Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-tn8tq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-16T11:51:33.906Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2019

Javier Cumpa
Affiliation:
Universidad Complutense, Madrid
Bill Brewer
Affiliation:
King's College London
Get access

Summary

Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Armstrong, D. M. 1983. What Is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austin, J. L. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia, Warnock, G. (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Ayers, M. 1974. ‘Individuals without sortals’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:113–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ayers, M. 1991. Locke: Epistemology and Ontology. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Ayers, M. 2005. ‘Ordinary objects, ordinary language, and identity’, Monist 88:534–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, L. 1991. ‘Has content been baturalized?’, in Loewer, B. and Rey, G. (eds), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1732.Google Scholar
Baker, L. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, L. 2002. ‘On making things up: constitution and its critics’, Philosophical Topics: Identity 30(1):3152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, L. 2007. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, L. 2008. ‘A metaphysics of ordinary things and why we need it’, Philosophy 83: 524.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, L. 2012. ‘Ontology and ordinary objects’, in Loeffler, W., Kanzian, C. and Quitterer, J. (eds), The Way Things Are: Studies in Ontology. Ontos: Frankfurt, pp.167–80.Google Scholar
Baker, L., Zimmerman, D., Rea, M. and Pereboom, D. 2002. ‘Symposium on Persons and Bodies’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64: 592635.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, K. 2004. ‘Spatio-temporal coincidence and the grounding problem’, Philosophical Studies 118:339–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, K. 2009. ‘Composition, colocation, and metaontology’, in Chalmers, D., Manley, D. and Wasserman, R. (eds), Metametaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3876.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bittencourt, J. A. 1986. Fundamentals of Plasma Physics. Oxford: Pergamon Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackburn, S. 2013. ‘Pragmatism: all or some?’, in Price, H., Blackburn, S., Brandom, R., Horwich, P. and Williams, M. (eds), Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6784.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Block, N. 2003. ‘Mental paint’, in Hahn, M. and Ramberg, B. (eds), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 165200.Google Scholar
Boghossian, P. 1990. ‘The status of content’, Philosophical Review 99:157–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boghossian, P. 1991. ‘The status of content revisited’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71:264–78.Google Scholar
Brandom, R. 2008. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandom, R 2013. ‘Global anti-representationalism?’, in Price, H., Blackburn, S., Brandom, R., Horwich, P. and Williams, M. (eds), Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 85111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Braun, D. 1993. ‘Empty names’, Noûs 27:449–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brenner, A. 2015. ‘Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question’, Synthese 192(5):12951314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brewer, B. 1998. ‘Levels of explanation and the individuation of events: a difficulty for the token identity theory’, Acta Analytica 20:724.Google Scholar
Brewer, B 2000. ‘Externalism and a priori knowledge of empirical facts’ in Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. (eds), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.  415–32.Google Scholar
Brewer, B 2015. ‘Exclusive individuals’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 89:125–42.Google Scholar
Brewer, B 2017. ‘Material objects and their parts’, Metaphysica 18: 1531.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brewer, B 2017. ‘The object view of perception’, Topoi: 36:215–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brewer, J. and Rea, M. 2005. ‘Material constitution and the trinity’, Faith and Philosophy 22:5776.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bueno, O. and French, S. 2018. Applying Mathematics: Immersion, Inference, Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burge, T. 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burke, M. 1992. ‘Copper statues and pieces of copper: a challenge to the standard account’, Analysis 52: 1217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burke, M. 1994. ‘Preserving the principle of one object to a place: a novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals and persistence conditions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 591624.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byrne, A. 2009. ‘Experience and content’, Philosophical Quarterly 59:429–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byrne, A. 2016. ‘The epistemic significance of experience’, Philosophical Studies 173:947–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byrne, A. and Logue, H. 2008. ‘Either/or’, in Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.  314–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calosi, C. and Tarozzi, G. 2014. ‘Parthood and composition in quantum mechanics’, in Calosi, C. and Graziani, P., (eds), Mereology and the Sciences, Synthese Library 371. