1 Feller, S. Z., “Concurrent Criminal Jurisdiction in the International Sphere”, (1981) 16 Is. L. R. 40–74.Google Scholar

2 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, U. S. Supreme Court, 16 June 1992, No. 91–712, 51 Criminal Law Reporter 2164–2158 (dissenting votes: 2158–2163).

3 Zagaris, B., “U.S. Court Acquits Alvarez-Machain While Mexico Calls for the Extradition of Two DEA Agents for Kidnapping”, (December 1992) 8 International Enforcement Law Reporter, 469–471Google Scholar with further references. See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1992), No. 292, p. 8 (16 December 1992).

4 See Bolstad, D. C., “Combatting Torture: Revitalizing the Toscanino Exception to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine” (1991) 13 Loyola L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. 871–923Google Scholar; Gray, J. L., “International Kidnapping and the Constitutional Rights of the Kidnapped” (1991) 44 Rutgers L. R. 165–204Google Scholar; Henderson, K. J., “Fighting the War on Drugs in the ‘New World Order’: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine as a Product of its Time” (1991) 24 Vanderbilt J. Transnat'l L. 635, at 568/9Google Scholar; Wolfenson, A. M., “The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects Abducted Abroad under International Law” (1989–1990) 13 Fordham Int'l L. J. 705, at 738 and subs.Google Scholar

5 Lowenfeld, Andreas F., “Kidnapping by Government Order: A Follow-up”, (1990) 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 712–716, at 716.Google Scholar

6 E.g., Chrystle, H. M., “When Rights Fall in a Forest… The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and American Judicial Countenance of Extraterritorial Abductions and Torture” (1991) 9 Dickinson J. Int'l L. 387, at 402 subsGoogle Scholar; Grassie, Y. G., “Federal Sponsored International Kidnapping: An Acceptable Alternative to Extradition?” (1986) 64 Wash. U. L. Q. 1205, at 1215/6Google Scholar; Lowenfeld, A. F., “U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad” (1990) 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 444, at 475CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mann, F. A., “Zum Strafverfahren gegen einen völkerrechtewidrig Entführten”, (1987) 47 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaÖRV) 469, at 479Google Scholar; Schultz, H., “Male Captus, Bene Judicatus?” (1967) 24 Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht 67 at 80Google Scholar; Vogler, T., “Strafprozessuale Wirkungen völkerrechtswidriger Entführungen von Straftatern aus dem Ausland”, in Festschrift für Dietrich Oehler zum 70 Geburtstag, Herzberg, R. D., ed., (Heymanns Berlin, Bonn, München, 1985) 379, at 391Google Scholar (Article 6 ECHR); Wedgwood, R., “The Argument Against International Abduction of Criminal Defendants” (1991) 6 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Policy 537, at 565Google Scholar and subs. For a contrary view see Herdegen, M., “Die völkerrechtswidrige Entführung eines Beschuldigten als Strafverfolgungshindernis”, (1986) 13 Europaische-Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (EuGRZJ) 1 at 3.Google Scholar

7 See also the Bozano case, infra, in and text accompanying n. 55.

8 See decision of the Swiss Federal Court [Bundesgericht] of 15 July 1982, (1983) 10 EuGRZ 435: No extradition from Switzerland to Germany since German authorities lured the prosecuted person, a Belgian national, away from Belgium to Swiss territory.

9 For example, the national extradition law of Brasil allows extradition to be executed only within a certain period of time after the extradition has been granted. A case currently pending before the European Commission of Human Rights will deal with the question of whether extradition to Germany despite the expiration of this time period is a violation of the ECHR.

10 See § 53 para. 3 of the new German law on aliens (Ausländergesetz) 1990 Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt], Part I, at 1954 prohibiting expulsion (i.e., deportation) as long as an extradition-proceeding is pending.

11 From the perspective of the state of origin, of course, the comparison must be different because there is no obligation to extradite under international law in the absence of a treaty. According to national law in many continental systems, extradition is allowed even in the absence of a treaty, Thus, the requested state has a wide discretion to extradite. The state's interest therefore will be the discretionary power (not) to extradite when these requirements are not met.

12 See, e.g., Nadelmann, E. A., “The Role of the United States in International Law Enforcement”, (1988) 31 Harv. Inti L. J. 37, at 74Google Scholar; Kallenbach, C., “Plomo o plata: Irregular Renditions as a Means of Gaining Jurisdiction over Colombian Drug Kingpins” (1990) 23 Int'l L. & Pol. 169, at 178–195.Google Scholar

13 Because of the principle of legality (“Legalitätsprinzip”, i.e., duty to prosecute) it is difficult but not impossible to imagine such examples; see §§ 153 subs, of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, which allow the termination of proceedings.

