On transnational politics in North America, see the various articles in Fox, Annette Baker, Hero, Alfred O. Jr. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (eds.), Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations, International Organization 28 (1974), 595–1028Google Scholar.

15 An example is provided by the conflict described in Kretschmer, Dieter, “Internationale Kampfmassnahmen gegen Multinationalekonzerne am Beispiel von AKZO,” WWI Mitteilungen 4 (1975), 200–03Google Scholar.

16 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Introduction: The Complex Politics of Canadian-American Interdependence,” in Fox, et al. (eds.), Canada and the United Stales, 595–607. See especially p. 596.

17 Ibid.

18 Scheinman, Lawrence, “Some Preliminary Notes on Bureaucratic Relationships in the European Economic Community,” International Organization 20(1966), 750–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Kal J. Holsti and Thomas A. Levy, “Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental Relations Between Canada and the United States,” in Fox et al., Canada and the United States, 875–901.

20 Keohane and Nye, “International Interdependence and Integration.”

21 Haas, “Turbulent Fields”; Haas, Ernst B., “Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes,” International Organization 29 (1975), 827–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haas, Ernst B., “On Systems and International Regimes,” World Politics 37 (1975), 147–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Haas, “Turbulent Fields.”

23 Braybrooke, David and Lindblom, Charles E., A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York: Free Press, 1963), see especially pp. 61–79Google Scholar.

24 Lindberg, Political Dynamics, 10.

25 Haas, “Tuibulent Fields,” 190–92.

26 Ibid., 196.

27 Ibid.

28 See the argument presented and the sources cited in Busch, Peter and Puchala, Donald, “Interests, Influence, and Integration: Political Structure in the European Communities,” Comparative Political Studies 9 (1976), 235–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Ibid.

30 The summit conferences have become a regular part of EC life and provide the arena in which very important issues, either general or specific, may be resolved. However, because of the limited number of meetings (three per year) and because of the many non-EC matters which heads-of-govemment must attend to, most final bargains are struck at the Council of Ministers or at the Committee of Permanent Representatives level.

31 Busch and Puchala, “Interests, Influence, and Integration”; Wallace, Helen, National Governments and the European Communities (London: Chatham House/PEP, 1973)Google Scholar.

32 Bouvard, Marguerite, Labour Movements in the Common Market Countries: The Growth of a European Pressure Group (New York: Praeger, 1972)Google Scholar; Rosenthal, Glenda O., The Men Behind the Decisions (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1975)Google Scholar; Averyt, William, “Eurogroups, Clientela and the European Community,” International Organization 29 (1975), 949–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Busch and Puchala, “Interests, Influence, and Integration,” 239–40; Feld, Wemer, “National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC,” Political Science Quarterly 81 (1966), 393–411CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Wallace, Helen, “The Impact of the European Communities on National Policy-Making,” Government and Opposition 6 (1971), 520–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Caporaso, James A., The Structure and Function of European Integration (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear, 1974)Google Scholar, chaps. 2–4; Scheinman, “Some Preliminary Notes.”

35 Many of the following ideas were presented in briefer form in Busch and Puchala, “Interests, Influence, and Integration.”

36 On “networks,” see Boissevain, Jeremy and Mitchell, J. Clyde (eds.), Network Analysis Studies in Human Interaction (The Hague: Mouton, 1973)Google Scholar; also see Mitchell, J. Clyde (ed.), Social Networks in Urban Situations (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1969)Google Scholar; fora rather different application of the concept of networks, see Vaughn, William M., “Transnational Policy Program Networks in the European Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies 11 (1972), 36–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 The information upon which the following is based comes from my interviews with elites in Germany and in Brussels. Considerably more research on career patterns and their consequences for Commission and national civil servants is required. On the relationship between the recruitment of Commission civil servants and interpersonal contacts between national and Commission officials, see Scheinman, Lawrence, “Some Preliminary Notes on Bureaucratic Relationships in the European Community,” International Organization 20 (1966), 750–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 On agriculture in the EC, see Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Policy, chap. 5; Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions; Muth, Hanns Peter, French Agriculture and the Political Integration of Europe (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970)Google Scholar.

39 Puchala, Donald J., “Popular Europeanism Reconsidered,” European Review 23 (1973), 21–34Google Scholar; Puchala, Donald J., “Europeans and Europeanism in 1970,” International Organization 27 (1973), 387–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 Busch, Peter, Legitimacy and Ethnicity: A Case Study of Singapore (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1974)Google Scholar, chaps. 1, 7.

41 Holsti and Levy, “Bilateral Institutions.”

42 Brief examinations of some of these historical factors as they affected France and Germany can be found in Josef Joffe, “The Foreign Policy of the German Federal Republic,” and Roy C. Macridis, “French Foreign Policy” both of which appear in Macridis, Roy C. (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (5th ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976)Google Scholar; on Germany and the European Community, see Mueller-Roschach, Herbert, Die Deutsche Europapolitik (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1974)Google Scholar; the particular historical interpretation presented in this article is based upon my interviews as well as upon the literature.