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 5384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, R. 2008a. ‘Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble’, Philosophical Studies 140: 118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, R. 2008b. ‘There are no things that are musical works’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 48: 295314CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, J. 2006. ‘Does visual reference depend on sortal classification? Reply to Clark’, Philosophical Studies 127:221–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, J. and Cassam, Q. 2014. Berkeley’s Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, K. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Cappelen, H. and Lepore, E. 2004. Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Carey, S. 2009. The Origin of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, S. and Xu, F. 2001. ‘Infants’ knowledge of objects: beyond object files and object tracking’, Cognition 80:179213.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Carnap, R. 1950. ‘Empiricism, semantics, and ontology’, Reprinted in Meaning and Necessity, 2nd edn 1956. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 205–21.Google Scholar
Casati, R. and Varzi, A. C. 1999. Parts and Places: The Structures of Spatial Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Challinor, J. 1978. A Dictionary of Geology, 5th edn. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. 1973. ‘Parts as essential to their wholes’, Review of Metaphysics 26:581603.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. 1975. ‘Mereological essentialism: further considerations’. Review of Metaphysics 28:477–84.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. 1976. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Chicago, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Chrisman, M. 2007. ‘From epistemic contextualism to epistemic expressivism’, Philosophical Studies 135(2):225–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Churchland, P. M. 1981. ‘Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy 78:6790.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. M. 1984. Matter and Consciousness: Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Cohen-Tannoudji, C., Diu, B. and Laloe, F. 1997. Mécanique quantique, vol. I. Paris: Hermann.Google Scholar
Contessa, G. 2014. ‘One’s a crowd: mereological nihilism without ordinary-object eliminativism’, Analytical Philosophy 55:199221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Corbett, G. 2000. Number. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curley, E. (ed.) 1994. Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1688. Reprint of Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, 1651. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 2001a. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2nd updated edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D. 2001b. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dehaene, S. 1997. The Number Sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. 1981. ‘True believers: the intentional strategy and why it works’, in Heath, A. F. (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 150–67.Google Scholar
Devitt, M. 1990. ‘Transcendentalism about content’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71:247–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devitt, M. and Rey, G. 1991. ‘Transcending transcendentalism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 87100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dickie, I. 2011. ‘The sortal dependence of demonstrative reference’, European Journal of Philosophy 22: 3640.Google Scholar
Dickie, I. 2015. Fixing Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Doepke, F. 1982. ‘Spatially coinciding objects’, Ratio 24: 4560.Google Scholar
Dorr, C. and Rosen, G. 2002. ‘Composition as fiction’, in Gale, R. (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.151–74.Google Scholar
Dorr, C. and Rosen, G. 2003. ‘Merricks on the existence of human organisms’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(3):711–18.Google Scholar
Dorr, C. and Rosen, G. 2005. ‘What we disagree about when we disagree about ontology’, in Kalderon, M. E. (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 234–86.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. 1969. Seeing and Knowing. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. 1979. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. 1986. ‘Misrepresentation’, in Bogdan, R. (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1736.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. 1988. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Cambridge: MIT.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Driver, J., Davis, G., Russell, C., Turatto, M. and Freeman, E. 2002. ‘Segmentation, attention and phenomenal visual subjects’, in Scholl, B. J. (ed.), Objects and Attention. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 6195.Google Scholar
Dummett, M. 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
Duncan, J. 1984Selective attention and the organization of visual information’, Journal of Experimental Psychology General 113:501–17.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Eddington, A. 1928. The Nature of the Physical World. New York, NY: The Macmillan Co.Google Scholar
Evans, G. 1973. ‘The causal theory of names’, in Collected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 124.Google Scholar
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Evnine, S. 2016. Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evnine, S.in preparation. A Certain Gesture: Evnine’s Batman Meme Project and Its Parerga!Google Scholar
