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PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1985

John R. Wright
John R. Wright*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

This study uses information about the organizational arrangements of five major political action committees to develop an explanation for the extent to which PAC contributions are capable of influencing congressional voting decisions. The explanation claims that the processes by which PACs raise and allocate money must be understood before the impact of money on roll call decisions can be appreciated. In contrast to some previous studies, this analysis demonstrates with marked clarity the limited nature of PAC influence.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 79 , Issue 2 , June 1985 , pp. 400 - 414
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1985

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