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Effective Altruism and Systemic Change
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 June 2019
Abstract
One of the main objections against effective altruism (EA) is the so-called institutional critique, according to which the EA movement neglects interventions that affect large-scale institutions. Alexander Dietz has recently put forward an interesting version of this critique, based on a theoretical problem affecting act-utilitarianism, which he deems as potentially conclusive against effective altruism. In this article I argue that his critique is not as promising as it seems. I then go on to propose another version of the institutional critique. In contrast to Dietz's version, it targets not the core principles of effective altruism but rather some important methodological assumptions made in EA research, namely diminishing marginal returns and low-hanging fruits. One key conclusion is that it may be time for critics of effective altruism to shift their attention from the theoretical core principles of effective altruism towards the methodological tools actually employed in practice by the EA movement.
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References
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6 Another important consideration to bear in mind is that these initial institutional critiques date back to a few years ago. Given the rapid intellectual evolution of the EA movement, they might aim at an obsolete version of effective altruism.
7 For example, Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE), the main EA-aligned evaluator in animal advocacy, currently recommends ‘Legal and Legislative Work’ as high-priority cause area. See <https://animalcharityevaluators.org/advocacy-interventions/prioritizing-causes/causes-we-consider>.
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23 This stands in sharp contrast to Dietz's coordination game, where efforts to communicate are apparently not considered as actions in the same way that A and B are.
24 In addition to frequent online activity, for example on social media or on the EA Forum (<https://forum.effectivealtruism.org>), real-life events like the EA Global conference are good opportunities for cooperation and sharing of ideas.
25 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, p. 10.
26 In this article I consider ‘systemic change’ and ‘institutional change’ as interchangeable.
27 The critique that I am going to develop here could be made in a formal way, by using a mathematical framework of cost-benefit analysis of interventions. While this would have the advantage of being systematic and providing well-defined necessary and sufficient conditions for the problems I am going to discuss, it would exceed the scope of this article. Here I will simply offer an intuitive grasp of an idea that may be promising to investigate further.
28 Apart from the last one, these are all examples of interventions that GiveWell, the main EA-aligned evaluator working on global poverty, recommends at the present time.
29 To define precisely what is meant by ‘large’ would unfortunately take me too far. Roughly speaking, it is to be understood as large enough to trigger systemic change.
30 Interventions that have a high probability of failing are at the core of OpenPhilanthropy's hits-based conception of philanthropy (see <https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/hits-based-giving>). Funding Clinton's campaign is an example of intervention that was likely to fail (if Clinton loses the election), but not obviously an example of systemic intervention in my sense, as I have shown in the previous section.
31 Of course, it is not clear what is meant by ‘significant’, but the assumption is usually thought to apply to most prominent cause areas at this time, in particular global poverty.
32 Robert Wiblin, ‘How to Compare Different Global Problems in Terms of Impact – 80,000 Hours’, 80,000 Hours, <https://80000hours.org/articles/problem-framework/> (2017).
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39 See for example Emily Clough, ‘Effective Altruism's Political Blind Spot’, Boston Review, <https://bostonreview.net/world/emily-clough-effective-altruism-ngos> (14 July 2015).
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43 For example, corporate campaigns for cage-free eggs have been strongly supported by EA organizations like OpenPhilanthropy or ACE. The interpretation proposed here presupposes that the abolitionist strategy may naturally be associated with (radical) systemic change, and (neo)-welfarist strategies with non-systemic, or less systemic, change. While there is some reason to do so (abolitionism does purport to change the property status of animals, which is a radical cultural and legal change), it should be pointed out that it is debatable to categorize abolitionist and (neo)-welfarist strategies in this way. Indeed, on the one hand, (neo)-welfarist strategies are mostly about corporate outreach and policy influencing, which may count as fairly systemic actions; on the other hand, Francione tends to deny the systemic status of abolitionism, as he promotes ‘incremental eradication of the property status of animals’ (Francione, Rain without Thunder, p. 4, italics in the original).
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45 Francione, Rain without Thunder.
46 I am particularly grateful to Laura Green for extensive comments and proofreading. I would also like to thank Cédric Paternotte and the participants in the 2016 and 2018 International Society for Utilitarian Studies Conferences for helpful feedback, as well as the members of EA France for many interesting discussions on this topic.
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