Fine, K. 1999. ‘Things and their parts’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23: 6174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 2003. ‘The non-identity of a material thing and its matter’, Mind 112: 195234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 2008Coincidence and form’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82:101–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 2010. ‘Towards a theory of part’, Journal of Philosophy 107:559–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fish, W. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. 1981. ‘Three cheers for propositional attitudes’, in Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp.100–23.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. 1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. 1995. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. 2008a. LOT2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. 2008b. ‘Against Darwinism’, Mind and Language. 23(1):124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. and Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 2010. What Darwin Got Wrong. London: Profile Books.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. W. 2014. Mind without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Frege, G. 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Breslau: Koebner.Google Scholar
French, S. 2003. ‘Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddington’s structuralist conception of objects’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34:227–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, S. 2014. The Structure of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, S. forthcoming. ‘Doing away with dispositions’, in Meincke, A. (ed.), Dispositionalism: Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. Springer Synthese Library. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
French, S. and Krause, D. 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, S. and Krause, D. 2007. ‘Quantum sortal predicates’, Synthese 154:417–30.Google Scholar
French, S. and Ladyman, J. 2011. ‘In defence of ontic structural realism’, in Bokulich, A. and Bokulich, P. (eds), Scientific Structuralism. Springer, pp. 2542.Google Scholar
French, S. and McKenzie, K. 2012. ‘Thinking outside the (tool)box: towards a more productive engagement between metaphysics and philosophy of physics’, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8:4259.Google Scholar
French, S. and Saatsi, J. 2018. ‘Symmetries and explanatory dependencies’, in Saatsi, J. and Reutlinger, A. (eds), Explanation Beyond Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185205.Google Scholar
Gallois, A. 1998. Occasions of Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Garfinkel, A. 1981. Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Gauker, C. 1986. ‘The principle of charity’, Synthese 69(1):125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geach, P. 1967. ‘Identity’, Review of Metaphysics 21:312.Google Scholar
Geach, P. 1973. ‘Ontological relativity and relative identity’, in Munitz, M. (ed.), Logic and Ontology. New York, NY: New York University Press.Google Scholar
Geach, P. 1980. Reference and Generality. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goddard, C. 2001. ‘Lexico-semantic universals: a critical overview’, Linguistic Typology 5(1):166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Godfrey-Smith, P. 1998. Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. I. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Goldstein, H., Pool, C. and Safko, J. 2002. Classical Mechanics, 3rd edn. San Francisco, CA: Addison Wesley.Google Scholar
Goodman, R. 2012. ‘Why and how not to be a sortalist about thought’, Philosophical Perspectives 26:77112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gould, S. J. and Lewontin, R. C. 1979. ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, series B, 205(1161):581–98.Google Scholar
Gould, S. J. and Vrba, E. 1982. ‘Exaptation: a missing term in the science of form’, Paleobiology 8(1):415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glick, E. N. 2017. ‘What is a singular proposition?’, Mind (July), https://doi.org/10.1093/ mind/fzw063.Google Scholar
Gluer, K. 2006. ‘The status of Charity I: conceptual truth or a posteriori necessity?’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14:337–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grandy, R. 1973Reference, meaning and belief’, Journal of Philosophy 70(14):439–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grandy, R. 1975. ‘Stuff and things’, Synthese 31, 479–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Green, E. J. 2016. ‘Representationalism and perceptual organization’, Philosophical Topics 44:121–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griffin, N. 1977. Relative Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Grossmann, R. 1975. ‘Perceptual objects, elementary particles and emergent properties’, in Castañeda, H. N. (ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars. Indianapolis, IN: Bob Merrill, pp. 129–46.Google Scholar
Gwinn, R. P. and Norton, P. B. (eds) 1992. The New Encyclopedia Britannica 15th edn, Macropedia vol. XXVIII. Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.Google Scholar
Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hawthorne, J. and Cortens, A. 1995. ‘Towards ontological nihilism’, Philosophical Studies, 79:143–65.Google Scholar
