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⁹ Graciela Kaminsky, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Carlos A. Vegh, “When It Rains, It Pours: Pro-cyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies,” NBER Working Paper no. W10780 (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2004).

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³² Ibid., 16.

³³ Alberto Melo, “Industrial Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean,” IADB Working Paper no. 489 (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, August 2001), 14–22.

³⁴ Carla Macario, “Why and How Do Manufacturing Firms Export: Evidence from Successful Exporting Firms in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico” (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1998), 220.

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³⁶ Costa Rican R&D investment amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP in 1996, compared with 0.4 percent or less in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, countries at a comparable or higher level of devel-opment. This is still smaller than the R&D investments made by the East Asian developing countries or the United States (in excess of 2 percent of GDP), but it is impressive for a poor Central American nation. See Derek Hill, “Latin America: R&D Spending Jumps in Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica” National Science Foundation Division of Science Resource Studies NSF 00–316 (Washington, D.C.: NSF, 2000), 3–4.

³⁷ Eduaro Levy Yeyati, Alejandro Micco, and Ugo Panizza, “Should Government Be in the Banking Business? The Role of State-Owned and Development Banks,” Working Paper no. 517 (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2004), 34.

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⁹¹ Wibbels (fn. 4), 459.

⁹² All four variables are from World Bank (fn. 69).

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⁹⁴ World Bank (fn. 69).

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Indeed, partisanship appears to have little direct relationship to orthodox neoliberalism, most likely because both conservative and left governments have pursued it in the region, albeit typically for different reasons. See Brooks, Sarah and Kurtz, Marcus, “Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform,” American Journalof Political Science 51 (October 2007)Google Scholar. It is likely that other factors may condition the relationship (if any) between partisanship and aspects of orthodox neoliberal reform; at least this has been suggested in recent literature. See Murillo, M. Victoria and Martinez-Gallardo, Cecilia, “Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities,” American Journal of Political Science 51 (January 2007)Google Scholar; and Nielson, Daniel, “Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science 47 (July 2003)Google Scholar. While we consider this a fruitful line of research, further analysis of the question is beyond the scope of this paper.

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⁹⁹ Astorga, Berges, and Fitzgerald (fn. 41); Bruton (fn. 40), 916.

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¹⁰¹ Rodriguez-Clare (fn. 25), 313.

¹⁰² We are grateful to Matthew Golder for publishing the stata code from which we developed these figures. For the article on which the code is based, see Brambor, Thomas, Clark, William Roberts, and Golder, Matt, “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analysis,” Politi-calAnalysis 14 (Winter 2006)Google Scholar. The code is found at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/interaction.html#code.

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¹⁰⁹ In both these estimations we corrected for the first-order autocorrelation indicated by a lagrange multiplier test, and we employed robust standard errors. The invariant and slow-moving variables were manufacturing share of GDP in 1980, human capital in 1980, and inequality in 1980, growth over the 1980s, electoral system, partisanship, unionization rates, and their interaction. Using standard errors that assume clustering by country produced nearly identical results, including the size, sign, and statistical significance of the variables of interest. Reestimations of the slightly more parsimonious models (1 and 2) indicated that the results are robust to the inclusion or omission of electoral system (PR).

¹¹⁰ Each of these differenced models naturally includes as a control the lagged level of the dependent variable as the change score is very likely in part dependent upon the antecedent level (that is, at high levels further increases are likely to be smaller). No correction for autocorrelation is made as kgrange multiplier tests indicate its absence. The time trend variable was omitted as the multivariate augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicated stationarity.