Book contents
- Aristotle’s On the Soul
- Cambridge Critical Guides
- Aristotle’s On the Soul
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Hylomorphic Explanation and the Scientific Status of the De Anima
- Chapter 2 Aristotle on Earlier Definitions of Soul and Their Explanatory Power: DA I.2–5
- Chapter 3 Why Nous Cannot Be a Magnitude: De Anima I.3
- Chapter 4 Souls among Forms: Harmonies and Aristotle’s Hylomorphism
- Chapter 5 Aristotle on the Soul’s Unity
- Chapter 6 Aristotle on Seed
- Chapter 7 The Gate to Reality
- Chapter 8 Aristotle on the Objects of Perception
- Chapter 9 Perceptual Attention and Reflective Awareness in the Aristotelian Tradition
- Chapter 10 Phantasia and Error
- Chapter 11 Intelligibility, Insight, and Intelligence
- Chapter 12 The Separability of Nous
- Chapter 13 Thought and Imagination
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Critical Guides
Chapter 12 - The Separability of Nous
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2022
- Aristotle’s On the Soul
- Cambridge Critical Guides
- Aristotle’s On the Soul
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Hylomorphic Explanation and the Scientific Status of the De Anima
- Chapter 2 Aristotle on Earlier Definitions of Soul and Their Explanatory Power: DA I.2–5
- Chapter 3 Why Nous Cannot Be a Magnitude: De Anima I.3
- Chapter 4 Souls among Forms: Harmonies and Aristotle’s Hylomorphism
- Chapter 5 Aristotle on the Soul’s Unity
- Chapter 6 Aristotle on Seed
- Chapter 7 The Gate to Reality
- Chapter 8 Aristotle on the Objects of Perception
- Chapter 9 Perceptual Attention and Reflective Awareness in the Aristotelian Tradition
- Chapter 10 Phantasia and Error
- Chapter 11 Intelligibility, Insight, and Intelligence
- Chapter 12 The Separability of Nous
- Chapter 13 Thought and Imagination
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Critical Guides
Summary
In DA I.1, Aristotle asks whether nous (understanding or reason) is chōristē (separable) and presents a separability condition: the soul is separable if it has some activity proper to it that is not shared with the body. I argue that Aristotle is speaking here of separability in being, not separability in account or taxonomical separation. In the case of the soul, this sort of separability would allow the soul to exist apart from the body. Met. Λ.3, GA II.3, and DA III.4 suggest that Aristotle introduces the separability condition because understanding meets it. Reason is independent of the body in a way that no other power of the soul is. Nous alone is divine and separable. DA III.5 then situates this claim: there is an aspect of understanding that can only be active in connection with the body, but understanding is what it is and continues to be active apart from the body. This raises further questions about the life and ontological status of the sort of separated human nous Aristotle envisages. While figuring out its precise contours is difficult, Aristotle is, in fact, committed to the possibility of human intellectual activity continuing apart from the body.
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- Aristotle's On the SoulA Critical Guide, pp. 229 - 246Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
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