43 For information on politics in the Federal Republic, see Ellwein, Thomas, Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (3rd ed., Opladen, West Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973)Google Scholar; Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Kommers, Donald P., The Governments of Germany (4th ed., New York: Thomas Crowell, 1975)Google Scholar.

44 This is extremely important when, for instance, the CDU/CSU controls the Bundesrat while the SPD/FDP coalition controls the lower house.

45 Mayntz, Renate and Scharpf, Fritz W., Policy Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975)Google Scholar; also see the essays in Mayntz, Renate and Scharpf, Fritz W. (eds.), Planungsorganisation: Die Diskussion urn die Reform von Regierung und Verwaltung des Bundes (Munich: R. Piper, 1973)Google Scholar; Heidenheimer and Kommers, Governments of Germany, 79.

46 Mayntz and Scharpf, Policy Making; Ellwein, Das Regierungssystem, 308–41.

47 Basic Law, article 64.

48 Basic Law, article 65.

49 Ellwein, Das Regierungssystem, 311–13; of course certain characteristics, such as the personal political importance of ministers, are common to many parliamentary systems. However, as Mayntz and Scharpf argue, ministerial autonomy in Germany is probably greater than in most other systems (Policy Making).

50 Mayntz and Schaipf, Policy Making, 38ff.

51 “Section” is used here for the German ”Referat.”

52 “Division” refers to ”Abteilung.”

53 Mayntz and Scharpf, Policy Making, 64ff.

54 For an excellent discussion of coordination in German policy-making towards the EC, see Sasse, Christoph, Regierungen, Parlamente, Ministerrat: Entscheidungsprozesse in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1975)Google Scholar, esp. 25–29 on Abeilung E, the Committee of State Secretaries for European Questions (Staatssekretaersausschuss fuer Europafragen) and the Circle of Officials Concerned with Europe (Kreis der Europabeauftragten). My own research generally confirms Sasse's study except that my interviews showed that informal processes are even more important than Sasse thought.

55 The information presented here comes from 80 interviews I conducted in Germany and in Brussels. In Germany, civil servants in several ministries, political party officials, and trade union leaders were interviewed. In Brussels, Commission secretariat personnel, umbrella interest group officials, and members of the German and British Permanent Delegations to the European Communities were interviewed.

56 From this statement, the reader might draw the inference that the Community system is not “integrative” because it is easier to veto than to promote policy. My own Commistentative view is that if we must use the concept of “integration” here, we should use it in the sense of the process by which elites come to use the EC system to gain rewards and to avoid penalties. Because the Community affects so much of what used to be within the purview of “national” policy, it is as much a sign of increasing integration when, for instance, national officials veto a Community policy change as when they foster new programmes.

57 This point is based upon interview findings.

58 This is based upon interviews with members of the German and British delegations to the Community. The point was confirmed by officials in Bonn.

59 Commission of the European Communities, COM (75) 429 final, Brussels, July 25, 1975.

60 Interviews with Commission and German government officials.

61 The following information is based primarily on interviews; also see Wolfram Eisner, Die EWG: Herausforderung und Antwort der Gewerkschaften (Cologne: Pahl- Rugenstein, 1974), esp. 31–40, 136–150.

Among the many EC documents that should be consulted are:

1. (a)

   (a) Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Statute for European Companies (Supplement to Bull. EC 8/1970);

2. (b)

   (b) Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Fifth Directive on the Structure of Corporations (Supplement to Bull. EC 10/72);

3. (c)

   (c) Commission of the European Communities, Statute for European Companies: An Amended Proposal for a Regulation (Supplement to Bull. EC 4/75);

4. (d)

   (d) Commission of the European Communities, Employee Participation and Company Structure (Supplement to Bull. EC 8/75.)

62 See Section 3 of this article.

63 See Busch and Puchala, “Interests, Influence, and Integration,” 246ff; Etzioni, Amitai, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961)Google Scholar; Wilson, James Q., Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973)Google Scholar; Eldersfeld, Samuel J., Political Parties (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965)Google Scholar.

64 The effects of differential incentives is particularly evident in Eldersfeld, Political Parties; for an application of organization theory to the National Liberation Front of Vietnam and for an examination of differential incentives in that organization, see Berman, Paul, Revolutionary Organization (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1974)Google Scholar.

65 The importance of intermediate leaders is analyzed in Berman, Revolutionary Organization.

66 Ibid. As Berman shows, the specific requirements of leadership can vary considerably by level.

67 Busch, Legitimacy and Ethnicity, chaps. 1, 7 on direct and indirect legitimacy.

68 Ibid.

69 Rabier, Jacques-Rene, “Europeans and the Unification of Europe,” Government and Opposition 6 (1971), 477–501CrossRefGoogle Scholar, see p. 484, table 5.

70 Ibid., 495, table 16.

71 Haas, “Turbulent Fields.”

72 Koehane and Nye, “International Interdependence and Integration.”