Hazlett, A. 2013. A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heil, J. 2012. The Universe as We Find It. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heller, M. 1984. ‘Temporal parts of four-dimensional objects’, Philosophical Studies 46:323–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heller, M. 1990. The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hellie, B. 2014. ‘Love in the time of cholera’, in Brogaard, B. (ed.) Does Perception Have Content? Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hestevold, H. S. 1981. ‘Conjoining’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41(3):371–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hilpinen, R. 1993. ‘Authors and artifacts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93, 155–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirsch, E. 1982. The Concept of Identity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hirsch, E. 1997. ‘Basic objects: a reply to Xu’, Mind and Language 12(3–4):406–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirsch, E. 2002. ‘Quantifier variance and realism’, Philosophical Issues 12(1):5173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirsch, E. 2004. ‘Comments on Theodore Sider’s four dimensionalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(3):658–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirsch, E. 2005. ‘Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes, and common sense’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(1):6797.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirsch, E. 2008. ‘Language, ontology, and structure’, Noûs 42:509–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G. S. 1998. ‘On the unity of compound things: living and non-living’, Ratio 3: 289315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G.S. 1997. Substance: Its Nature and Existence. London and New York, NY: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hofweber, T. 2016. Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hofweber, T. 2017. ‘Replies to Bennett, Rayo, and Sattig’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(2):488504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hookway, C. 2016. ‘Pragmatism’, in Zalta, E. N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 edn), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/ entries/pragmatism/.Google Scholar
Horgan, T. 2001. ‘Contextual semantics and metaphysical realism: truth as indirect correspondence’, in Lynch, M. (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 6795.Google Scholar
Horgan, T. 2006. ‘Abundant truth in an austere world’, in Lynch, P. and Greenough, M. P. (eds), Truth and Realism: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–67.Google Scholar
Horgan, T. 2008. Austere Realism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T. and Potrč, M. 2000. ‘Blobjectivism and indirect correspondence’, Facta Philosophica 2:249–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hornsby, J. 1985. ‘Physicalism, events, and part–whole relations’, in Lepore, E. and McLaughlin, B. (eds), Actions and Events. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Horwich, P. 1998. Truth. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hossack, K. 2000. ‘Plurals and complexes’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51(3):411–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. 1975. ‘On the adverbial analysis of visual experience’, Metaphilosophy 6:127–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. 2015. ‘Singular belief’, in Johnson, R. N. and Smith, M. (eds), Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Johansson, J. 2009. ‘Review of The Metaphysics of Everyday Life’, Philosophical Quarterly 59: 365368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnston, M. 1992. ‘Constitution is not identity’, Mind 101:89105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnston, M. 2004. ‘The obscure object of hallucination’, Philosophical Studies 120:113–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnston, M. 2006. ‘Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awareness’, in Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. (eds), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.  260–90.Google Scholar
Jones, N. 2015. ‘Multiple constitution’, in Bennett, K. and Zimmerman, D. (eds), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 217–61.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D., Treisman, A. and Gibbs, J. 1992. ‘The reviewing of object files: object-specific integration of information’, Cognitive Psychology 24:175219.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kearns, S. 2009. ‘Review of The Metaphysics of Everyday Life’, Philosophical Review 118(4):533535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, J. C., Soames, S. and Speaks, J. 2014. New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korman, D. 2014. ‘Debunking perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects’, Philosophers’ Imprint 14(13):121.Google Scholar
Korman, D. 2015. Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korman, D. 2016. ‘Ordinary objects’, in Zalta, E. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/ordinary-objects/.Google Scholar
Koslicki, K. 2004. ‘Constitution and similarity’, Philosophical Studies 117:327–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koslicki, K. 2008. The Structure of Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kouider, S., Halberda, J., Wood, J. and Carey, S. 2006. ‘Acquisition of English number marking: the singular–plural distinction’, Language Learning and Development 2(1): 125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Ladyman, J., Ross, D., Spurrett, D. and Collier, J. 2007. Everything Must Go. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1968. ‘Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic’, Journal of Philosophy 65:113–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1974. ‘Radical interpretation’, Synthese 23:331–44.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1976. ‘Survival and identity’, in Rorty, A. (ed.), The Identities of Persons. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1983. Philosophical Papers: Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986a. Philosophical Papers: Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986b. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1993. ‘Many, but almost one’, in Campbell, K. and Reinhardt, L. (eds), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lewontin, R. C. 1984. ‘Adaptation’. in Sober, E. (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Liggins, D. 2008. ‘Nihilism without self-contradiction’, Philosophy 83:177–96.Google Scholar
