Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-9pm4c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-27T16:13:06.686Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Suárez, Francisco (1548–1617)

from ENTRIES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2016

Tad M. Schmaltz
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Lawrence Nolan
Affiliation:
California State University, Long Beach
Get access

Summary

Suárez was perhaps the greatest of the early modern Scholastics. This Spanish intellectual entered the Society of Jesus in 1564 and thereafter studied theology at the University of Salamanca. He taught philosophy and theology at various Jesuit colleges, including the Collegio Romano and the Colegio das Artes at Coimbra. In addition to several commentaries on the texts of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, Suárez wrote perhaps the best late Scholastic treatment of metaphysics, his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597). In this text, he treated the views of Thomas with great respect, reflecting the fact that the Jesuits were enjoined to follow the teachings of this Catholic saint. Nonetheless, in his text Suárez also sided on points of detail with the anti-Thomistic views of John Duns Scotus, and he was not afraid at times to stake out his own distinctive position on the metaphysical issues under consideration.

Despite the importance of Suárez for Scholastic thought, there is no evidence that Descartes knew of him or his work before 1640. During this time Descartes’ knowledge of Scholasticism derived mainly from the Scholastic textbooks he had studied as a student at La Flèche, which did not include Suárez's metaphysical treatise. Descartes’ first reference to Suárez is in his response to Antoine Arnauld's objections to the Meditations. In particular, Descartes attempted to defend the cogency of his view that claims that certain ideas can be “materially false” by appealing to Suárez's own use of the notion of material falsity in his Disputationes. But though Suárez does anticipate there Descartes’ view that there can be a kind of falsity that does not involve judgment, he does not conclude, as Descartes does in the Third Meditation, that certain sensory ideas are so obscure that we cannot determine whether they are materially false in the sense that they “represent what is not a thing as if it is a thing” (AT VII 44, CSM II 30) (see Wells 1984).

There is in fact a more substantive connection to Suárez in Descartes’ theory of distinctions (see distinction [real, modal, and rational]). Descartes was initially prompted to consider the Scholastic theory of distinctions in responding to Caterus's objections to the Meditations.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Carraud, Vincent. 2002. Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause de Suarez à Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
Cronin, Timothy. 1961. “Eternal Truths in the Thought of Suárez and Descartes (second part),” Modern Schoolman 39: 23–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cronin, Timothy. 1960. “Eternal Truths in the Thought of Suárez and Descartes (first part),” Modern Schoolman 38: 269–88.Google Scholar
Marion, Jean-Luc. 1991. Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, 2nd ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
Menn, Stephen. 1997. “Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes,” in Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery, ed. White, K.. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 226–56.Google Scholar
Schmaltz, Tad M. 2008. Descartes on Causation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Suárez, Francisco. 1967. Disputationes Memaphysicae, 2 vols. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (originally published 1866).Google Scholar
Wells, Norman. 1984. “Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld and Suárez,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22: 25–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×