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Cognitive Models in the Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Ronald N. Giere
Ronald N. Giere*
Affiliation:
The University of Minnesota
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Extract

When attempting to introduce new ideas it is usually best to provide an exemplar which demonstrates, in a particular case, the usefulness of those ideas. It is also occasionally helpful to talk about why the new ideas might be useful. Given limited space, one cannot do both. I have chosen here to talk about the use of cognitive models in the philosophy of science, leaving the exhibition of their usefulness for other occasions.

Now if one is just going to talk about something rather than exhibit its potential, it is best not to be too general or abstract. After all, the objective is to convince one's audience that one has something to offer. Few people, including even philosophers, are easily convinced by generalities or abstractions. So I will begin by sketching an account of how I personally came to the conclusion that the cognitive sciences provide models that are useful to the philosopher of science.

Type
Part IX. Epistemology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 319 - 328
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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