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This chapter responds to the critiques of Linda Radzik’s account of social punishment offered by Christopher Bennett, George Sher, and Glen Pettigrove. In response to their objections, Radzik revises her definition of social punishment, draws a distinction between the justificandum and justificans of social punishment, and explores the problem of interpreting particular actions as punishments as opposed to protests.
Ethicists often approach our task by thinking about the norms that apply to act types. We ask, for example, what it means to punish, to make amends, or to forgive, and what conditions govern the appropriate performance of actions that fall within these types. However, actions often do not fall neatly into only one action type. This chapter discusses two cases that can be interpreted both as acts of protest and as acts of what Linda Radzik calls “informal social punishment.” Since the norms that govern these two types diverge, the fact that a particular action can be interpreted in either of these ways poses a challenge for anyone who might be seeking moral guidance from the type to which the action belongs. The cases highlight a theoretical gap that needs to be filled not only by accounts of social punishment or protest but also by ethicists who would use this approach to think about actions of other overlapping types.
Chapter 6 takes a close look at the watershed moment of World War II to show how Africans’ demands for better working conditions, greater political participation, and more social services pressured European nations to reform the development episteme. Economic hardship during the war intensified African vulnerability to poverty, malnutrition, and disease. Britain passed the new Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) in 1940, and France followed suit with the establishment of the Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) (FIDES) in 1946. Unlike pre–World War II colonial development policies that demanded self-sufficiency, these initiatives provided significant metropolitan funding for economic and social programs in Africa without the stipulation that they result in a direct return on investment. European colonial development in Africa was no longer simply investment in colonial industries; now it claimed to promote the welfare of African people. Imperial powers envisioned postwar development as a solution to growing dissent in Africa and budding anticolonial movements across the globe at the end of the war. The new colonial development policies signaled a desperate attempt to keep colonialism alive at a time when it seemed perilously out of date.
How do Latin America’s poorest citizens participate in politics? This article explores the role that community organizations play in mobilizing individuals into three common modes of political participation: voting, protesting, and contacting government. It argues that community organizations help mobilize poor individuals both through the resources they provide for mobilization and because they serve as sites where political parties target individuals for mobilization. It analyzes survey data from LAPOP surveys for 18 Latin American countries and finds that overall, poor people are just as politically active as more affluent individuals; that involvement in community organizations is a very strong predictor of all types of political participation; and that membership in organizations has an especially strong effect on voting and protesting for poor people. By equalizing levels of political participation across income groups, organizations help erase class-based inequalities in participation that have plagued democracies in the region.
While auctoritas may seem to be a crucial prerequisite for the Roman orator, Cicero sometimes took on a nonauthoritative persona, especially in periods of domination by Pompey and Caesar: he made a show of fear, self-effacing humor, or stubborn silence. He performs fear especially in the introductions of Pro Milone and Pro Deiotaro in order to play down his own power to threaten Pompey and Caesar, and perhaps to provoke resentment of their power to threaten him. In Pro Milone and Pro Ligario, he makes a potentially comical statement that he will shout to be heard, acting foolishly to break political tension. In his letters and in the Brutusunder Caesar’s dictatorship, he proclaims his refusal to speak in public in order to show resistance to the new regime, using silence as an act of protest. I read this as rhetoric of withdrawal or disengagement rather than a transparent reflection of reality.
This chapter analyzes over fifty cases in which Trump sought to remove confrontational protestors during his campaign rallies. Consideration of the linguistic and semiotic form of Trump’s instructions shows that, most often, they consisted of a grammatical imperative, “Get them out,” addressed to his supporters or to event security. The activity of removing protestors became a tool of interactional messaging which not only allowed Trump to signify about his own self-image but also created opportunities for supporters to embody and enact the political project that Trump advocated. The semiotic notion of “iconicity,” in which a sign represents by way of a resemblance or similarity with its object, provides a key to understanding these events. Trump’s ejecting protestors not only allowed Trump to communicate an image of strong, masculine leadership, but also diagrammed aspects of his proposed policies. The very action of ejecting protestors served as a kind of portrait in miniature of Trump’s promised immigration policy; ejected protestors stood for those persons labelled illegal immigrants who would, Trump promised, be deported. “Get them out” thus came to allude to a large-scale redistribution of power and agency, a new morally righteous populism, that his leadership would bring about.
The importance of interpersonal trust for participation in mass politics has been established in some contexts, but rarely in the developing world, and the mechanism linking trust to participation has not be well specified. In this chapter, the link between trust and participation is defined in terms of interdependence, on the one hand, and uncertainty, on the other. Based on this, participation levels are expected to be lower for individuals who generally distrust others and higher for those with a salient religious group identity. Moreover, religious group identity is expected to bolster participation because group-based trust operates as an effective substitute for generalized trust, where it is absent. The hypotheses are tested using survey responses from twenty-four Muslim countries, and evidence is found in support of each. Finally, the theory is extended to explain how repression impacts the advantage of Islamic-based political movements: in contrast to existing theories, which hold that repression should effectively sideline Islamic groups, I illustrate how increased repression bolsters the Islamic advantage by making trust even more important for political participation.
