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We analyze the effect of green patents on G7 stock market returns. First, we build a small IS-LM model to identify the relevant channels, augmented with open-economy channels and the Green Tobin’s q (Faria et al., 2022). The model highlights that the intertemporal impacts of greening on stock returns are ambiguous. We then turn to an estimated global vector autoregressive model to more rigorously analyze the effect of monetary and green patenting shocks across the G7. Both shocks influence green patents through real and financial markets. As regards green patent shocks, results suggest that a tension exists over time between promoting pollution reduction and energy efficiency and the profitability of (green and brown) companies in the aggregate. We perform a variety of robustness exercises around our main results. Our results provide something of a challenge to the literature and call for more research effort to understand the various channels that might explain this dynamic—and in turn whether any particular policy recommendations follow.
Iberian colonies produced the vast majority of world precious metals in the Early Modern period, which increased liquidity in the Iberian Peninsula. The chapter focuses on the relationship between liquidity and financial development – including other relevant variables such as instruments and institutions – to examine the efficiency of the financial systems in Castile and Portugal. Public credit, debt management and the cost of public debt service are considered, as well as private debt, the diversity of financial instruments and the cost of capital. Finally, the authors compile their perspective on the main similarities and differences in the development of the financial systems of Castile and Portugal.
We provide new evidence about US monetary policy using a model that: (i) estimates time-varying monetary policy weights without relying on stylized theoretical assumptions; (ii) allows for endogenous breakdowns in the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and output; and (iii) generates a unique measure of monetary policy activism that accounts for economic instability. The joint incorporation of endogenous time-varying uncertainty about the monetary policy parameters and the stability of the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and output materially reduces the probability of determinate monetary policy. The average probability of determinacy over the period post-1982 to 1997 is below 60% (hence well below seminal estimates of determinacy probabilities that are close to unity). Post-1990, the average probability of determinacy is 75%, falling to approximately 60% when we allow for typical levels of trend inflation.
This chapter examines areas of knowledge where the Romans displayed expertise and consciously sought to develop techniques and systems that enabled them to better understand and control future uncertainties. It begins by looking at architecture, military logistics and law, before moving on to aspects of financial management, such as maritime loans, interest rates and annuities; it then finishes by looking at the probabilistic thinking involved in the religious practices of oracle and dream interpretation. It argues that the ancients did not rely solely on religion to deal with uncertainty. The Romans thought systematically and creatively about many areas where future uncertainty could be assessed and managed. These approaches were not statistical but all show an awareness of a range of likelihoods and possibilities. The Romans did not have statistical models, nor had they worked out how to calculate probabilities, but they did develop a range of sophisticated ways of dealing with the many unknowns they faced.
Modern risk studies have viewed the inhabitants of the ancient world as being both dominated by fate and exposed to fewer risks, but this very readable and groundbreaking new book challenges these views. It shows that the Romans inhabited a world full of danger and also that they not only understood uncertainty but employed a variety of ways to help to affect future outcomes. The first section focuses on the range of cultural attitudes and traditional practices that served to help control risk, particularly among the non-elite population. The book also examines the increasingly sophisticated areas of expertise, such as the law, logistics and maritime loans, which served to limit uncertainty in a systematic manner. Religious expertise in the form of dream interpretation and oracles also developed new ways of dealing with the future and the implicit biases of these sources can reveal much about ancient attitudes to risk.
Summary: Amidst high default rates, how did moneylenders recover unpaid loans? They had two options. One was to recover loans informally through private negotiations with borrowers. The other was to execute written contracts and revert to courts to enforce these contracts. This chapter analyses the history of courts as well as land laws, contract laws and credit surveys to examine the costs incurred by lenders to enforce different types of contracts in the unregulated market. Judicial proceedings were expensive in colonial India and often exceeded the size of loans. The chapter records a loan upgrading process in which lenders attached different types of contracts depending on the stage of default and reimbursed the costs of enforcing these contracts by charging higher interest rates. For small loans in high-risk areas, enforcement was through private negotiations and conditions harsh. These findings suggest an inverse relationship between transaction costs and equity in credit markets.
This paper weighs possible medium-term responsible policy choices to the extraordinary expansion of government spending in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. The paper is divided into two parts. In part 1 of the paper, we look at conventional debt sustainability and question whether conventional rules created during a period of high interest rates and high inflation remain relevant. Current and future conditions support a case for government debt/GDP to remain elevated compared to history, conditional upon limited state interference in the economy to allow appropriate allocation of capital and resources. In part 2, we consider the historical experience of the United Kingdom. History shows the country had several examples of rapid, large-scale expansion of government debt relative to the size of the economy. On each occasion, the elevated level of debt-to-GDP was later reduced by a combination of relatively benign factors, including commitment to low inflation and sound monetary system. This supported the financial probity of the UK government and allowed it to continue to borrow unimpeded.