Linnebo, Ø. and Nicolas, D. 2008. ‘Superplurals in English’, Analysis 68(3):186–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Locke, J 1975. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Nidditch, P. H. (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Loewer, B. & Rey, G. (eds) 1991. Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Logue, H. 2014. ‘Experiential content and naive realism: a reconciliation’, in Brogaard, B. (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 220–41.Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 1983. ‘Instantiation, identity and constitution’, Philosophical Studies 44:4559.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 1995. ‘Coinciding objects: in defence of the standard account’, Analysis 55:171–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 2007. ‘Sortals and the individuation of objects’, Mind and Language 22:514–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 2012A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither constituent nor relational’, in Tahko, T. (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 229–48.Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 2013. Forms of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lycan, W. G. 1985. ‘Epistemic value’, Synthese 64(2):137–64 (repr. in 1988. Judgement and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lynch, M. 2004. True to Life: Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lynch, M. 2013. ‘Three questions for truth pluralism’, in Pedersen, N., and Wright, C. (eds), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 2141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Magidor, O. 2013. Category Mistakes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mandelbaum, E. 2017. ‘Seeing and conceptualizing: modularity and the shallow contents of perception’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, http://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, M. G. F. 1998. ‘Setting things before the mind’, in O’Hear, A. (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–79.Google Scholar
Martin, M. G. F. 2004. ‘The limits of self-awareness’, Philosophical Studies 120:3789.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, M. G. F. 2013. ‘Shibboleth: some comments on William Fish’s Perception, Hallucination & Illusion’, Philosophical Studies 163:3748.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matthews, G. 1992. ‘Aristotle’s theory of kooky objects’, manuscript.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 1977. ‘On the sense and reference of a proper name’, in Moore, A. (ed.) 1993. Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 111–36.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 1994. ‘The content of perceptual experience’, Philosophical Quarterly 44: 190205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 1998. Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McGlynn, A. 2012. ‘Interpretation and knowledge maximization’, Philosophical Studies 160:391405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGrath, M. 2005. ‘No objects, no problem?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(4):457–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKenzie, K. and Müller, F. A. 2016. ‘Bound states and the special composition question’, in Massimi, M., Romeijn, J. W. and Schurz, G. (eds), EPSA15 Selected Papers: The 5th Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Dü sseldorf. Basel: Springer, pp. 233–41.Google Scholar
Merricks, T. 2001. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merricks, T. 2003. ‘Replies’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(3):727–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merricks, T. 2015. Propositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Merricks, T. 2016. ‘Do ordinary objects exist? No’, in Barnes, E. (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics. London: Routledge, pp.135–48.Google Scholar
Messiah, A. 2017. Quantum Mechanics. New York, NY: Dover.Google Scholar
Millikan, R. G. 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. London: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. G. 1993. White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Millikan, R. G. 2004. Varieties of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, K. 2014. ‘Pragmatism, joint-carving, and ontology’, Monist, 47(4):571–91.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1925. ‘A defence of common sense’, in Muirhead, J. H. (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series), repr. in Moore 1959.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1959. ‘Certainty’, in Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.Google Scholar
Nolan, D. 2006. ‘Vagueness, multiplicity and parts’, Noûs 40(4):716–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oderberg, D. 1996. ‘Coincidence under a sortal’, Philosophical Review 105:145–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oliver, A. and Smiley, T. 2016. Plural Logic. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, E. 2001. ‘Thinking animals and the constitution view’, Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind (Spring 2001), 19.Google Scholar
Olson, E. 2008. ‘Reply to Baker’, Abstracta Revista Special Issue 1:3242.Google Scholar
