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Towards an Expanded Epistemology for Approximations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Jeffry L. Ramsey
Jeffry L. Ramsey*
Affiliation:
Rice University
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Extract

Since “one can seldom directly deduce from a speculation consequences that are even in principle testable,” a scientist must “articulate” a theory, mathematically altering a given speculation to bring it “into greater resonance with the world” (Hacking 1983, p. 214). When confronted with computational difficulties caused by analytically intractable equations, imprecise specifications of initial conditions, or the absence of required auxiliary theories, scientists commonly articulate a theory by applying approximations and idealizations to the theoretical equations they have at hand. Recognizing this, the following question immediately arises for both the scientist and the philosopher of science, “How does one judge the quality of a particular approximation? I.e., when is a given approximation valid?“

Type
Part IV. Issues in Methodology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 154 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

Much of this paper is based on material in my dissertation (Ramsey 1990a). Many thanks to Bill Wimsatt, R. Stephen Berry, and Dan Garber for helpful criticism and comments on the dissertation.

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