Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- 36 Heuristics and Biases in the Criminology of Compliance
- 37 Prospect Theory and Tax Compliance
- 38 Nudging Compliance
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
38 - Nudging Compliance
from Part VI - Compliance and Cognition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- 36 Heuristics and Biases in the Criminology of Compliance
- 37 Prospect Theory and Tax Compliance
- 38 Nudging Compliance
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
Summary
Abstract: In recent decades, a new approach to regulations and compliance was developed to complement the traditional instruments, such as command-and-control and economic instruments. This approach is termed ‘nudging’ or ‘choice architecture’ as it proposes to design the environment in which individuals make choices, in order to promote welfare enhancing behaviour. By utilising insights from behavioural sciences, nudges direct people’s behaviour without limiting their choices. In this chapter, we explain the concept of ‘choice architecture’ and review specific ‘compliance nudges’ in both the public and the private spheres. These include – amongst others – nudges that promote tax compliance, guideline-compliant drugs prescribing, and timely loan and fee repayments. The reviewed nudges include salience nudges, which emphasise certain aspects of a choice to make people focus on it; moral suasion nudges, which make more visible the moral consequences of people’s decisions; and descriptive or injunctive social norms nudges, informing people what others are doing or believe should be done. Furthermore, we discuss the empirical literature demonstrating the effectiveness (or lack of it) of compliance nudges. Whilst it is not easy to compare the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these nudges across different fields of application, some conclusions are reached regarding the effectiveness of compliance nudges in general. Finally, we point out the limitations of nudging compliance, compared to the traditional tools, and present some thoughts on possible future developments. The area of nudging compliance has the potential to develop rapidly as technological advancements make compliance monitoring, and automated nudging, possible. Whilst nudging is a promising way forward in compliance, ethical questions remain about the proper extent of its use, and further research is required into the long-term effectiveness of this technique.
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- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 551 - 568Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
References
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