Article contents
Can the Bundle Theory Save Substantivalism from the Hole Argument?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
One of the most serious theoretical obstacles to contemporary spacetime substantivalism is Earman and Norton's hole argument. We argue that applying the bundle theory of substance to spacetime points allows spacetime substantivalists to escape the conclusion of this argument. Some philosophers have claimed that the bundle theory cannot be applied to substantival spacetime in this way due to problems in individuating spacetime points in symmetrical spacetimes. We demonstrate that it is possible to overcome these difficulties if spatiotemporal properties are viewed as tropes rather than universals.
- Type
- Relativity and Fields
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001
Footnotes
The authors thank Li Li, Bernard Linsky, Alexander Rueger, Oliver Schulte, and Martin Tweedale for comments on an earlier draft, as well as the participants of the Simultaneity, Space, and Spacetime session at the 2000 PSA meetings for helpful comments and discussion. The authors were supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
References
- 3
- Cited by