The hybrid metaethical interpretation of Hobbes (with which chapter 1 ended) is undermined by his account of practical reasoning and counsel: it fails to integrate the reasoning-based and prescriptivist elements composing it. This chapter argues, against the dominant interpretation, that Hobbesian deliberation and action can be reflectively responsive to both practical reasoning and to judgements about reasons. When humans engage in practical reasoning or give counsel, they do not merely (a) assent to or assert the proposition that some fact furnishes a reason to do something combined with (b) a decision or prescription to do it. The two elements are intrinsically linked: one decides to do something or prescribes doing it on the basis of a putative fact furnishing a reason to do it. Linguistic reasoning for Hobbes consists in reflectively reasoning from premises—inferentially drawing conclusions on the basis of propositions one supposes or takes to provide a reason from which to draw conclusions. Similarly, good counsellors ground their advice in the reasons they cite. The hybrid interpretation severs this intrinsic connection between deciding or prescribing and reasons. Only an irreducibly normative interpretation of Hobbes’s metaethics properly accounts for Hobbes’s account of linguistic practical reasoning and counsel.