Pagin, P. 2006. ‘The status of Charity II: charity, probability and simplicity’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14:361–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pagin, P. 2013. ‘Radical interpretation and the principle of charity’, in Lepore, E. and Ludwig, K. (eds), A Companion to Donald Davidson. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 225–46.Google Scholar
Papineau, D. 1987. Reality and Representation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Parfit, D. 1971. ‘Personal identity’, Philosophical Review 80:327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pati, J. C. and Salam, A. 1974. ‘Lepton number as the fourth “color”’, Physical Review D. 10:275289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pauling, L. 1970. General Chemistry. New York, NY: Dover Publication.Google Scholar
Paul, L. A. 2012. ‘Building the world from its fundamental constituents’, Philosophical Studies 158:221–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pautz, A. 2013. ‘Do the benefits of naïve realism outweigh the costs? Comments on Fish Perception, Hallucination and Illusion’, Philosophical Studies 163: 2536.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Peirce, C. 1958. ‘Some consequences of four incapacities’, in Wiener, P. P (ed.), Charles Sanders Peirce: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Dover Publications, pp. 3972.Google Scholar
Pendlebury, M. J. 1990. ‘Sense experiences and their contents: a defense of the propositional account’, Inquiry 33:215–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perry, J. 1970. ‘The same F’. Philosophical Review 79(2):181200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Piaget, J. 1971. Biology and Knowledge. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Pinker, S. and Bloom, P. 1990. ‘Natural language and natural selection’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13(4):707–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pollock, J. 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Price, H. 2011. Naturalism without Mirrors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Price, H. 2015. ‘From quasirealism to global expressivism – and back again?’, in Johnson, R. and Smith, M. (eds), Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 134–52.Google Scholar
Price, H. H. 1932. Perception. London: Methuen and Co.Google Scholar
Prinz, J. J. 2002. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pylyshyn, Z. 2000. ‘Situating vision in the world’, Trends in Cognitive Science 4:197207.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pylyshyn, Z. 2001. ‘Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision’, Cognition 80:127–58.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pylyshyn, Z. 2003. Seeing and Visualizing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pylyshyn, Z. 2007. Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. 1950. ‘Identity, ostension and hypostasis’, Journal of Philosophy 47:621–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. 1969. ‘Epistemology naturalized’, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. 1985. ‘Events and reification’, in Lepore, E. and McLaughlin, B. (eds), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 162–71.Google Scholar
Rea, M. 1998. ‘Sameness without identity: an Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution’, Ratio (new series) 11:316–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rea, M. 2001. ‘How to be an eleatic monist’, Philosophical Perspectives 15:129–51.Google Scholar
Recanati, F. 2004. Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Recanati, F. 2012. ‘Contextualism, some varieties’, in Allen, K. and Jacszolt, K. M. (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–49.Google Scholar
Recanati, F. 2012. Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rescher, N. 1955. ‘Axioms for the part relation’, Philosophical Studies 6(1): 811.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Restall, G. 2012. ‘A cut-free sequent system for two-dimensional modal logic, and why it matters’, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163(11):1611–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rohrbaugh, G. 2005. ‘I could have done that’, British Journal of Aesthetics 45:209–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rohrbaugh, G. and Louis, deRosset (2004). ‘A new route to the necessity of origin’, Mind 113:705–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rohrbaugh, G. and Louis, deRosset 2006. ‘Prevention, independence, and origin’, Mind 115:375–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, G. and Dorr, C. 2002. ‘Composition as a fiction’, in Gale, R. (ed.), The Blackwell Guide To Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 151–74.Google Scholar
Rosenkrantz, G.S. 2012. ‘Animate beings: their nature and identity’, Ratio 4:442–62.Google Scholar
Rosenkrantz, G.S. 2015. ‘Life and death’, Monist 98:303–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rupert, R. D. 1999. ‘The best test theory of extension: first principle(s)’, Mind and Language 14(3):321–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Sainsbury, R. M. and Tye, M.. 2012. Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, N. 1998. ‘Nonexistence’, Noûs 32:277319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sattig, T. 2015. The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sattig, T. 2017. ‘Metaphysical ambitions in the ontology of objects’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(2):481–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2009. ‘The deflationary metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects’, Philosophical Books 50:142–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schellenberg, S. 2010. ‘The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience’, Philosophical Studies 149:1948.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schellenberg, S. 2011. ‘Perceptual content defended’, Noûs 45:714–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schellenberg, S. 2013. ‘Externalism and the gappy content of hallucination’, in Platchias, D. and Macpherson, F. E. (eds), Hallucination. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 291311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schiffer, S. 1996. ‘Language-created, language-independent entities’, Philosophical Topics 24(1):149–67.Google Scholar
