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The neural underpinnings of self and other and layer 2 of the shared circuits model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2008

Linda Furey  and
Julian Paul Keenan
Linda Furey
Affiliation:
Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, NJ 07043. fureyl1@mail.montclair.eduKeenanj@mail.montclair.eduhttp://www.cogneurolab.com
Julian Paul Keenan
Affiliation:
Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, NJ 07043. fureyl1@mail.montclair.eduKeenanj@mail.montclair.eduhttp://www.cogneurolab.com
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Abstract

Differentiating self from other has been investigated at the neural level, and its incorporation into the model proposed Hurley is necessary for the model to be complete. With an emphasis on the feed-forward model in layer 2, we examine the role that self and other disruptions, including auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), may have in expanding the model proposed by Hurley.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , February 2008 , pp. 25 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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