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Approaches to Reduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Kenneth F. Schaffner*
Affiliation:
The University of Chicago

Abstract

Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an “isomorphic model” schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, to the explanation of physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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Footnotes

I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Ernest Nagel, Sidney Morgenbesser, and W. V. Quine for their helpful comments on materials presented in this paper. A shorter version of this paper was read at the annual meeting of The American Philosophical Association, Western Division, Chicago, May 1967.

References

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