A financial system channels funds from net savers to net spenders. But it does more than that, for the pie need not be fixed in size. Through its power of credit creation, the financial system can fuel economic expansion. The process is prone to fragility, however, and overshoot can end in crisis. A financial system encompasses financial intermediaries, which issue claims against themselves in order to provide funds to users (e.g., banks creating deposit accounts to make loans), and financial markets, which facilitate the direct exchange of claims between suppliers and users of funds (e.g., stocks and bonds). A diversity of channels for financing undertakings allows for the management and dispersion of risk. Interest rates and asset prices are determined in financial markets, with movement in the opposite direction of one another. Variation among the economies of Emerging East Asia is nowhere more stark than in the realm of finance. Hong Kong is home to the highest ratio of financial assets to GDP in the world while in the least developed economies of the region banking systems are rudimentary and capital markets little more than an idea.
Chapter 5 extends our framework to credit markets, which are not usually analyzed by scholars of the welfare state, yet fulfill many of the same income-smoothing functions. Much like in private insurance markets, more and better information allows for better risk classification, which enables lenders to tie interest rates more directly to default risk. This results in inequality because individuals with a higher risk of default are almost always lower income, and more information either raise their interest rates or cut them off from credit markets altogether. The welfare state matters, too, because generous social protection lowers default risk – something lenders take into account. Based on a data set containing the 39 million single-family loans that Freddie Mac purchased or guaranteed in the past two decades, we show that the interest rate spread markedly increased over time and we test, using a regression discontinuity design, whether information could have plausibly caused this increase. We also test whether social protection influences access to credit for different income groups and find that it does.
Over the past two generations a fundamental change has taken place in the scholarly understanding of the commercial world of late imperial China. Lasting from the Song (960–1279) to the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), this millennium of Chinese history had long been judged a period of decline, its initial economic breakthroughs never fulfilling their promise. The commercial and technological innovations of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were thought to have given way to economic stagnation and cultural conservatism, as the enterprising peasantry and merchants of south China lost out to the prerogatives of Confucian scholar-officials and their state-sponsored culture in the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties. Tested by a highly competitive examination regime and thereafter sheltered by a host of privileges, these scholar-officials acquired and retained an unrivalled hegemony that was cultural, political, and, some would add, economic. When China suffered a severe economic downturn during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the once-admired stability of the Qing regime was criticized for its backwardness, and the late imperial economy of these scholar-officials’ rule was condemned for its stagnation.
Increased credit availability facilitates land acquisition, but higher land values also hinder it. We investigate the impact of credit availability on land values, after regulatory changes in the lending system. We build an index of increased credit availability using Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation data. County-level panel fixed effects estimations are performed controlling for land value determinants, credit availability, and county-level macroeconomic factors. We find that estimating the effects of credit availability separately masks its total effect. Results show a 0.1 change in the index for increased credit availability is associated with 1.64–1.96% increase in land values.
Monetarism was at the core of the ideological and policy wars of the 1980s, and of the strategy of the Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher. The UK had the highest rate of inflation in the industrialized world. By the 1970s, inflation was tearing the British social fabric apart: especially in its interactions with a government-imposed prices and wages policy. The British policy-making community could not agree whether money should be an overall objective of policy, or simply a target for an indicator that might be a temporary expression of how far the objective was being met, or an instrument for the conduct of policy in pursuit of the target. The Bank was initially quite sceptical about monetary targeting and hostile to monetarism. It believed that proposals for monetary base control ignored the structure of the British banking system, the knowledge of whose complexities and intricacies formed the core of the Bank of England’s professional competence. The keystone of the UK government’s approach was to target a range for £M3 growth as part of a Medium Term Financial Strategy. Meanwhile the Bank felt that it was shut out of policy formulation.
In practice, the early 1980s UK policy involved sporadically – but surprisingly often – responding to exchange rate movements, even when the exchange rate was specifically not designated as either a policy goal or an instrument, as well as raising interest rates as a way to cool down inflation but also economic growth. The 1981 budget, the most controversial of the Thatcher years, was accompanied by the attempt to take the pressure off manufacturing industry by lowering interest rates. The Bank responded to a surge in broad monetary aggregates by overfunding, that is, selling more than the amount of long-term debt (mainly gilts and National Savings instruments) required to finance the government. In 1983, a new Governor, Robin Leigh-Pemberton, who seemed more aligned with Thatcher’s view, came to the Bank of England, replacing Gordon Richardson, whose relationship with the Prime Minister had been strained. In the same year, a new Chancellor the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, began a slow move away from monetarism and the application of monetary targets. The exchange rate came to play an increasing role in policy.