14 Soering case, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, 161 Series A, Judgments and Decisions; see also the in-depth analysis of Breitenmoser, S. & Wilms, G., “Human Rights v. Extradition”, (1990) 11 Mich. J. Int'l L. 845–886.Google Scholar The United States had requested the extradition of the German citizen Jens Soering from the United Kingdom. Soering was indicted for capital murder punishable by death. The European Court of Human Rights held that the so-called “death row phenomenon” present in the U.S. represented an inhuman and degrading treatment (Art. 3 ECHR). Extradition in this case therefore would be contrary to Art. 3.

15 Para. 85 of the judgment. Under German constitutional law such a right exists: the right not to be extradited contrary to existing law as a result of the rule of law [Gesetzesvorbehalt]. Thus, it may be argued that any abduction violates constitutional guarantees. However, with regard to the Gesetzesvorbehalt, a differentiation has to be drawn between such legal norms that are for the benefit of the individual (i.e., human rights extradition requirements, see infra IIB), and those which are for the benefit of the state only (infra IIA).

16 Some authors' argumente are based on these traditional principles, e.g., R. Wedgwood, supra n. 6, at 543 and subs., who, on the other hand, also mentions the death penalty clause in the U.S.-Mexico Treaty of May 4, 1978. The Federal Swiss Court (supra n. 8) argued that extradition requirements in general are for the benefit of the individual, as well as the requested state. But this case did not involve an abduction by Swiss authorities.

17 See Lagodny, O., “The Abolition and Replacement of the Political Offence Exception: Prohibited by International or Domestic Law?” (1989) 19 Is. Yrbk Human Rights 317, at 318Google Scholar and subs, with further references; Lagodny, O., “Die Rechteteilung des Auszuliefernden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, (1987) 9 Beiträge und Materialien aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht Freiburg, at 46 and subs.Google Scholar; see also M. Herdegen, supra n. 6, at 2.

18 See, on the other hand, the discussion based on arguments of the rule of speciality, e.g., Siegal, C. D., “Individual Rights under Self-Executing Extradition Treaties—Dr. Alvarez-Machain's Case”, (1991) 13 Loyola L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. 765, at 782Google Scholar and subs.; Horan, T. L., “Extradition — International Law — The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holds Government-Sponsored Abduction Abroad is not a Lawful Alternative to Extradition. United States v. Verdugo Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991)” (1991) 21 Geo. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 525, at 529Google Scholar, both referring to United States v. Rauscher, (1886) 119 U. S. 407. See also Schunemann, B., “Materielle Tatverdachteprüfung und völkerrechtswidrige Entfürung als nationalstaatliche Sprengsätze im internationalen Austieferungverkehr”, in (1993) 140 Jahre Goldtammer's Archiv für Strafrecht, Eine Würdigung zum 70Google ScholarGeburtstag von Paul Günter Pötz, J. Wolter (ed.), 57 R. v. Decker's rechts - und Sozialwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, at 234 and subs.

19 See Buschbeck, K., “Verschleierte Ausweisung durch Auslieferung — Bin Beitrag zur Abgrenzung von Auslieferungsrecht und Fremdenrecht”, (1973) 28 Schriften zum Völkerrecht 82–121.Google Scholar

20 Supra n. 14.

21 According to German constitutional law, this deviation should not be necessary, as extradition in the case of possible death penalty would be unconstitutional. After having declared extradition in the face of the imposition of the death penalty permissible in 1964 ([1965] 18 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 112) the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic hesitated to maintain this position in a later decision ([1982] 60 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 348, at 354). For a discussion of views strongly in favour of a constitutional bar to extradition in such cases, see the references of Schomburg and Lagodny in Uhlig, S., Schomburg, W. & Lagodny, O., RG-Kommentar [Annotated Textbook to German Sources of International Cooperation in Criminal Matters], (Munich, 2nd ed., 1992)Google Scholar, § 8 ann. 10–14; § 73 ann. 8–13, 14–45.

