These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called “inner sense.” In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes of sense-perception. One of these, based primarily on the case of vision, is what I called the object-perceptual model – it takes perception to be in the first instance a relation to objects and only secondarily a relation to facts. I argued in my first lecture that introspection does not have nonfactual objects of the sort required to make this model applicable. The other, which does not require perception to have nonfactual objects, I called the broad perceptual model; its key tenet is that the existence of the objects of perception, whether they be factual or nonfactual, is independent both of their being perceived and of there being the possibility of their being perceived. The view that introspection conforms to this was my target in my second lecture, where I argued that it is of the essence of various kinds of mental states that they are introspectively accessible.

But one important issue was left dangling. If we had only such intentional states as beliefs and desires to deal with, the view that introspective awareness is awareness of facts unmediated by awareness of objects would seem phenomenologically apt. My awareness of a belief just comes down to my awareness that I believe such and such.