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Are liberal perfectionism and neutrality mutually exclusive?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Eldar Sarajlic
Eldar Sarajlic*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
*
*Email: eldar.sarajlic@gmail.com
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Abstract

In this paper, I question the view that liberal perfectionism and neutrality are mutually exclusive doctrines. I do so by criticizing two claims made by Jonathan Quong. First, I object to his claim that comprehensive anti-perfectionism is incoherent. Second, I criticize his claim that liberal perfectionism cannot avoid a paternalist stance. I argue that Quong’s substantive assumptions about personal autonomy undermine both of his arguments. I use the discussion of Quong to argue that the standard assumption in liberal theory about mutual exclusivity of liberal perfectionism and neutrality needs to be reconsidered, and I show why the argument about the convergence of perfectionism and neutrality makes conceptual sense.

Keywords

perfectionismneutralityautonomyliberalismQuongconvergence
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , August 2015 , pp. 515 - 537
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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Footnotes

1

Alumnus, graduated in 2014.

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