1 Amended without objection on June 6, 1994, as noted in the Court’s order, 1994 ICJ Rep. 105, of June 16. The basic documents, decisions, pleadings, hearing transcripts, press releases, and other materials of the Court are available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.

2 See also the Court’s order, 1996 ICJ Rep. 13, of March 15, 1996, by which it indicated certain provisional measures.

3 See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), Preliminary Objections, 1998 ICJ Rep. 275 (June 11) [hereinafter Preliminary objections judgment], and my case report at 92 AJIL 751 (1998). The Court subsequently rejected, 1999 ICJ Rep. 31 (Mar. 25), Nigeria’s request for interpretation of this judgment.

4 See the Court’s orders at 1999 ICJ Rep. 983 (June 30) & 1029 (Oct. 21).

5 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.; Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, para. 325 (Int’l Ct. Justice Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Judgment].

6 Id., paras. 48–49.

7 Id., paras. 50–55.

8 Id., paras. 55, 325 (I) (A) (dissenting on this point: Judge Koroma and Judge ad hoc Ajibola). Based on its examination of the governing instruments, the Court reached the same conclusions as the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) regarding the precise location of the longitudinal coordinate of the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint in Lake Chad, from where the boundary starts, although the Court also found that the LCBC had no authority to engage in interpretation on its own. Regarding the question of the mouth of the Ebeji River—to which the boundary followed a straight line—the Court explained that its task in the present case was to ascertain the parties’ 1931 intention as to the meaning of the expression “mouth,” and not to determine the river’s “main channel” as in the Kasikili/Sedudu Islandcase between Botswana and Namibia. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), 1999 ICJ Rep. 1045, paras. 30–40 (Dec. 13). The Ebeji no longer has a single mouth, however, through which it discharges its waters into Lake Chad. Instead, it divides into two channels as it approaches the lake. Faced with this problem, the Court fixed the geographical coordinates for the mouth of the Ebeji as it was in 1931, based on the coordinates that were identified both in the governing maps and by the LCBC. The Court found that the 1931 mouth was, with respect to those coordinates, north of the “mouth” suggested by Cameroon and Nigeria (based, respectively, on the river’s current western and eastern channels). See Judgment, supra note 5, paras. 56–61.

9 In support of its claim, Nigeria pointed to the Nigerian nationality of the inhabitants of the disputed villages, the exercise of authority by the traditional chiefs, the long settlement of Nigerian nationals in the area, and Nigeria’s peaceful administration of the villages, in which Cameroon was said to have acquiesced. Judgment, supra note 5, para. 62.

10 Fisheries (UK v. Nor.), 1951 ICJ Rep. 116 (Dec. 18).

11 Judgment, supra note 5, para. 65 (citing Fisheries, 1951 ICJ Rep. at 130).

12 Id, para. 68 (citing Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554, para. 63 (Dec. 22)). The term “effectivités” is used to refer generally to acts demonstrating the effective exercise of authority over an area.

13 Id., paras. 68–70.

14 See supra text accompanying note 6.

15 Judgment, supra note 5, paras. 72–75.

16 Id., para. 78.

17 Id., paras. 82–85.

18 Statement to the Press by President Guillaume (Oct. 10, 2002). For the discussion of all seventeen sectors, see Judgment, supra note 5, paras. 86–192.

19 Judgment, supra note 5, paras. 193–94, 200, 202.

20 Id., paras. 203–09.

21 Id., paras. 193–99, 201. Nigeria sought to sever from the 1913 Agreement the provisions concerning the Bakassi Peninsula, which Cameroon argued was not possible under the law of treaties. The dissenting judges (Judges Koroma and Rezek, and Judge ad hoc Ajibola) fundamentally disagreed with the majority’s treatment of the 1884 Treaty.

22 Id., paras. 212–16.

23 Id., para. 217. The Court found it unnecessary either to address the parties’ arguments regarding the severability of treaty provisions (whether generally or as regards boundaries) or to pronounce upon the parties’ uti possidetis arguments.

