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Analytic Philosophy and its Synoptic Commission: Towards the Epistemic End of Days

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2014

Fraser MacBride*
Affiliation:
Glasgow Universityfraser.macbride@glasgow.ac.uk

Abstract

There is no such thing as ‘analytic philosophy’, conceived as a special discipline with its own distinctive subject matter or peculiar method. But there is an analytic task for philosophy that distinguishes it from other reflective pursuits, a global or synoptic commission: to establish whether the final outputs of other disciplines and common sense can be fused into a single periscopic vision of the Universe. And there is the hard-won insight that thought and language aren't transparent but stand in need of analysis – a recent variation upon the abiding philosophical theme that we need to get behind appearances to tell the ultimate truth about reality – an insight that threatens to be lost once philosophers appeal to intuitions.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2014 

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References

1 See Hacker, P.M.S., Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, (OxfordBlackwell), 45Google Scholar, Sluga, Hans, ‘What Has History to Do with Me: Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy’, Inquiry 41 (1998), 99121CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 107 and, for a more thoroughgoing development of these ideas, Glock, Hans-Johann, What is Analytic Philosophy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 204–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 See Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897), 28Google Scholar, and Relations’, in his Collected Essays: Vol. II, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), 630–76Google Scholar, 643

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5 Witness the failure of recent attempts to use modern truthmaker technology to account for the proper function of relations. See MacBride, FraserRelations and truthmaking’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2011), 161–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 See Moore, G.E.'s 1910 lecture, ‘What is Philosophy?’ in his Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), 127Google Scholar

7 Dummett, Michael advanced both of these theses. See his ‘Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic and Ought it to Be?’ in Truth & Other Enigmas, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 1978) 437–58Google Scholar, 441–2. Whilst I deny that a systematic theory of meaning need be conceived as a foundation for all the rest of philosophy, Dummett is entirely right that the production of such a theory, if there is such a thing to be had, would not only be a formidable intellectual achievement, but the theory itself would furnish an extraordinarily useful resource for enabling future philosophical research (for reasons that will become clear in the succeeding two paragraphs). I'd be straight online to buy one!

8 See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (translated by Ogden, C.K. with an introduction by B. Russell. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922)Google Scholar, 4.002

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12 Compare Quine, W.V.O., Word & Object (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), 260–1Google Scholar, Strawson, P.F., ‘Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems vs Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy’ in Schillp, P. (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. XI (La Salle, Il.: Open Court, 1963), 503–18Google Scholar, 512–3, and Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982), xiiixivGoogle Scholar

13 See Russell, Bertrand, ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’ in his Mysticism and Logic (New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1918), 96120Google Scholar, and, for a more recent call to logico-mathematical arms, see Williamson, Timothy, ‘Must Do Better’ in Greenough, P. & Lynch, M.Truth & Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 177187Google Scholar.

14 See Russell, B., ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918–1919)’ reprinted in his Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950, edited by Marsh, R.C. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), 177281Google Scholar, 281. Originally published in The Monist XXVIII (1918), 495–527, XXIX (1919), 32–63, 190–222, 345–80

15 Op. cit., note 5, 4.0031

16 See Williams, Bernard, ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline’, Philosophy 75, 477–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 478

17 See Collingwood, R.G., An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939)Google Scholar, 64

18 See Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980)Google Scholar, 47

19 Op. cit., note 13, 113

20 See Quine, W.V.O., ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’ in his Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 123Google Scholar, 20, Russell, B., ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ in his Mysticism and Logic (New York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1918), 140–72Google Scholar, 149, Broad, C.D., ‘Philosophy and “Common Sense”’, in G.E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970)Google Scholar, 203 and Bradley, F.H., ‘The Presuppositions of Critical History’, Collected Essays: Volume I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), 170Google Scholar, 17.

21 I am grateful to audiences at the Royal Institute of Philosophy in London, a meeting of SEFA in Madrid and a Graduate Reading Party held by the University of Glasgow at the Burn. I would also like to thank Helen Beebee, Renée Bleau, Tyler Burge, Jane Heal, Ken Gemes, Sacha Golob, Frédérique Janssen-Lauret, Mike Martin, Kevin Mulligan, Chris Pincock and Alan Weir for subsequent discussion.