22 Opinion of the Advocate-General and the Dutch Supreme Court (the Hoge Raad), the Netherlands v. Short, 30 March 1990, 29 ILM 1375–1389 (1990); see also the Note of Swart, A. H. J., (1991) Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, no. 249.Google Scholar

23 The Oberlandesgericht has to decide on the permissibility of extradition.

24 Decision of the Regional High Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Cologne, 13 February 1990-Ausl. 294/88, reprinted in Eser, A., Lagodny, O. and Wilkitzki, P., eds., “Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, Rechtsprechungssammlung 1949–1992”, (1993) 15 Beiträge und Materialien aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht (Freiburg, 2nd ed.), decision no. U 187.Google Scholar

25 See Swiss Federal Court [Bundesgericht], (1983) 10 EuGRZ 253 at 255.Google Scholar

26 This possibility was left open by the Court in the Soering case, supra n. 14, at n. 113.

27 See in detail Wildhaber, L. and Breitenmoser, S., in Golsong, H., Karl, W., Miehsler, H. et al. , Internationaler Kommentar zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention [Loosleaf, April 1992], Art. 8 annotations 415–456.Google Scholar

28 Of course, deduction of the time of detention spent either in the state of origin or before conviction in the abducting state, would mean some “natural” equivalent; therefore the Brasilien case (supra n. 9) would not be problematic since deduction is mandatory according to § 51 para. 4 German Penal Code.

29 See, in general: Lagodny, O. and Reisner, S., “Extradition Treaties, Human Rights and TEmergency-Brake'-Judgments — A Comparative Survey”, (1992) Finnish Yrbk Int'l L. 237–297.Google Scholar

30 As to the discussion under German law, see Lagodny, supra n. 21, § 73 n. 7 subseq.

31 For a discussion of the “compact theory”, which restricts the applicability of U.S. constitutional rights for acts happening abroad, see U.S. v. Verdugo Urquidez, supra n. 18 [1990] 110 Supreme Court 1056); Abramovsky, A., “Extraterritorial Abductions: America's ‘Catch and Snatch’ Policy Run Amok” (1991) 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 151, at 181 and subs.Google Scholar; H. M. Chrystle, supra n. 6, at 394 subs.; Gentin, J., “Government-Sponsored Abduction of Foreign Criminals Abroad: Reflections on U.S. v. Caro-Quintero and the Inadequacy of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine”, (1991) 40 Emory L. J. 1227, at 1252 subs.Google Scholar; J. L. Gray, supra n. 4, at 191 and subs.; Lowenfeld, F., “U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued”, (1990) 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 444, at 449CrossRefGoogle Scholar subs, and 490 and subs.; Paul, J. R., “The Argument against International Abduction of Criminal Defendants” (1991) 6 Am. U. J. L. & Policy 527, at 532 and subs.Google Scholar

32 There is no doubt that these covenants create substantive rights for the individual within the German legal system. See art. 59, para. 2 of the German Basic Law which requires a law of parliament.

33 This problem is even more evident with national constitutional bars.

34 (1992) 31 I.L.M. 888. See also F. A. Mann, supra n. 6, at 476; Schubarth, M., “Faustrecht statt Auslieferungsrecht”, (1987) 7 Strafverteidiger 173, at 174Google Scholar; Morgenstern, F., (1952) 29 Br. Yrbk. Int'l L. 266, at 279.Google Scholar

35 Herdegen, M., “Völkerrechtliche Restitutionspflichten und ihre Wirkungen im innerstaatlichen Recht”, (1988) 41 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), 593, at 595Google Scholar; T. Vogler, supra n. 6, at 386 and 392. See also Federal High Court (Bundesgerichtshof) (1987) 40 NJW 3087. The approach of Schünemann, supra n. 18, at 235 and subs, differs. He proposes for cases where Germany was the abducting state to apply, for example, the 45-day period of Art 14, para. 1 lit b of the European Convention on Extradition and to set the abductee free for this period in order that he might leave the country. This is not the status quo ante.

36 See Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, (1986) 39 NJW at 1427 and 3021; Federal High Court [Bundesgerichtshof], (1984) 4 NStZ 563; (1987) 40 NJW 3087 (with further references). Benvenisti, E., “Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts’, (1993) 4 Eur. J. Int'l L. 159–183, at 169CrossRefGoogle Scholar and subs, shows that the underlying pattern of such decisions in general are “avoidance doctrines”. Though pointing out mainly different act-of-state doctrines (also with a view to the Machain case) or “ordre public” doctrines in continental law as being meant for avoiding conflicts with the executive and with a foreign state, another type of the “avoiding doctrine” could be to avoid the applicability of national law (see infra n. 46 and accompanying text).

37 Case of Argoud, decision of 4 April 1964 of the Cour de Cassation (1964) 38 Juris Classeur Périodique, Jurisprudence 13806.

