¹ See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Projet de la Constitution de la Corse (1765); Les classiques des sciences sociales, La gaya scienza, Apr. 2012, at 22, http://www.ac-grenoble.fr/PhiloSophie/old2/file/rousseau_corse.pdf.Google Scholar

² Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, Pensees 348 (2013), https://www.unicaen.fr/services/puc/sources/Montesquieu/index.php (“J'apelle genie d'une nation les moeurs et le caractere d'esprit de differens peuples dirigés par l'influance d'une même cour et d'une même capitale.”).Google Scholar

³ See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 14 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse § 274 (reprint 2009) (1821).Google Scholar

⁴ For the correct criticism, see Herder, Johann Gottfried, Une autre philosophie de l'histoire 166 (1774)Google Scholar

Niemand in der Welt fühlt die Schwäche des allgemeinen Charakterisierens mehr als ich. Man mahlet ein ganzes Volk, Zeitalter, Erdstrich- wen hat man gemahlt? … Endlich fasst man sie doch in Nichts, als ein allgemeines Wort zusammen, wo jeder vielleicht denkt und fühlt, was er will – unvollkommenes Mittel der Schilderung) wie kann man missverstanden werden! … Charakter der Nationen! Allein Data ihrer Verfassung und Geschichte müssen entscheiden.Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional law 756, 756 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) [hereinafter Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook]; José Luis Martí, Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v. Identity of the People, in National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, 17, 18–19 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013).Google Scholar

⁶ Martí, supra note 5, at 17.Google Scholar

⁷ See, e.g., François-Xavier Millet, L'Union europeenne et l'identite constitutionnelle des Ètats membres (L.G.D.J. ed., 2013); National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013); L'Identite Constitutionnelle Saisie par les Juges en Europe (Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen ed., 2011); for a recent opinion of Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón, see also Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, paras. 58–61 (Jan. 14, 2015); Faraguna chapter in this volume 18 German L.J. PAGE (2017).Google Scholar

⁸ See, e.g., Peters, Anne, Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur Neubestimmung der Verhältnisse 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht [ZÖR] 3, 54 (2010).Google Scholar

⁹ See id. at 59–61.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Walter, Christian & Vordermayer, Markus, Verfassungsidentität als Instrument richterlicher Selbstbeschränkung in transnationalen Integrationsprozessen, 63 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts [JÖR] 129, 165 (2015).Google Scholar

¹¹ For France, see, e.g. Frédérique Coulée, En quoi les engagements internationaux de la France en matiere de droits de l'homme nous-renseignent-ils sur son identité constitutionelle, 118 Revue generale de droit international public 541, 542 (2014); Michel Troper, Behind the Constitution? The Principle of Constitutional Identity in France, in Constitutional Topography, Values and Constitutions 187, 190 (András Sajó & Renáta Uitz eds., 2010); see also Polzin, Monika, Constitutional Identity, Unconstitutional Amendments and the Idea of Constituent Power, Int'l J. Const. L., 411, 433–38 (2016).Google Scholar

¹² The leading case was the Lisbon Judgment. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 30, 2009, 123 BVerfGE 267. For more detailed on the development, see Polzin, supra note 11, at 424–29.Google Scholar

¹³ Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, in particular 125–30 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008) (1928).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Bilfinger, Carl, Der Reichssparkommissar (1928); Carl Bilfinger, Verfassungsfrage und Staatsgerichtshof, 20 Zeitschrift für Politik [ZfP] 81 (1931).Google Scholar

¹⁵ For a detailed account, see Polzin, supra note 11, at 418–21.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Dec. 15, 2015, 140 BVerfGE 317 (Identity Control), para. 41.Google Scholar

¹⁷ For an example of the rare use of the notion of “basic-structure doctrine” in German law, see Jürgen Bast, Don't Act Beyond your Powers: The Perils and Pitfalls of the German Constitutional Court's Ultra Vires Review, 15 German L. J. 167, 168 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See, e.g., Krishnaswamy, Sudir, Democracy and Constitutionalism (2009); Dietrich Conrad, Constituent Power, Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution: A Critical Reconsideration, 6 Delhi Law Review 1 (1977/78); Virandra Kumar, Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution: Doctrine of Constitutionally Controlled Governance, 49 J. Indian L. Inst. New Delhi 365 (2007). However, Indian case-law also refers to the notion of constitutional identity. See, e.g., Indian Supr. Ct., Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (Uoi), (1980) 1 S.C.R 206 para. 21 (India), http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1215719/ (“[T]he Constitution is a precious heritage; therefore, you cannot destroy its identity.”); see also Jacobsohn, Gary Jeffrey, Constitutional Identity 53 et seq. (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Mate, Manoy, State Constitutions and the Basic Structure Doctrine, 45 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 441 (2014).Google Scholar

