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The motives for cooperation in work organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2009

HELENA LOPES ,
ANA C. SANTOS  and
NUNO TELES
HELENA LOPES*
Affiliation:
ISCTE and DINÂMIA, Research Centre on Socioeconomic Change, Lisbon, Portugal
ANA C. SANTOS
Affiliation:
Centre for Social Studies (CES), Coimbra, Portugal
NUNO TELES
Affiliation:
DINÂMIA, Research Centre on Socioeconomic Change, Lisbon, Portugal
*
*Email: Helena.lopes@iscte.pt
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Abstract:

This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of cooperation in productive ventures, conceived of as collective action endeavours that require cooperation rather than mere coordination. It is argued that cooperative behaviour is grounded on three kinds of ‘common goods’, defined as goods that are shared and recognized as beneficial by the workers. These comprise common goals, relational satisfaction, and moral norms and values. The commonly held goods are associated with motives and behavioural rules which constitute both the reasons for cooperating and the means through which the dilemmatic nature of cooperation is overcome. It is further argued that the binding character of these rules is closely linked to humans’ ability and opportunity to communicate. Normative guidelines relative to management practices and directions for future research are also derived.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , December 2009 , pp. 315 - 338
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2009

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