¹ In response to Maria Theresa's outraged consent to the first Polish partition, Frederick observed that, “she cries, but she takes.” See Ritter, Gerhard, Frederick the Great, Paret, Peter, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 192.Google Scholar

² There were concentrations of Poles in Austrian Silesia and the Bukowina; however, in 1911, their numbers in these areas amounted to only 235,224 and 36,210, respectively. This is in contrast to Galicia's 4,672,500 Polish-speaking subjects, of whom 4,005,400 were ethnic Poles. By virtue of their small numbers, the Poles in Silesia and the Bukowina had no independent significance in the life of the monarchy. See Batowski, Henryk, “Die Polen” in Wandruszka, Adam and Urbanitsch, Peter, eds., Die Völker des Reiches, I. Teilband, vol. III of Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 526–528,Google Scholar 531–536.

The number of Poles concentrated in Austrian Galicia reflects its status as a part of Poland “irredenta.” This has meant that it has been dealt with by scholars both as a topic in general Polish histories and as an aspect of the history of the Habsburg empire. Many of these treatments have centered on Galicia's role after 1866 as a center for Polish national development prior to the post–1918 reconstitution of the state. Halecki, Oscar, A History of Poland (New York: Roy Publishers, 1961)Google Scholar and Estreicher, Stanislaw, “Galicia in the Period of Autonomy and Self-Government, 1848–1914,” in Reddaway, W.F.. et al. , eds., The Cambridge History of Poland: From Augustus II to Pilsudski (1697–1935) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951),Google Scholar are two of the more well-known examples of Galicia treated within the Polish context. Works that examine the position of Polish Galicia within nineteenth-century Austria have addressed the question largely in terms of the transition of the Poles from a subject nationality to a de facto “people of state” and whether they became a force for integration within the Habsburg multi-national state. Kann, Robert, The Multi-National Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848–1918,2 vols (New York: Octagon Books, 1977),Google Scholar Henryk Batowski's contribution in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, Wereszycki, Henryck, “The Poles as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor,” The Austrian History Yearbook, III, pt. 2 (1967), 287–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the recently reprinted article from the Yearbook by Wandycz, Piotr, “The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy” in Markovits, Andrei S. and Sysyn, Frank E., eds., Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982),Google Scholar reflect the range of approaches over the last thirty years that deal with Galicia in the Austrian context. This essay has drawn upon these and other works in English and German.

³ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” p. 85.

⁴ Batowski, “Die Polen,” pp. 531–532.

⁵ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” pp. 90–91.

⁶ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” pp. 75–78, and Kann, Multi-National Empire, pp. 531–537; both works provide a full discussion of the events of 1846; however, Wandycz offers a more balanced interpretation than Kann, who denies Austrian responsibility for the peasant insurrection.

⁷ Macartney, C.A.,The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918(New York:The Macmillan Co., 1969), pp. 531,Google Scholar547.

⁸ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” p. 89.

⁹ Estreicher, “Galicia in the Period of Autonomy,” p. 444.

¹⁰ See Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” p. 84, and Estreicher, ibid., pp. 444–445.

¹¹ For the text of this resolution, see Kolmer, Gustav, Parlament und Verfassung in Öslerreich, 1 (1848–1869) (Vienna: K. u. K. Hof-Buchdruckerei und Hof-Verlags-Buchhandlung Carl Frome, 1902), 353–354.Google Scholar

¹² See note 2 for examples of these approaches. The relatively recent loss of their independence and the preoccupation of the Poles in regaining it made them unique, in those respects, within the Habsburg empire. Both this preoccupation and what issued from it has captured the attention of most historians. Of the recent literature in English and German, the contribution by Henryk Batowski in volume III of Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918 is the most balanced discussion of the Poles in Austria.

¹³ In addition to the conservatives, most Polish political leaders saw their national future in terms of some kind of relationship with Austria. Outside of their own conflict with the Ruthenians, Galicia's Poles had only slight interest in the problems of other Slavs. Particularly because of its Russian origins, Pan-Slavism captured the imaginations of very few Poles. Even after 1907, the social radicalism of the new mass-based parties did not, generally, lead to a nationalistic counterpart. Thus, the leader of the Austrian Polish Social Democratic Party, Ignaz Daszyński, thought of Galicia as a “Piedmont” achieving Polish unity under Habsburg protection. Najdus, Walentyna, “The Relation of the Polish Social Democrats in Galicia to the Habsburg Empire and the Austrian Social Democratic Workers Party,” in Hitchins, Keith, ed., Studies in East European Social History, I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), 85.Google Scholar The one relatively minor exception to this loyalistic rule was the National Democratic Party which was closely allied with its pro-Russian counterpart led by Roman Dmowski in Russian Poland. In October of 1914, it withdrew from the Austrian Polish national committee of Cracow in sympathy with Dmowski's pro-Entente position and, during the 1914–1915 Russian occupation of eastern Galicia, elements of the party cooperated with the enemy. See Batowski, “Die Polen,” pp. 535–536, and Valiani, Leo, The End of Austria-Hungary (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1973), p. 77.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” pp. 83,90.

