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Penalizing Atrocities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2022

Andrew H. Kydd Open the ORCID record for Andrew H. Kydd [Opens in a new window]
Andrew H. Kydd*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, USA
*
Email: kydd@wisc.edu
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Abstract

The Syrian Civil War that began in 2011 killed more than 400,000 civilians. Could a limited intervention motivated by humanitarian concerns have reduced the death toll at an acceptable cost to the intervenors? I distinguish between two approaches to intervention: penalizing atrocities, by raising the cost and lowering the benefit of killing civilians; and fostering a balance of power, to convince the two sides that they cannot win on the battlefield and so must negotiate an end to the war. I show, using a game-theoretic model, that fostering a balance of power causes the government to commit more atrocities and prolongs the war. Penalizing atrocities, while it increases the likelihood of war, can reduce the expected level of atrocities. The model helps account for the failure of US efforts to promote negotiations by aiding Syrian rebels, and the success of efforts to deter Syrian chemical weapons use through threats and limited strikes.

Keywords

Civil wargame theoryhumanitarian interventionatrocitiesresponsibility to protectSyrian Civil War
Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 76 , Issue 3 , Summer 2022 , pp. 591 - 624
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The IO Foundation

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