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Hegel’s Concept of Empfindung and the Debate on State vs. Content Nonconceptualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 August 2017

Federico Sanguinetti
Federico Sanguinetti*
Affiliation:
Rio de Janeiro State University, Brazil Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazilsanfede@hotmail.it
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Abstract

In this paper, I suggest that Hegel’s concept of sensation (Empfindung) can be fruitfully read against the background of the recent distinction between state vs. content nonconceptualism. I) I provide a brief outline of the distinctions that characterize the debate between state and content nonconceptualism. II) I discuss Hegel’s concept of sensation, arguing that Hegel’s concept of sensation is compatible with a certain version of content conceptualism that is combined with a ‘weak’ state nonconceptualism for adult, rational subjects and with a ‘strong’ state nonconceptualism for non-rational animals and infants. III) I conclude my paper by illustrating some features of Hegel’s conception of mental content starting from distinctions that characterize the debate on state vs. content nonconceptualism.

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Articles
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Hegel Bulletin , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , August 2020 , pp. 294 - 320
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2017

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