²⁰ See Jacobsohn, supra note 18; Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject (2010); see also Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook, supra note 5, at 760.Google Scholar

²¹ For the perspective of Robert Post, see Post, Robert, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Forward: Establishing the Legal Constituton: Culture, Courts and Law (2003), 117 Harv. L. Rev. 8 (2003–04) (“[C]onstitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”).Google Scholar

²² See liav Orgad, The Cultural Defense of Nations 234 (2015).Google Scholar

²³ I use in the following the terms nation or people interchangeably. They refer to an imagined political community. See Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities 6 (rev. ed. 1991). I mainly use these terms to refer to the citizens of a given state. The idea behind this formal approach is that the subjects of the constitution are the citizens of a state. On a theoretical level the people, meaning the citizens of a state, have the constitution-making power. Therefore, they also define their community within their constitution. Although, in every state non-citizens and citizens live together, the percentage of non-citizens varies from one country to another. In, Germany roughly about 12% of the population are foreigners. Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt, Mehr als 10 Millionen Ausländer in Deutschland, DStatis (June 30, 2017), https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2017/06/PD17_227_12521.html. Thus, the self-definition of every nation is also influenced by the non-citizens living in a particular country. The extent to which foreign citizens are included in the self-image of a particular nation depends on an abstract level on the willingness of a nation to include non-citizens and on the willingness of non-citizens to be included.Google Scholar

²⁴ Constitution in the sense of the present article refers to those written or unwritten constitutional documents that establish a basic democratic and constitutional order.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook, supra note 5, at 757Google Scholar

Three distinct general meanings of constitutional identity emerge. First, there is an identity that derives from the fact of having a constitution – polities with a constitution differ from those that do not; secondly, the content of a constitution provides distinct elements identity – a federal constitution sets up a different kind of polity than one establishing a centralized unitary state; and thirdly, the context in which a constitution operates seems bound to play a significant role in the shaping of its identity – different cultures envision fundamental rights in constrasting and even sometimes contradictory ways.Google Scholar

[Emphasis omitted.].Google Scholar

²⁶ On theoretical concept of constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus), see, e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung 642–43 (1992); Jürgen Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung 173–74 (1987); Dolf Steinberger, Verfassungspatriotismus (1982); for an account regarding the criticism, see, e.g. Josef Isensee, Staatsrepräsentation und Verfassungspatriotismus in: Staatsrepräsentation 223, 237–39 (Jörg-Dieter Gauger & Justin Stagl eds., 1992).Google Scholar

²⁷ See Jürgen Habermas, Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat, in Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung 147, 178 (Charles Taylor ed., 1993).Google Scholar

²⁸ See expressly Michelman, Frank I., Morality, Identity and “Constitutional Patriotism”, 76 Denv. U.K. Rev. 1009, 1025–26 (1998); cf Jan-Werner Müller, Verfassungspatriotismus 70 (2010) (using instead the notion Verfassungskultur (constitutional culture); cf. Habermas, supra note 26, 642-43 (without using the notion constitutional identity).Google Scholar

²⁹ See Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook, supra note 5, at 759.Google Scholar

³⁰ Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 10.Google Scholar

³¹ See Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook, supra note 5, at 761.Google Scholar

³² See id. at 761Google Scholar

As I conceive it in its broadest terms, the place and function of constitutional identity is determined by the need for dialectical mediation of existing, evolving, and projected conflicts and tensions between identity and difference – or, more precisely, identities and differences – that shape the dealings between self and other within the relevant polity committed to constitutional rule and favorably disposed toward the aims of constitutionalism. At its most abstract, constitutional identity figures in relation to the threshold decision of whether to pursue constitutionalism or to reject it altogether as would be the case in the context of a pure theocracy.Google Scholar

³³ Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between Identity and Diversity, in: Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy 3, 6 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994) [hereinafter Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism].Google Scholar

³⁴ See id. Google Scholar

³⁵ Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook, supra note 5, at 771–73.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Jacobsohn, supra note 18, at 7.Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. Google Scholar

