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What Language Dependence Problem? A Reply for Joyce to Fitelson on Joyce

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Arthur Paul Pedersen  and
Clark Glymour
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Abstract

In an essay recently published in this journal, Branden Fitelson argues that a variant of Miller's argument for the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of accuracy of credences formulated in terms of scoring rules, resulting in a general potential problem for Joyce's argument for probabilism. We argue that no relevant problem of the sort Fitelson supposes arises since his main theorem and his supporting arguments presuppose the validity of nonlinear transformations of credence functions that Joyce's theory, charitably construed, would identify as invalid on the basis of the principle of simple dominance.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 4 , October 2012 , pp. 561 - 574
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We wish to thank Branden Fitelson, Jim Joyce, Hailin Liu, Richard Pettigrew, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Greg Wheeler for valuable comments and discussion. We also wish to thank the referees for helpful suggestions.

References

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