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6 - Classification and Formalization of Interpretative Schemes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 December 2020

Douglas Walton ,
Fabrizio Macagno  and
Giovanni Sartor
Douglas Walton
Affiliation:
University of Windsor, Ontario
Fabrizio Macagno
Affiliation:
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal
Giovanni Sartor
Affiliation:
Università di Bologna
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Summary

In our previous chapters, we underscored the role of interpretative arguments in the justification of the passage from a legal text to a legal rule (Hage, 1996, 214; Tarello, 1980), where the latter is intended as a normative premise under which an individual case can be “subsumed” or classified (Moreso & Chilovi, 2018). Legal interpretation can be compared to the common understanding and processing of utterances in ordinary conversation (Smolka & Pirker, 2016), in which semantic content is only a vehicle for getting to the “speaker’s meaning,” i.e., what is communicated – a richer content to which semantic “meaning and obvious background assumptions have both contributed” (Soames, 2008, 411; see also Butler, 2016; Carston, 2013; Horn, 1995; Miller, 1990).

Type
Chapter
Information
Statutory Interpretation
Pragmatics and Argumentation
 , pp. 280 - 332
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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References

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Cases Cited

Dunnachie v. Kingston-upon-Hull City Council 2004 UKHL 36.

Johnson v. Unisys Limited 2001 UKHL 13.

Norton Tool Co. v. Tewson [1973] 1 WLR 45.

R. v. Barnet London Borough Council [2004] 1 All ER 97.

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