Based on a behavioral stock-flow housing market model in which the expectation formation behavior of boundedly rational and heterogeneous investors may generate endogenous boom-bust cycles, we explore whether central banks can stabilize housing markets via the interest rate. Using a mix of analytical and numerical tools, we find that the ability of central banks to tame housing markets by increasing the base (target) interest rate, thereby softening the demand pressure on house prices, is rather limited. However, central banks can greatly improve the stability of housing markets by dynamically adjusting the interest rate with respect to mispricing in the housing market.
In this paper we show that Portugal benefitted from comparatively low-interest rates from the 13th century onwards, well before the generalised drop in interest rates in Europe. Contrary to the thesis that frontier economies struggle with high-interest rates and scarcity of capital, we find that the country's low and stable interest rates can be explained by its wide availability of land, combined with monetary stability and a favourable institutional network. These conclusions are built upon an entirely new dataset of interest rates and returns on capital for Portugal in the period 1230–1500.
The application of exchange rate target zones modeling to interest rates allows interpreting the puzzles that emerged with the public debt euro area crisis, namely the nonlinear behavior of the interest rates and the fact that some stand-alone countries, not belonging to the euro area, have not been subject to speculative attacks in spite of equally large public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios. As a matter of fact, this model shows that in the case of a noncredible upper threshold for the interest rate (that may be due to both the lack of room for increasing further the required government primary surplus and/or the absence of a monetary authority acting as a lender of last resort), the resulting public debt unsustainability determines an interest rate nonlinearity and makes the crisis possible for public debt levels that would be stable in the presence of a credible interest rate target.
Over the last 20 years, the extent of defined benefit provision has declined substantially in the United Kingdom. Whilst most of the focus has been on deficits relating to past benefit accrual, the increasing cost of future benefit accrual is also important. There are two reasons for this. First, the change in the cost of defined benefit accrual represents the difference in the earnings for employees with membership of a defined benefit scheme and those with membership of a defined contribution scheme. Second, the current cost of defined benefit accrual gives an indication of the cost of an adequate pension. As such, it can be compared with levels of contribution to defined contribution schemes to determine whether these are adequate. I therefore look at how the cost of pensions has changed relative to the cost of non-pensions earnings. I also look at the main components of the change in pensions cost – those relating to benefits payable, discount rates and longevity – to analyse their relative importance. I find that the cost of employing a member of defined benefit pension scheme has consistently outpaced the cost of employing someone in a defined contribution arrangement. I also find that the current cost of accrual is significantly higher than the average level of payments to defined contribution schemes.
This is the third and last subpart of a long paper in which we consider stochastic interpolation for the Wilkie asset model, considering both Brownian bridges and Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) bridges. In Part 3A, we developed certain properties for both these types of stochastic bridge, and in Part 3B we investigated retail prices and wages. In this paper, we investigate the remainder of many of our data series, relating to shares and interest rates. We conclude that, regardless of the form of the annual model, the monthly data within each year can be modelled by Brownian bridges, usually on the logarithm of the principal variable. But in no case is a simple Brownian bridge enough, and all series have their own peculiarities. Overall, however, our modelling produces simulations that are realistic in comparison with the known data. Many of our findings would apply to any similar model used for simulation over time. Our results have considerable importance for financial economics. We reconcile the conflict between the long-term mean-reverting modelling of Schiller and the short-term random walk modelling of Fama. This conclusion therefore has very wide significance.
The agricultural sector has operated in a period of high real interest rates for over half a decade. Some are concerned that this has limited capital availability and stagnated the historic capital for labor substitution occurring in the sector. This study proposes new procedures for estimating the aggregate production function of United States agriculture. Improvements include incorporation of total returns and revised measures of both durable and nondurable capital inputs. Results indicate increasing capital productivity has occurred, but encouraging further capital substitution may not benefit agricultural producers.
Periodically, events occur in the domestic and global economies that remind agricultural economists that macroeconomics matter. This was evident in the early 1980s when the Federal Reserve responded to double-digit inflation by driving interest rates to post-World War II period highs. The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, rising oil prices this past decade, and current stress in domestic and overseas financial markets serve to remind us again that externalities can have an effect on the economic performance and financial strength of U.S. agriculture. These effects are transmitted through interest rates, inflation, unemployment, real gross domestic product, and exchange rates.