Schiffer, S. 2003. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scholl, B. 2002. ‘Objects and attention: the state of the art’, in Scholl, B. (ed.), Objects and Attention. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Scholl, B., Pylyshyn, Z. and Feldman, J. 2001. ‘What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in multiple object tracking’, Cognition 80:159–77.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Searle, J. 2015. Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sellars, W. 1958. ‘Counterfactuals, dispositions and the causal modalities’, in Feigl, H., Scriven, M., and Maxwell, G. (eds), Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science Vol. 2: Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body Problem. Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 225308.Google Scholar
Sellars, W. 1963 Science, Perception, and Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Sellars, W. 1981. ‘Foundations for a metaphysics of pure process Monist, 64(1).Google Scholar
Selley, R. C., Cocks, R. and Plimer, I. (eds) 2004. Encyclopedia of Geology. Chicago, IL: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Sher, G. 2013. ‘Forms of correspondence: the intricate route from thought to reality’, in Pedersen, N. and Wright, C. (eds), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 157–79.Google Scholar
Sher, G. 2015. ‘Truth as composite correspondence’, in Galinon, H., Achourioti, D., Fujimoto, K. and Martinez, J. (eds), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 191210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, S 1970. ‘Persons and their pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7:269–85.Google Scholar
Sider, T. 1993. ‘Van Inwagen and the possibility of gunk’, Analysis 53:285–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T. 2013. ‘Against parthood’, in Bennett, K. and Zimmerman, D. (eds), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 237–93.Google Scholar
Sider, T. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T. 2014. ‘Hirsch’s attack on ontologese’, Noûs 48:565–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S. 2008. ‘The epistemic conception of hallucination’, in Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–24.Google Scholar
Siegel, S. and Byrne, A.. 2016. ‘Rich or thin?’, in Nanay, B. (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 5980.Google Scholar
Simons, P. 1987. Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Simpson, J. and Weiner, E. 1989. The Oxford Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Snowdon, P. 2009. ‘On the sortal dependency of the individuation thesis’ in Dyke, H. (ed.), From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 254–71.Google Scholar
Sosa, E. 1997. ‘Subjects among other things’, in Rea, M. C. (ed.), Material Constitution. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 6389.Google Scholar
Spelke, E. S. 1988. ‘Where perceiving ends and thinking begins: the apprehension of objects in infancy’, in Yonas, A. (ed.), Perceptual Development in Infancy. Minnesota Symposium on Child Psychology (vol. XX). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Spelke, E. S. 1990. ‘Principles of object perception’, Cognitive Science 14:2956.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spelke, E. S., Gutheil, G. and van de Walle, G. 1995. ‘The development of object perception’, in Osherson, D. (ed.), Invitation to Cognitive Science. 2nd edn, Vol. II: Visual Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 297330.Google Scholar
Stampe, D. 1977. ‘Towards a causal theory of mental representation’, in French, P. A., Wettstein, H. K. and Uehling, T. E. (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 4263.Google Scholar
Stanley, J. 2007. Language in Context: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stebbing, S. 1937. Philosophy and the Physicists. London: Methuen and Co.Google Scholar
Stephenson, N. 1999. Cryptonomicon. New York, NY: Avon.Google Scholar
Sterelny, K. 2003. Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
Sterelny, K. 2012. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steward, H 2015. ‘What is a continuant?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 89:109–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stich, S. P. 1993. The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. London: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. 1979. ‘Perception and its objects’, in MacDonald, G. F. (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer. London: MacMillan, pp. 4160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swadesh, M. 1971. The Origin and Diversification of Language, Sherzer, J. (ed.). Chicago, IL: Aldine.Google Scholar
Tallant, J. 2013. ‘Against mereological nihilism’, Synthese 191(7):1511–27.Google Scholar