38 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment of 29 May 1962, (1968) 36 International Law Reports 277 at 304 and subs. See also the comment of Halberstam, M., “In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain”, (1992) 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 736, at 744CrossRefGoogle Scholar and subs., with regard to the Eichmann case. The reader will notice that I oppose abduction especially in cases of an imminent death penalty, unless the abducting state at least accepts not to carry it out. The legal debate on this issue has changed in Germany since the early sixties (see supra n. 21). Thus, my view of 1992 can neither be transposed to the early sixties nor regarded as any comment on the Eichmann case.

39 See Federal High Court [Bundesgerichtshof (1987) 40 NJW 3087 pointing out that there is no permanent bar to prosecution.

40 Expressly arguing the non-relevance of the breach of international law under U.S. law are Jonas, T. C., “International ‘Fugitive Snatching’ in U.S. Law: Two Viewe From Opposite Ends of the Eighties” (1991) 24 Cornell Int'l L. J. 521, at 645 and subs.Google Scholar and K. J. Henderson, supra n. 4, at 544 and subs., 570; For a contrasting view, see Glennon, M. J., “State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain”, (1992) 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 746 and subs.CrossRefGoogle Scholar pointing out that in his opinion the key question is when and how may the United States violate international law; see also Leigh, M., “Is the President above Customary International Law?” (1992) 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 757CrossRefGoogle Scholar who argues that under certain conditions abductions do not represent a breach of international law; Findlay, D. C., “Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law” (1988) 23 Texas Int'l L. J. 1–53Google Scholar; Fletcher, A. K., “Pirates and Smugglers: An Analysis of the Use of Abductions to Bring Drug Traffickers to Trial” (1991) 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 233–264Google Scholar; C. Kallenbach, supra n. 12, at 213 and subs.; Materin, M. J., “Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritiorial Abduction in Lieu of Extradition” (1992) 41 Duke L. J. 907–932CrossRefGoogle Scholar; T. C. Jonas, loc. cit., at 537 and subs. The following authors are skeptical that the U.S. practice will change: Heyman, P. B. & Gershengom, I. H., in Eser, A. & Lagodny, O., eds., Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law, (1992) 33 Beiträge und Materialien aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht Freiburg im Breisgau, Freiburg, p. 101 at 124.Google Scholar See also the discussions of the workshop session reported ibid. by B. Zagaris, at 229–232. Some American authors, although acknowledging in principle a bar where the state of origin protests abductions, seem to be very reluctant to take seriously the Latin American protests. See, e.g., T. L. Horan, supra n. 18, at 534 and subs.; Jones, W. G., “The Ninth Circuit's Camarerena Decisions: Exceptions or Aberrations of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine?” (1992) 27 Texas Int'l L. J. 242 and subs.Google Scholar; M. J. Matorin, loc cit., at 926 and subs. C. Kallenbach, supra n. 12, at 215 presumes that protests by Colombia are unlikely: “Colombia will be relieved that the United States is removing the whole problem from their hands”.

41 For a solution of this problem between the U.S. and Switzerland, see “Memorandum of Understanding”, (1988) 27 I.L.M. 480.

42 See testimony of Andreas F. Loewenfeld at the Hearing of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommitttee on Civil and Constitutional Rights (22 June 1992), quoted in “U.S. Congress Holds Hearing on Extradition Policy in Aftermath of Alvarez-Machain Decision”, (July 1992) 8 International Enforcement Law Reporter, 274 at 278.

43 See Arts. 1 and 4 of the Dutch Uitleveringswet of 29 September 1988, Statsblad 478.

44 See also Siegal, supra n. 18, at 795 subs., who argues from a concept of sovereignty which includes protection of a country's citizens.

45 The claim would be against the German Government or the Minister of Foreign Affaire as its representative; compare (1981) 55 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 349, at 364/5 (case of Rudolf Hess) concerning the authority to take a decision on diplomatic protection.

46 German courts obviously did not consider whether there would be a “Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch” on the level of national public law if Germany were the abducting state. One possible reason — though not a convincing one in the special case of abduction — is that the “Folgenbeseitigung” may not have results that are illegal in themselves (see: Kopp, F. O., Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (Munich, 8th ed., 1989)Google Scholar, § 113 ann. 41): The principle of legality involving a duty to prosecute (see § 152 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure) may not be invoked, since German prosecutors are not hindered from requesting extradition from the abducting state. The principle of legality becomes moot if the requested state refuses to extradite. Therefore Schünemann, supra n. 18, at 237, is right when arguing from the “Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch”. But the consequence thereof must be to produce the status quo ante, i.e., return of the individual to the state of origin (see supra n. 35).

