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Interpretations of Probability in Evolutionary Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Roberta L. Millstein
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Abstract

The ubiquitous probabilities of evolutionary theory (ET) spark the question: Which interpretation of probability is the most appropriate for ET? There is reason to think that, whatever we take probabilities in ET to be, they must be consistent with both determinism and indeterminism. I argue that the probabilities used in ET are objective in a realist sense, if not in an indeterministic sense. Furthermore, there are a number of interpretations of probability that are objective and would be consistent with deterministic evolution and indeterministic evolution. However, I suggest that evolutionary probabilities are best understood as propensities of population-level kinds.

Type
Evolutionary Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1317 - 1328
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Lisa Gannett, Elliott Sober, Marcel Weber, and members of the audiences at PSA 2002 and Northwest Philosophy Conference 2002 for helpful comments on this paper. I would also like to thank Lindley Darden and the University of Maryland's Committee on the History and Philosophy of Science for helpful comments on an earlier version. This work was supported by a Faculty Support Grant from California State University, Hayward.

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