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Profile: Reputation can make the world go round – or why we are sometimes social

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Manfred Milinski
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
Tamás Székely
Affiliation:
University of Bath
Allen J. Moore
Affiliation:
University of Exeter
Jan Komdeur
Affiliation:
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
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Summary

Reciprocity is the secret of our success, even though two unrelated individuals sometimes find it difficult to cooperate. They may mutually reciprocate help, if they know they will meet again. However, there is always the temptation not to return the help to the donor. Using a strategy such as Tit-for-Tat (see Chapter 4) can minimise the risk of being the sucker in the end, but there is no guarantee. To achieve cooperation seems hopeless when groups of three or more unrelated individuals need to cooperate in order to maintain a common resource: the resource is usually overused and collapses, as do fish populations as a consequence of over-fishing, and the global climate as a consequence of unrestricted use of fossil energy. The latter is regarded as the greatest challenge to humankind. The tragedy of the commons, as Hardin (1968) called this kind of social dilemma (see Chapter 6), appears inevitable – free access to a public resource brings ruin to all.

The so-called Public Goods game has been invented as a paradigm to study tragedy of the commons situations experimentally. For example, a group of four volunteers is asked to supply one euro each to a public pool, which is then doubled and redistributed among the four players irrespective of whether they have contributed. If all contribute, each has a net gain of one euro. However, a single defector has a net gain of 1.50 euro whereas each of the three contributors gains only 50 cents. Why should you cooperate?

Type
Chapter
Information
Social Behaviour
Genes, Ecology and Evolution
, pp. 200 - 202
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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References

Bateson, M., Nettle, D. & Roberts, G. (2006) Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters, 2, 412–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haley, K. J. & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005) Nobody's watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hardin, G. (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.Google ScholarPubMed
Milinski, M., Semmann, D. & Krambeck, H. J. (2002) Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Nature, 415, 424–426.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Milinski, M., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H. J., Reed, F. A. & Marotzke, J. (2008) The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 105, 2291–2294.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (1998) Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature, 393, 573–577.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rockenbach, B. & Milinski, M. (2006) The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature, 444, 718–723.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wedekind, C. & Milinski, M. (2000) Cooperation through image scoring in humans. Science, 288, 850–852.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

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