24 Id., para. 218.

25 Id., para. 220.

26 Id., para. 223 (citing Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554, para. 63 (Dec. 22)).

27 Id., para. 224.

28 Id., paras. 225, 325 (III)(A), (B).

29 See Preliminary objections judgment, supra note 3, paras. 116–17. The vote rejecting the eighth objection was 12–5.

30 Judgment, supra note 5, para. 238.

31 Id., para. 261.

32 Id., paras. 265–68. Invoking the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969 Google Scholar, Arts. 7, 46, 1155 UNTS 331, Nigeria argued that the Maroua Declaration was never properly ratified by Nigeria after being signed by its head of state—a shortcoming that should have been objectively evident to Cameroon. Judgment, supra note 5, paras. 258–59.

33 Judgment, supra note 5, paras. 268, 325 (111) (C).

34 Opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (1983)Google Scholar. Cameroon and Nigeria have both ratified the Convention.

35 Id., paras. 285–88.

36 Id., para. 290. In its previous law of the sea ruling, the Court defined the equidistant line as “the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.” Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), para. 177 (Int’l Ct. Justice Mar. 16, 2001).

37 Judgment, supra note 5, paras. 291–92.

38 Id., para. 293 (citing Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 ICJ Rep. 13, para. 63 (June 3)).

39 Id., paras. 270–75.

40 Id., para. 284.

41 Id., para. 297.

42 Id., para. 299.

43 Id., para. 301.

44 Id., paras. 307, 325 (IV) (C), (D).

45 Id., paras. 310–11.

46 Id., para. 313 (citing Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 ICJ Rep. 6, 37 (June 15); Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 ICJ Rep. 6 (Feb. 3)).

47 Id., paras. 314–15, 325 (V) (A), (B).

48 Id., paras. 318–19.

49 Id., para. 322. Oddly, the Judgment contains no operative subparagraph on either this claim or the claim for guarantees of nonrepetition. Contrast this absence with the operative paragraph in LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.) (Int’l Ct. Justice June 27, 2001), para. 128 (5), (6).

50 See Judgment, supra note 5, 323–24, para. 325 (V) (D), (E). Remarkably, the Court takes only a single sentence to dispose of the counterclaims in the case. See id., para. 324.

51 For a summary and review of each of these proceedings, see Pieter H. F., Bekker, World Court Decisions at the Turn of the Millennium (1997–2001), at 103, 137, 185, 189 (2002)Google Scholar.

52 See 1999 ICJ Rep. 31 (Mar. 25).

53 See id.

54 Judgment, supra note 5, para. 215. In the Court’s view, Cameroon’s granting of hydrocarbon licenses over the Bakassi Peninsula and its waters also evidenced that it had not abandoned its title. Id., para. 223.

55 Id., para. 304. See paragraphs 282–83 for the parties’ arguments on oil practice.

56 Id., para. 221.

57 “Nigeria’s Reaction to the Judgement of the International Court of Justice at The Hague (Nigeria, Cameroon with Equatorial Guinea Intervening)” (Nov. 7, 2002), at <http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/110802_1.shtml>. Through this statement, Nigeria ignored both the ICJ Statute, to which it is a long-standing party, and the system of compulsory jurisdiction that it has accepted since 1965. Pursuant to Article 20, ICJ judges undertake to exercise their powers impartially and conscientiously. The same applies to judges ad hoc. According to Article 31, even if a judge has the nationality of a party in a case, he or she retains the right to sit in the case.

58 Id.

59 The parties’ heads of state apparently also met in the presence of the UN Secretary-General regarding the case on September 5, 2002, exactly five weeks prior to the delivery of the Judgment. Remarkably, this meeting is not referred to in the Judgment itself, but only in President Guillaume’s Statement to the Press on the day that the Judgment was delivered. (The opening paragraph of judge Ranjeva’s separate opinion does refer to the meeting.) This situation differs markedly from the approach followed by the Court’s chamber in the 1986 Frontier Dispute case. In addition to noting with satisfaction that the heads of state of Burkina Faso and Mali had agreed in a communiqué “to withdraw all their armed forces from either side of the disputed area and to effect their return to their respective territories,” the chamber stated that it was “happy to record the adherence of both Parties to the international judicial process and to the peaceful settlement of disputes.” Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554, para. 178 (Dec. 22). As Nigeria’s post-judgment remarks make clear, it would have been helpful if the Court had included at least the latter statement in its Judgment.

60 Judgment, supra note 5, para. 316.

61 Id., paras. 317, 325 (V)(C).