47 See M. Herdegen, supra n. 35, at 595.

48 See (1981) 55 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 349, at 364/5 (case of Rudolf Hess) with further references to the question of the discretion of the German Government in matters concerning protection of its nationals vis-à-vis foreign states. The court held that there is a broad discretion [“weites Ermessen”] that can only be reviewed for mistakes of discretion [“Ermessenfehler”], i.e., where the discretionary power is not exercised at all, where aspects that are not relevant in the case are considered, or where certain important aspects of the case are discounted.

49 Compare (1957) 6 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, 290, at 295.

50 As to the compact theory under the U.S. Constitution, see supra n. 30.

51 See W. Schomburg and O. Lagodny, supra n. 21, Introduction, arm. 84 and subs.

52 6 November 1990, European Treaties Series No. 140; as of 1 March 1993 ratified only by: Austria, (former) Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway (see Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of European Treaties [Looseleaf], Council of Europe). Condition for entry into force: 10 ratifications.

53 See art. 48 of the ECHR.

54 Thus, the Bozano case is not an abduction case in the narrow sense but rather a case of “disguised” extradition. The underlying individual interests, however, are the same.

55 Judgment of 18 December 1986, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, 111 Series A, Judgments and Decisions, at no. 60 of the judgment.

56 “If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the … Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party”.

57 Nos. 65 subs. of the judgment In my opinion, one of the main reasons behind the Bozano judgment surely was that he was convicted in absentia. Bozano's complaint against Italy was rejected by the Commission since Bozano failed to comply with the six-month period laid down in Article 26. Regarding the alleged Swiss-Italian collaboration, the Commission held that the complaint of Bozano against Italy under Art. 18 was manifestly ill-founded (see no. 39 of the judgment).

58 Emphasis added.

59 Bassiouni, M.C., “Draft Statute International Criminal Tribunal”, (1992) 9 Nouvelles Études Pénales, érès Toulouse (France) 77Google Scholar and subs. See also: Bassiouni, M. C. & Blakesley, C. L., “The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New International World Order”, (1992) 25 Vanderbilt J. Transntl L. 151, at 165Google Scholar and subs. The optional jurisdiction for cases of concurring jurisdiction was not yet included in Art. XIV of Bassiouni, M. C., A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, (Kluwer Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1987) 215 subs. and 222.Google Scholar See also Bassiouni, in this issue at p.

60 Supra n. 1, at 68 and subs.

61 See also the proposal of Bassiouni, supra n. 59, 1992, art. XXXIX, p. 143, which establishes the following list of priorities: territoriality, active personality, passive personality, protective principle, universality principle.

62 See Blakesley, C. and Lagodny, O., “Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction, the Role of Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law”, (1991) 24 Vanderbilt J. Transnat'l L. 1–73, at 68–70.Google Scholar

63 See art. XXXVII and subs. of the proposals of Bassiouni, supra n. 59, at 129 and subs. See also Art. 29 (“Cooperation and judicial assistance”) of the Statute of the International Tribunal [hereinafter “Int'l” Trib. for Former Yugoslavia] for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territories of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (see Annex to the Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution (S/25704), page 47, and “U.N. Secretary General Issues Draft War Crimes Tribunal Statute”, [1993] 9 International Enforcement Law Reporter, at 172–177) provides: “[…] 2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to […] (e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal”. The crucial question how to deal with a State that does not comply with such a request or order is at least not expressingly ruled. Art. 18 of the Statute (“Investigation and preparation of indictment”) obviously is not meant to give direct arrest power to the prosecutor (Art. 16 of the Statute) as “[…] the prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned […]” (emphasis added).

64 See M. Kremnitzer, “The World Community as an International Legislator in Competition with National Legislators”, in A. Eser and O. Lagodny, eds., supra n. 24, at 337, 345; Dinstein, Y., “International Criminal Law”, (1985) 20 Is. L. R. 206, 236Google Scholar and subs. (superior orders), 239 (obedience to national law).

65 See Bassiouni, 1992, supra n. 59, Chapter 5, articles XXII and subs. (p. 88 and subs.); art. XXI which does not mention the death penalty. On the other hand, it is not clear according to art. XX para. 4 whether the application of the penalties of the law of the transferring state where the death penalty is part of that law, is applicable in accordance with the general rule in art. XIX. Besides, the Second Additional Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would bar even the creating of such an international or supranational law. See Art. 24 of the Statute of the “Int'l Trib. for Former Yugoslavia” (supra n. 63) which definitely excludes the death penalty, and Art. 19 and subs, with view to fair trial provisions.