³⁸ Id. For Jacobsohn, constitutional disharmony is very important for developing this constitutional identity. See id. at 4, 13).Google Scholar

³⁹ For a particularly clear example of this, see id. at 351.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Jacobsohn, supra note 18, at 4, 13, 351–55; see also Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook, supra note 5, at 760.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See in more detail infra Part B.Google Scholar

⁴² See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Apr. 13, 1994, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1779, 1780 (1994).Google Scholar

⁴³ I borrow this term from Robin West. See West, Robin, Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence of Respect: A Comment on George Fletcher's Constitutional Identity, in: Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy 245, 251 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Armin von Bogdandy, Europäische und nationale Identität: Integration durch Verfassungsrecht?, 62 Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer [VVDSTRL] 156, 170 (2002).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 76.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See the recent German debate on the proposal of the German Interior Minister de Maizière of a ten-point proposal on the German Leitkultur. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Keine Muslima muss Herrn de Maizière de Hand geben, Rheinische Post [RP] (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/leitkultur-das-sagt-juergen-habermas-zur-debatte-aid-1.6793232 [hereinafter Habermas, Muslima].Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Das ist De Maizières Zehn-Punkte-Plan, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ] (May 2, 2017), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/de-maizieres-zehn-punkte-plan-14994262.html.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See, e.g., CDU-Mann Geißler nimmt de Maizières, Leitkultur' auseinander, Münchner Merkur (May 5, 2017), https://www.merkur.de/politik/cdu-mann-geissler-verspottet-de-maizi-res-leitkultur-zr-8259204.html.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Habermas, Muslima, supra note 46.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See in detail infra Part C.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See supra Part B II.Google Scholar

⁵² Countries without a written constitution are for example Israel or the United Kingdom.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Strumia & Kaushal chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. PAGE, PINCITE (2017).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Preuß, Ulrich K., The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience, 44 Isr. L. Rev. 429, 445 (2011). Such an understanding of eternity clauses is also widespread in the German literature on Article 4 para. 2 TEU. A majoritiy of German authors argue that in particular the German eternity clause covers those constitutional provisions that are the expression of the national identity in the sense of article 4 para. 2 TEU. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Art. 4 EUV, in 1 Das Recht der Europäischen Union para. 22 (Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf & Martin Nettesheim eds., 58. Actualization 2016); Armin Hatje, Art 4 EUV, in EU-Kommentar para. 12 (Jürgen Schwarze ed., 2012); Rudolf Streinz, Art. 4, in EUV/AEUV para. 14 (Rudolf Streinz ed., 2012); for examples from the non-German literature, see also Constanze Grewe, Methods of Identification of National Constitutional Identity, in National Constitutional Identity and European Integration 37, 39 et seq. (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013); Gerhard van der Schyff, The Constitutional Relationship Between the European Union and Its Member States: The Role of National Identity in Article 4(2) TEU, 37 Eur. L. Rev. 563, 576 (2012); cf. Besselink, Leonard F., National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6 Utrecht L. Rev. 36, 48–49 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See also Liav, Orgad, The preamble in constitutional interpretation, 8 Int'L of Const. L 714, 717, 738 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Consitution of Tunisia, preamble (2004), English version available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ It states that: Expressing our people's commitment to the teachings of Islam and its aims characterized by openness and moderation, and to the human values and the highest principles of universal human rights, and inspired by the heritage of our civilization, accumulated over the travails of our history, from our enlightened reformist movements that are based on the foundations of our Islamic-Arab identity and on the gains of human civilization, and adhering to the national gains achieved by our people ….Google Scholar

Id. Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See also Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism, supra note 33.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See, e.g., Constitution [Constitution], June 3, 1958, art. 2 (France).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18 1999, SR 101, art. 3 (Switz.).Google Scholar

⁶¹ For an accurate analysis, see also Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, A Huron at the Kirchberg Plateau or a Few Naive Thoughts on Constitutional Identity in the Case-law of the Judge of the European Union, in National Constitutional Identity and European Integration 275, 304 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013).Google Scholar

⁶² For the first decision, see Case C-379/87, Groener v. Minister for Education and City of Dublin Vocational Educational Commit., 1989 E.C.R. I-3987, para. 18–19. This case-law was confirmed and repeated within Article 4 para 2 sentence 2 TEU. See Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn & Wardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija, 2011 E.C.R. I-03787, para. 86–87. The previous Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen consented. See Case C-202/11, Anton Las v. PSA Antwerp NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:456, para. 26–27 (Dec. 16, 2010); cf. Opinion of Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro, Case C-160/03, Kingdom of Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-02077, para. 24 (Dec. 16, 2004) (“Respect for linguistic diversity is one of the essential aspects of the protection granted to the national identities of the Member States, as is apparent from Article 6(3) EU and Article 149 EC.”); Opinion of Advocate General Juliane Kokott, Case C-222/07, UTECA, 2009 E.C.R. I-01407, para. 90 et seq. (Sept. 4, 2008).Google Scholar

⁶³ See Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, 2010 E.C.R. I-13693, para. 92; Case C-438/14, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff v. Standesamt der Stadt Karlsruhe and Zentraler Juristischer Dienst der Stadt Karlsruhe, 2003 E.C.J. I-11613, para. 73.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Case C-156/13, Digibet Ltd & Albers v. Westdeutsche Lotterie GmbH & Co. OHG, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1756, para. 34 [hereinafter Digibet]; cf. Opinion of Advocate General Juliane Kokott, Joined Cases C-428-434/06, Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja v. Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya (UGT/Rioja), para. 54 (May 8, 2008)Google Scholar

First of all, I would like to mention that under Article 6(3) EU the European Union must respect the national identities of its Member States. This means that the Union cannot encroach on the constitutional order of a Member State, whether it is centralist or federal, and does not in principle have any influence on the division of competences within a Member State. The revision of that provision by the Treaty of Lisbon expressly mentions respect for the constitutional structures of the Member States by the Union.Google Scholar

For further confirmation, see Case C-51/15, Remondis v. Region Hannover, 2009 E.C.J. I-8127, para. 40.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Strumia & Kaushal, supra note 53.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Case C-156/13, Digibet, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1756, para. 34.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Jacobsohn, supra note 18, at 6 (“In theory, these textual barriers to certain kinds of constitutional change are designed to preserve a preexisting identity by obstructing the removal of those attributes without which the object in question, as in the case of the pool table, would become something very different.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See Norwegian Const., art. 121, para. 1, sentence 2 (“Such an amendment must never, however, contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, but solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do not alter the spirit of the Constitution, and two thirds of the Storting must agree with such an amendment.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Art. 139 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); French Const. Art. 89 para. 5.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Turkish Const. Art. 4; GBL Art. 79 para. 3; Maroc. Const. Art. 175.Google Scholar

⁷¹ See infra, last section.Google Scholar

⁷² For a reprint, see Godechot, Jacques, Les constitutions de la France depuis 1789, 337 (1995)) (“Loi du 10 Août 1884, portant révision partielle des lois constitutionnelles … Le paragraphe 3 de l'article 8 de la même loi du 25 février 1875 est complété ainsi qu'il suit: -,La forme républicaine du gouvernement ne peut faire l'objet d'une proposition de révision.”).Google Scholar

⁷³ See Genevois, Bruno, Les limites d'ordre juridique à l'intervention du pouvoir constituent, 5 Revue francaise de droit administratif 909, 912 (1998).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See 1946 Const. art. 125 (Fr.) (reprinted in Godechot, supra note 72, at 389); see also Polzin, supra note 11, at 437.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ For the only countries in the European Union that have express material limits for constitutional amendments, see 1958 Const. art. 89, ¶ 5 (Fr.); Art. 139 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); Ústava ČV [Constitution] art. 9, ¶ 2 (Czech Rep.); 1975 Syntagma [Constitution] art. 110, ¶ 1 (Greece); Cyprus Const. art. 182, ¶ 1; Port. Const. art. 288; Rom. Const. art. 148; cf. Grewe, supra note 54, at 40.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ The constitutions of the other nineteen-member states do not contain material limits for constitutional amendments. However, two Member States have special provisions for constitutional amendments during a Regency. See Belg. Const. art. 197 and Lux. Const. art. 115. Six Member states have special procedural rules for certain constitutional amendments. See Est. Const. Ch. XV, § 162; Lat. Const. art. 77; Lith. Const. art. 148; Spain Const. art. 168; Pol. Const. art. 23,5 ¶ 6; see also Bundesverfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] article 44, ¶ 3 (containing a special procedure for a complete revision).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ For the relation to art. 79, ¶ 3 of the German Basic Law, see Steiner, Udo, Verfassunggebung und verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes, 211–12 (1966); Hans-Ulrich Evers, Art. 79 Abs. 3 (2nd rev. Oct. 1982), in Bonner Kommentar para. 88 (Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Walter & Christian Waldhoff eds., 45th Actualization).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ German Basic Law translated by: Prof. Christian Tomuschat and Prof. Currie, David P. (Translation revised by: Prof. Christian Tomuschat and Prof. Kommers, Donald P. in cooperation with the Language Service of the German Bundestag), available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ (14 June 2017).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ For more detail, see infra Part C. II.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ For a detailed account of the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) and its history, see, e.g., 1 Der Parlamentarische Rat 1948–1949, Akten und Protokolle, Vorgeschichte, Introduction (Deutscher Bundestag/Bundesarchiv eds., 1975).Google Scholar

⁸¹ See also Dreier, Horst, Gilt das Grundgesetz ewig? 59 (2008); Paul Kirchhof, Die Identität der Verfassung, in 2 Handbuch des Staatsrechts [Handbook of Constitutional Law] §21, rn. 42 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3d ed. 2004). For more detail, see Polzin, supra note 11, at 421–24.Google Scholar

⁸² Translation provided by the author. See 14/2 Parlamentarischer Rat 1948–1949, Hauptausschuss, 1094, 1118 no. 36 (Deutscher Bundestag/Bundesarchiv eds., 2009).Google Scholar

⁸³ Cf. George Flechter, Constitutional Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 737, 737 (1992)Google Scholar

When constitutional language fails to offer an unequivocal directive for decision, the recourse of the judge is not always to look “outward” toward overarching principles of political morality. In an illumating array of cases, the acceptable way to resolve the disputes and to explain the results is to turn “inward” and reflect upon the legal culture in which the dispute is embedded. The way to understand this subcategory of decisions is to interpret them as expressions of the decision makers' constitutional identity.Google Scholar

See also Fletcher, George, Constitutional Identity, in: Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy 223 (Michael Rosenfeld ed., 1994).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook, supra note 5, at 771.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ For a view relying on this aspect, see Shapiro, Robert A., State Constitutional Law, 84 Va. L. Rev. 389, 455 (1998)Google Scholar

The community that matters, though, is not an actual preexisting community, but the aspirational community represented in the constitution. It is a community constituted by the political process of constitution-making, by democratic politics, not by blood or history. This view allows for a more heterogenous notion of constitutional identity, one that may well accord with the situation in the states of the United States. These states may have had little preexisting moral unity, and free migration …. Their population and their culture may well reflect great national or international diversity, Nevertheless, through their constitution, the people of the state give rise to a value structure.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ For an opinion regarding the recent headscarf judgment of the German Constitutional Court, see also Uwe Volkmann, Dimensionen des Kopftuchstreits, JURA 1083, 1084 (2015).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ For a view on this aspect, see Ackerman, Bruce, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1519, 1519 (1996).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See Conseil Constitutionnel decision no. 2010-613 DC, Oct.7, 2010, Rec. 276.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ The European Court of Human Rights accepted the burka ban due to a wide margin of appreciation accorded to France. See ECHR, S.A.S. v. France (App. No. 43835/11), paras. 153–59 (July 1, 2014).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Flechter, supra note 83, at 739.Google Scholar

⁹¹ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, 36–37.Google Scholar

⁹² Flechter, supra note 83, at 738.Google Scholar

⁹³ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, 76–77.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg, in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the US and the EU 54, 65 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Jan. 27, 2015, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1359, 1364–65.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Uwe Volkmann describes the decision as a demand for serenity. See Volkmann, supra note 86, at 1092.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Jan. 27, 2015, NJW, 1359, 1369–73 (Schluckebier, J. & Hermanns, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See, e.g., Reinhard Müller, Die Schule ist keine religiöse Erziehungsanstalt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ] (Mar. 13, 2015); cf. also Josef Isensee, Toleranz stiften, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ] (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/staat-und-recht/gastbeitrag-toleranz-stiften-1911558-p3.html.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ I am very grateful to the comments by Ruud Koopmans on this point.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ For more detail, see supra Part C II.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See Orgad, supra note 22, 85–131, 234.Google Scholar

¹⁰² See Strumia & Kaushal, supra note 53.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ For a recent opinion, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Dec. 15, 2015, 140 BVerfGE 317 (Identity-control), para. 53–55.Google Scholar