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Sequential Voting with Endogenous Voter Forecasts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Dennis Epple  and
Joseph B. Kadane
Dennis Epple
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University
Joseph B. Kadane
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University
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Abstract

We investigate a sequential voting model in which voters' forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined endogenously. Voters are assumed to make decisions in an environment in which future outcomes are uncertain. The uncertainty arises from two possible sources. Voters may be uncertain of other voters' preferences. In addition, events that occur before future issues are decided may affect voters' preferences on future votes. Information available to voters at each point in time is characterized. An equilibrium to the voting problem, if one exists, is one for which the outcome on the issue currently being decided and voters' forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined simultaneously. We show that an equilibrium exists under a particular voting institution and characterize voters' forecasts for this equilibrium.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 165 - 175
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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