¹⁵ For a discussion of Gohichowski's significance, see Estreicher “Galicia in the Period of Autonomy,” pp. 435–447.

¹⁶ Quoted in Estreicher, ibid., pp. 444–445.

¹⁷ The principle of dynastic loyalty is typified by the attitude of Emperor Franz I, who thought that “the citizen should be inspired to duty and sacrifice, not by love of his country or the state, but by devotion and loyalty to the hereditary dynasty and the sacred person of the monarch.” Wandruszka, Adam, The House of Habsburg (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 137.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Redlich, Joseph, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, A Biography (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. xii,Google Scholar 330,332.

¹⁹ May, Arthur J., The Habsburg Monarchy. 1867–1914 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 37.Google Scholar

²⁰ Kann, Multi-National Empire, I,231; see also Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung, I,351.

²¹ In June of 1870, Beust sent a communication to the Austrian ambassador in London on why the government supported the Austrian Poles against the wishes of Prussia and Russia. He stated that, “Among the various nationalities who inhabit the Austrian empire, the Polish nation is one whose loyalty to the general interests and the maintenance of the empire has been fully secured … her representatives in our legislative bodies have manifested a great concern for the greatness of the empire. Among the persons belonging to the Delegations of the Reichsrat towards whom I am especially obligated to defend imperial policy, the Poles were most faithful in supporting the imperial cause in their speeches and votes. To strengthen the ties binding the Poles to Austria-Hungary has always seemed to me a matter of essential importance. This goal cannot be attained in a better way than by granting them the concessions which they are seeking in the way of administrative autonomy”; quoted in Wereszycki, “Poles as Integrating and Disintegrating Factor,” pp. 303–304.

²² Clam-Martinic, Heinrich Graf, “Kaiser Franz Joseph und die Nationalitaten,” in Ritter von Steinitz, Eduard, ed., Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph (Berlin: Verlag för Kulturpolitik, 1931),p. 164.Google Scholar See also Lt.-General von Margutti, Baron, The Emperor Francis Joseph and his Times (New York: George H.Dorn Company, 1921), p. 205,Google Scholar where he recalls of Franz Joseph that, “It is true he conceded the Poles of Galicia a higher political status, but he did not regard them as of much political importance. He was convinced that they had only to look beyond the frontiers of the empire to see from the fate of their brothers in Russia and Prussia how well off they were in Austria…”.

²³ For a full discussion of the important reform of the suffrage in 1907 and its significance, see Jenks, William A., The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).Google Scholar

²⁴ On the electoral disadvantages of the Ruthenians, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia Under Austrian Rule,” in Markovits and Sysyn, Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia, pp. 36–37.

²⁵ Redlich, Josef, Schickalsjahre Österreichs, 1908–1919. Das Politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs,I (1908–1914), Fellner, Fritz, ed. (Graz: Verlag Herman Böhlaus Nachf. Ges. m. b. H., 1953), 79.Google Scholar This story was told to him by the then Minister without Portfolio Count Wenzel Zaleski on March 10,1911. Zaleski saw this event as similar to Franz Joseph's use of his authority in 1888 to assure compliance by the Polish Club with a new tax on spirits that went against Galician economic interests. In fact, the reform of suffrage involved a much more fundamental capitulation on the part of the Poles. For the spirits-tax incident, see Jenks, , Austria Under the Iron Ring, 1879–1893 (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1965), pp. 224–225.Google Scholar

²⁶ The electoral system put in place in Galicia was designed to increase Ruthenian representation without eliminating the Polish preponderance. In addition, Vienna agreed to certain modest subsidiary concessions in areas already dominated by the Poles. For a listing of these concessions (which she describes as “vital agreements”) and a discussion of the post–1907 Galician electoral system, see Narkiewicz, Olga A., The Green Flag: Polish Populist Politics, 1867–1970 (London: Croom Helm and Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), p. 120;Google Scholar for the electoral system, see also Rudnytsky, “Ukrainians in Galicia,” p. 61.

²⁷ Rudolf, Kronprinz, “Entwurf zu einer Flugschrift über die Slawen in der Monarchie” (1880), in Hamann, Brigitte, ed., Majestät ich warne Sie … geheime und private Schriften (Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1979), p. 53.Google Scholar

²⁸ Rudolf, , “Skizzen aus der üsterreichischen Politik der letzten Jahre” (1886),Google Scholaribid., p. 165.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Kann, Multi-National Empire, pp. 189–193.

³¹ Ibid., p. 196.

³² Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” p. 91.

³³ Batowski, “Die Polen,” p. 548.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 549.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 523–533,Google Scholar and, for the general negotiations and attitudes about Poland between Germany and Austria-Hungary during the war, see chs. 8, 12, 17, 19, and 23.

