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Shifting Electorates and Preferences in Chile’s Constitutional Process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2024

Philip Keefer Open the ORCID record for Philip Keefer [Opens in a new window]  and
Gabriel L. Negretto Open the ORCID record for Gabriel L. Negretto [Opens in a new window]
Philip Keefer
Affiliation:
Inter-American Development Bank, USA
Gabriel L. Negretto
Affiliation:
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain, and Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile
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Extract

Normatively, democratic constitutions should express how citizens want to govern themselves collectively. Little is known, however, about how citizens’ constitutional preferences can be elicited and aggregated in practice. An intuitively appealing approach is to allow various forms of popular participation during a constitution-making process, including a popular vote to accept or reject the draft constitution (Fishkin 2011). Based on the Chilean experience with democratic constitution making, this article identifies unanticipated and previously unexplored distortions that can lead to incongruence between the preferences of voters and representatives regarding the extent and direction of constitutional change.

Type
Constitution-Making in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Chilean Process
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , April 2024 , pp. 248 - 252
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Political Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

Aleman, Eduardo, and Navia, Patricio. 2023. “Chile’s Failed Constitution: Democracy Wins.” Journal of Democracy 34 (2): 90–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishkin, James. 2011. “Deliberative Democracy and Constitutions.” Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (1): 242–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keefer, Philip, and Negretto, Gabriel Leonardo. 2023. “Replication Data for ‘Shifting Electorates and Preferences in Chile’s Constitutional Process.’” PS: Political Science & Politics. DOI:10.7910/DVN/LR89AZ.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larrain, Guillermo, Negretto, Gabriel, and Voigt, Stefan. 2023. “How Not to Write a Constitution: Lessons from Chile.” Public Choice 194:233–47.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Negretto, Gabriel. 2021. “Deepening Democracy? Promises and Challenges of Chile’s Road to a New Constitution.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 13:335–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Piscopo, Jennifer, and Siavelis, Peter. 2023. “Chile’s Constitutional Chaos.” Journal of Democracy 34 (1): 141–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Keefer and Negretto Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LR89AZ
Link