Tallant, J. 2014. A Natural History of Human Thinking. London: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2007. ‘Modal normativism and the methods of metaphysics’, Philosophical Topics 35(1–2):135–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2007. Ordinary Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2010. ‘The controversy over the existence of ordinary objects’, Philosophy Compass 5(7):591601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2013. ‘Fictionalism vs. deflationism’, Mind 122(488):1023–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2014. ‘Quizzical ontology and easy ontology’, Journal of Philosophy 111(9–10):502–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2015. Ontology Made Easy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Thomson, J. 1998. ‘The statue and the clay’, Noûs 32:149–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tomasello, M. 2008. Origins of Human Communication. London: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tye, M. 2009. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Tye, M. 2014. ‘What is the content of a hallucinatory experience?’, in Brogaard, B. (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 291310.Google Scholar
Unger, P. 1979: ‘I do not exist’, in MacDonald, G. (ed.), Perception and Identity. London: Macmillan, pp. 235–51.Google Scholar
Unger, P. 1980The problem of the many’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5(1):411–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Uzquiano, G. 2011. ‘Plural quantification and modality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111:219–50.Google Scholar
van Cleve, J 1986. ‘Mereological essentialism, mereological conjunctivism and identity through time’, in French, P. & Wettstein, H. (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 11. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 141–56.Google Scholar
van Cleve, J 2008. ‘The moon and sixpence: a defense of mereological universalism’, in Sider, T., Hawthorne, J. and Zimmerman, D. W. (eds), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 321–40.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, B. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 2014a. ‘Introduction: inside and outside the ontology room’, in Existence: Essays on Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 2014b. ‘Causation and the mental’, in Existence: Essays on Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 238–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 2016. ‘The neo-Carnapians’, Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016–1110-4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wald, R. B. 1984. General Relativity. Chicago, IL: University of Chigaco Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wasserman, R. 2004. ‘The constitution question’, Noûs 38:693710.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wierzbicka, A. 1996. Semantics: Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiggins, D. 1967. Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wiggins, D. 1968. ‘On being in the same place at the same time’, Philosophical Review, 77:9095.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiggins, D. 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wiggins, D. 1997. ‘Sortal concepts: a reply to Xu’, Mind and Language 12(3–4):413–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiggins, D. 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, B. 1970. ‘The self and the future’, Philosophical Review 79:161–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, D. C. 1959. ‘Universals and existents’ (paper delivered to the Yale Philosophy Club and published posthumously 1986), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, M. 2011. ‘Pragmatism, minimalism, expressivism’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18(3):317–30.Google Scholar
Williams, M. 2013. ‘How pragmatists can be local expressivists’, in Price, H., Blackburn, S., Brandom, R., Horwich, P. and Williams, M. (eds), Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 128–44.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 1994. Vagueness. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: BlackwellCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. 2016. ‘Counterpossibles’, Topoi 37(3):357–68.Google Scholar
Wilson, M. 2008. ‘Beware of the blob: cautions for would-be metaphysicians’, in Zimmerman, D. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 275320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, N. L. 1958. ‘Substances without substrata’, Review of Metaphysics 12(4):521–39.Google Scholar
Wolfe, J. and Bennett, S. 1997. ‘Preattentive object files: shapeless bundles of basic reatures’, Vision Research 37:2543.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, C. 2010. ‘Truth, Ramsification, and the pluralist’s revenge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88:265–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Xu, F. 1997. ‘From Lot’s wife to a pillar of salt: evidence that physical object is a sortal concept’, Mind and Language 12 (3–4):365–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Xu, F. 2007Sortal concepts, object individuation, and language’, Trends in Cognitive Science 11(9):400–6.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Xu, F. and Carey, S. 1996. ‘Infants’ metaphysics: the case of numerical identity’, Cognitive Psychology 30:111–53.Google ScholarPubMed
Yablo, S. 1987. ‘Identity, essence and indiscernibility’, Philosophical Review 104: 293314.Google Scholar
Yablo, S. 2005. ‘The myth of the seven’, in Kalderon, M. (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 88115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. 2009. ‘Must existence-questions have answers?’, in Chalmers, D., Manley, D. and Wasserman, R. (eds), Metametaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 507–25.Google Scholar
Zimmerman, D. W. 2002. ‘The constitution of persons by bodies: a critique of Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory of material constitution’, Philosophical Topics 30(1):295338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar