¹ Unless otherwise indicated, the page numbers in parentheses in the text of this paper refer to Rawls', JohnA Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).Google Scholar This paper grew out of a particularly stimulating seminar conducted by Professor Bill Diggs (University of Illinois). However, as Professor Diggs strongly objected to the general thrust of the criticism of Rawls which this paper presents, he should in no way be burdened with any responsibility for it. Colleagues at the University of Alberta, Professor T.C. Pocklington, Professor D.J.C. Carmichael, and Mr Donald Andrews, read earlier drafts of this paper and made numerous helpful suggestions which, I hope, are reflected in its finished form.

² Most commentators on Rawls understand the limitations he sets for his project and seem generally to endorse them. For instance, Michael Lessnoff [“John Rawls' Theory of Justice,” Political Studies xix (1), 63–80] considers “one of the most interesting features of Rawls' theory” to be the claim “that from his conception of justice can be derived the essential norms of liberal democracy” (p. 67).

³ Rawls, replying to other critics, protests against reading too much into this implicit individualism: “the theory does not hold that human beings are self-sufficient; nor that social life is simply a means to individual ends. Persons' more particular desires and preferences are not thought to be given, but (rather) to be shaped by social institutions and culture. The view is individualistic in the minimal sense of stipulating that society is composed of a plurality of human persons for whom an equal liberty and the right of dissent is to be maintained.” See his “Reply to Lyons and Teitelman,” in The Journal of Philosophy LXIX (18), 557. It is my opinion that the effects of even this “minimal sense” of such individualism are quite pervasive, and I intend to argue against it, partly on Rawls' own grounds (i.e. his moral psychology).

⁴ A good exposition of this aspect of Rousseau's thought is Riley's, Patrick “A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will,” in the American Political Science Review LXIV (March 1970), 86–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ In the process of refining his theory, Rawls adds “self-respect” as a social primary good enjoying a “central place” (p. 62), as “perhaps the most important” (p. 440); the many problems involved with this idea can be ignored for purposes of our discussion.

⁶ Rawls' final version of the principles is considerably more complex and not of particular concern to this critique. His statement of them is in article 46 (pp. 302—3).

⁷ Kuhn's, ThomasThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962, 1970)Google Scholar is merely one of the more prominent challenges to the univocal objectivity claimed by modern science. The discussion this book has generated demonstrates clearly that there are live issues in this area. See also Hanson's, Norwood RussellPatterns of Discovery (London 1958)Google Scholar, Polanyi's, MichaelPersonal Knowledge (London 1958) etal.Google Scholar

⁸ Winch's, PeterThe Idea of a Social Science (New York 1958)Google Scholar is one of the better known examples of this line of argument. A recent and especially lucid presentation summarizing most of the major issues here is Ryan's, AlanThe Philosophy of the Social Sciences (London 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Phenomenological studies offer another source of criticism directed at any attempted science of man modeled on the physical sciences. See, for instance, Merleau-Ponty's, MauriceStructure of Behavior (Boston 1963)Google Scholar or Phenomenology of Perception (London 1963), especially the first four chapters.

⁹ Michael Teitelman in “The Limits of Individualism” (Journal of Philosophy LXIX (18), 545–56) offers a critique of Rawls in the spirit of Marx's early writings that supplements our own critique in interesting ways: “it is obviously of great importance what conception or model of individuals is permitted in the basis of the theory. If we allow the appropriate assumptions in the model, we can guarantee the inference to any principles we would like to generate” (p. 546). Teitelman charges that Rawls has prejudiced his theory of justice in that very way. We agree with the spirit of Teitelman's criticism, but our own diverges from it somewhat on this point. We argue that Rawls' theory of justice is not even wholly consistent with Rawls’ own model of man.

Lessnoff, in “John Rawls’ Theory of Justice,” also recognizes the “knowledge problem” we refer to when he concludes that Rawls' conception is “a social contract theory, and highly illuminating about the merits of that style of theorizing. But it also shares some of the defects of social contract theory: it assumes that we know more about human nature than we really do; and it assumes that human nature is more uniform than it probably is” (p. 78).

¹⁰ As W.C. Runciman has shown in a more limited but illuminating way, frequently the determination of what the facts are effectively decides the moral question (“Sociological Evidence and Political Theory,” in his and Lasletts' Philosophy, Politics, and Society, second series; Oxford 1962).

¹¹ David Lyons, in “Rawls Versus Utilitarianism” (The Journal of Philosophy LXIX (18), 535–45), seems to provide an especially damaging critique of Rawls' argument on this point.

¹² We are indebted to a working paper by Professor W.E. Cooper (University of Alberta) for a particularly illuminating discussion of the extent and import of Rawls' determinism.

¹³ Brian Barry, in “Liberalism and Want Satisfaction, a Critique of John Rawls” (Political Theory I, (2), 134–53), develops a line of argument against Rawls that is complementary to that given here. Barry observes, “the choice to be made is a choice between different kinds of society, each with advantages and disadvantages, a liberal society and an orthodox society.” Rawls has not successfully shown that pop would choose a liberal society. “Everything… turns on how important one thinks orthodoxy is” p. 148–52.

¹⁴ The term “value” is used throughout this paper despite my misgivings about it, given that such use implies an acceptance of the peculiarly modern and quite problematic “fact-value” distinction. Still, the term is so thoroughly established in today's philosophical discourse that avoiding it involves considerable clumsiness, especially in discussing a work such as Rawls’.

¹⁵ Schaefer, David Lewis, in a very scathing review of Rawls' book (“The ‘Sense’ and Non-sense of Justice,” Political Science Reviewer III (Fall 1973), 1–41)Google Scholar, finds Rawls' unexamined prejudices especially unsettling: “this book is not, as its author claims, a work of political philosophy. Rather, it is an ideological tract … [which] accords so well with the political dogmas that are currently popular in the academic community … [that] it is unlikely to receive much severe testing from that quarter” pp. 1–2. Schaefer's general philosophic perspective, as well as certain specific strands of his criticism, parallel our own; he turns them to somewhat different account, however.

¹⁶ Strangely enough, this is basically the same conclusion J.S. Mill reached in On Liberty: “yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale.” But whereas Mill, unlike Rawls, had read the historical evidence correctly, he seems not to have profited thereby; both fail equally to appreciate the internal rationale of why this is so.

¹⁷ The “Laws” in Plato's Crito elaborate this argument with forceful eloquence. Obviously, this claim does not exhaust the considerations that may legitimately be brought to bear on questions where the interests of-one's society conflict with one's own immediate interests. But the truth referred to either has the implication specified, or it has no implications at all; it certainly does not imply the opposite (i.e., that claims of the individual have priority over those of his society). Liberals, in order to protect their individualism, are obliged to pretend they can see no implications at all.

¹⁸ Santayana, George, Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1967; originally published in 1922), 175–6.Google Scholar