³⁷ Anonymous, , “Einige Bemerkungen zu der Denkschrift der Ruthenen” (Vienna, 23 04 1867), in Skedl, Arthur, ed., Der politische Nachlafβ des Grafen Eduard Taaffe (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1922), p. 223.Google Scholar The Denkschrift argues at some length against too much reliance on the Poles and proposes, instead, that the Ruthenians gain more official support. The author also strongly urges that the policy of German dominance based on an evenhanded treatment of both peoples be continued in Galicia as the best way to safeguard the interests of all concerned, including those of the state. It is a very forcefully argued and well-presented memorial that, however, seems to have had no effect on the person for whom it was intended.

³⁸ Quoted in Wereszycki, “Poles as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor,” pp. 303–304.

³⁹ Batowski, “DiePolen,” p. 38.

⁴⁰ Rudolf, “Skizzen aus der österreichischen Politik,” p. 164; he acknowledged the possibility that the Poles might offer the crown of a reconstituted Polish kingdom to Archduke Karl Ludwig who was sympathetic towards them, but he believed that, once the Poles had consolidated their position, they would drop him in favor of a native ruler in order to reestablish the old Polish administration (die alte polnische Wirtschaft).

⁴¹ Batowski, “Die Polen,” p. 549; he refers to Polish support for Austria's policy in the Balkans.

⁴² For a list of the Polish ministers in this period, see Batowski, ibid., pp. 532–533.

⁴³ Ibid.,533.

⁴⁴ Although the “democrats” were bourgeois liberals, they accepted the conservative national strategy and were content with the socially restrictive franchise that benefited them both. For the genesis of this association, see Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” pp. 85–86.

⁴⁵ Batowski, “Die Polen,” p. 534;the presidency was held by Franz Smolka(1887–1893) and by David von Abrahamowicz (1897). The lower house (Abgeordnetenhaus) of the Reichsrat was where all legislation proposed by the state as well as its budget were considered and passed on. Having the presidency of this body was comparable to the speaker's position in the American House of Representatives. After the reform of 1907, Galicia sent 106 deputies to the lower house of which twenty-seven were Ruthenians, while, in the aristocratic upper house (Herrenhaus) thirty Polish nobles had seats (Estreicher,“Galicia in the Period of Autonomy”, pp. 449–450).

⁴⁶ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” p. 88.

⁴⁷ Estreicher, “Galicia in the Period of Autonomy,” p. 457.

⁴⁸ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” p. 89

⁴⁹ Batowski, “Die Polen,” pp. 534, 536.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 536.

⁵¹ Rudnytsky, “Poles as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor,” p. 61; the intervention of Vienna was motivated by fear of an impending war with Russia and to prevent any possible defection of the Ruthenians to the Russians. The Russians had for some time been engaged in a propaganda campaign aimed at Galicia's Ruthenians and their subservient position to the Poles.

⁵² Because of their Marxist ideology, the Social Democrats opposed national states and stood for a federative empire that would observe the national rights of each people (see Kann, Multi-National Empire, pp. 103–108). On the other hand, the staunchly pro-Habsburg, Catholic and imperial position of the Christian Socials and their ethnically mixed Viennese constituency meant they supported the supra-national Austrian ideal of an equitable multi-national state. See Hantsch, Hugo, Die Nationalitátenfrage im alten Österreich, Das Problem der konstruktiven Reichsgestaltung (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1953), pp. 101,Google Scholar103.

⁵³ For an excellent discussion of the Pan-German movement and the Badeni crisis see Whiteside, Andrew G., The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schonerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Whiteside,ibid., p. 180.

⁵⁵ London Times, June 23, 1898, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Die Neue Freie Presse, June 23, 1898, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, pp. 794–797.

⁶⁰ The parliamentary figures following the reform of 1907 show how fractionalized the Poles had become: Polish National Democrats, twenty-five; Polish Conservatives, sixteen; Polish Populists, seventeen; Polish Center, twelve; Polish Independent Socialists, one; Social Democrats, seven. In 1910, the ministry of Freiherr von Bienerth got only the support of the Conservatives, and, by 1913–1914, the ministry of Count Karl Stürgkh was so beset by the problems of parliamentary obstructionism that what Polish support he had meant very little. See Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, pp. 794n–796.

⁶¹ An example of the chauvinistic attitude that existed in some Austro-German circles as a kind of defense-mechanism in the face of Slav encroachment can be seen in the deutschnational and staunchly anti-Polish work of Kaindl, Raimund Friedrich, Geschichte der Deutschen in Galizien, Ungarn, der Bukowina und Rumánien seit etwa 1770 bis zur Gegenwart, vol. III in Geschichte der Deutschen in den Karpathenlanáern (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1911).Google Scholar

⁶² See note 60.

⁶³ Samassa, Paul, Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Theodor Weicher, 1910), pp. 31–34.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Rudnytsky, “Poles as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor,” pp. 64–65.

⁶⁵ Kann, Multi-National Empire, p. 57; the term Staatsvolk was originally applied to the Germans alone.

⁶⁶ Wandycz, “Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy,” pp. 92–93.