The concept of social licence is increasingly being used to draw attention to the need for community support and acceptance of research,particularly of data-based research. Chapter three examines the nature of social licence and its application to research using linked data. Social licence is framed as an analytical tool to design and evaluate decision making for sharing and using linked data for research. The chapter examines the qualitative evidence of public perceptions and the conditions for community support and identifies the substantive and procedural conditions that lead to trust and legitmacy. The chapter concludes that these conditions should be embedded in the governance of research using linked data to develop and sustain community acceptance.

In this chapter, we define infinite orbits and show how to approximate such orbits. We prove that for every function that has no fixed point there is an approximate infinite orbit with unbounded variation, and we use this result to show that a certain class of quitting games admits undiscounted $\ep$-equilibria.

In this chapter, we define the model of stochastic games.

In this chapter, we extend the notion of discounted payoff to the model of stochastic games, and we define the concept of discounted equilibrium. We then prove that every two-player zero-sum stochastic game admits a discounted value, and that each player has a stationary discounted optimal strategy. The proof uses the same tools we employed in Chapter~\ref{section:mdp} to prove that in Markov decision problems the decision maker has a stationary discounted optimal strategy.

We finally prove that the discounted value is continuous in the parameters of the game, namely the payoff function, the transition function, and the discount factor.

In this chapter, we proveKakutani's Fixed Point Theorem, which is an extension of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theoremto correspondences (set-valued mappings). We then define the concept of $\lambda$-discounted equilibrium, and using Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem we prove that every multiplayer stochastic game admits a stationary $\lambda$-discounted equilibrium, for every discount factor $\lambda \in (0,1]$.

This chapter is devoted to the study of well-posed i/s/o systems. These systems are assumed to be solvable and to satisfy a well-posedness condition that guarantees the existence of a unique future generalized trajectory for any given initial state and input function that belongs locally to L2. Although it is not obvious from the definition, every well-posed i/s/o system is internally well-posed, i.e., it has a nonempty resolvent set-and its main operator generates a C0 semigroup. Semi-bounded i/s/o systems are well-posed. The class of well-posed i/s/o systems is the largest class in this book for which can to prove connections between time and frequency domain results that are analogous to those established in Chapter 8 for the class of semi-bounded i/s/o systems. At the end of this chapter we define the notion of a scattering passive system, and show that scattering passive systems are well-posed. A scattering passive system is characterized by the fact that it is regular, and its system operator is maximally scattering dissipative. Well-posed s/s systems are discussed in Chapter 15.