An often-cited finding in US-driven suicidology is that women have higher rates of suicidal behavior, and lower suicide rates than men. This pattern, however, is not representative of the global suicidality picture. In Asian countries, female and male suicide rates are similar. To stimulate new thinking about female suicidality, we put China at the center of our analysis, and the United States at the periphery, and then discussed the insights generated by this reversal. Insights include that the US-centered canon is caught in the mental illness paradigm; and that it generalizes to women assumptions and evidence that mainly apply to men. For example, China’s data challenge dominant assumptions that marriage offers suicide protection. For many Chinese rural women, suicide is an act of despair and protest against suffocating marriages and communities – not a plea for closer ties (nor an expression of mental illness). China’s evidence, including that women’s suicide-mortality has significantly dropped since urbanization, supports a paradigm-shift in suicidology.
Informed by the ‘assembly’ jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, this article addresses fundamental questions about the meaning and scope of ‘assembly’ in Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In seeking to determine when the right of peaceful assembly might properly be engaged, the article explores the interrelationship of assembly with expression and association and proposes a definition of ‘assembly’—for the purposes of its protection—as ‘an intentional gathering by two or more people (including in private and online/virtual spaces)’. Such definitional reflection is particularly timely in light of the Human Rights Committee's drafting of General Comment No 37 on Article 21.
Why is the #MeToo movement very active in some countries but not in others? What factors encourage the transnational diffusion of digital feminist activism? Although transnational forces are important, we argue that domestic political opportunity structures play a more significant role than transnational influences in the country-level diffusion of #MeToo. We collected 35,211 global tweets and used Bayesian statistical modeling to test the implications of our theory. Our findings support the idea that as a country better protects its citizens’ political and civil rights and civil liberties, individuals in that country are more likely to engage in the #MeToo movement.
At crucial junctures European citizens spoke up to express support for or dissatisfaction with the EC, or addressed European affairs in other forums. Yet the process from which the EC and EU eventually emerged was always characterised by a degree of remoteness, and by a tension between civil society participation and elite-centric politics. Overall, the chapter argues that attitudes towards the integration process – even before the Maastricht Treaty – were much less robust than had long been believed. During the post-war decades the EC remained no bearer of great passions. The reasons for this include the Community’s economic focus, its technocratic aspect and its remoteness from everyday life. At the same time many people preferred to become involved in other things than the affairs of the EC, for example in youth exchange programmes, town twinning or Interrailing around the continent and other forms of transnational tourism. For important questions that the public had in relation to Europe, the EC at the time offered no answers and no platform for civil society engagement. Hence, European cooperation EC style was based more on toleration than on genuine approval.
In the 1980s, many disillusioned East Germans dropped out of the official social system and created a parallel civil society within the Protestant Church, striving towards disarmament, demilitarisation and environmentalism. While these activists sought to eschew politics, the SED’s repression of a social sphere outside of party-approved organisations demonstrated to many that political reform was imperative to achieving even purely moral goals such as peace. In 1986, a small group of activists created the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, sparking a rallying cry for disparate groups of disaffected East Germans, who invoked human rights not as the antithesis of socialism but as a core value forgotten and abused by the SED. Simultaneously, the SED’s ideological bulwark against such a movement began to crumble as it sought to create a socialist version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Despite initial enthusiasm from allies who saw it as a means to unify the socialist world against Western pressure, one country after another pulled out, scared off by various human rights guarantees contained within. Simultaneously, reformers began to see human rights as a rhetorical tool to liberalise sclerotic political institutions to save the socialist project as a whole.
Sexualized naked protest using young and attractive women's bodies have long featured in the repertoire of protest tools for interventions in public space. Antirape feminist groups and nonhuman-animal rights activist groups, in particular, have mobilized these bodies to attract attention to their causes. Contemporary debates have suggested that these sorts of protest are objectionable, and that they are entwined with contemporary rape culture. This article complicates these accounts by considering what happens when the naked body is presented as a grotesquery in the service of these apparently emancipatory politics.
Analyzing two instances of naked protest as case studies, this article examines what happens to naked protest when the bodies protesting are “ugly” or are rendered so. The analysis suggests that naked protest featuring bodies that are “ugly” harbors the possibility of mobilizing a transgressive politics beyond contemporary rape culture. This article has implications for better understanding how to mobilize protest in a way that is transgressive and bold without further enshrining rape culture as the normative background against which it takes place.
this chapter explores the medium through which the Nigerian population addressed and contested the series of rules, restrictions, and regulations imposed by the British to address the crisis generated by the war. In this context, the letters and petitions Nigerians wrote provided opportunities to locate African voices, as they confronted the new political and economic system introduced during the war. This chapter reveals that, although support for the war cut across class lines, most of the upper class and political elite were less concerned with the issues of daily survival, such as food insecurity and matters of daily subsistence, that lay at the root of these petitions. It concludes that the richness of these petitions allows for a better understanding of the impacts of the war on rural families and urban communities and situates the civilian experience within the larger context of the war and colonial society while creating a space for petitioners to participate in the larger discourse. It argues that Nigerian petitions reveal how local economic conditions and production systems linked a broad range of people, classes, and spatial categories and allowed them to move into the realm of public discourses on war, colonialism, and policy.
This chapter outlines key themes in the history of racial violence in modern America, as well as exemplary scholarship on this important subject. More important, the essay centers white supremacy as a primary motivator of racial violence across region and era. The emancipation of enslaved African Americans led to violent struggles over citizenship and civic equality in the Civil War’s wake, yet those struggles extended far beyond the postbellum south. Violence fueled campaigns to disenfranchise, segregate, and exclude non-whites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As the United States emerged as a global power in these same decades, ideologies of racial dominance informed American encounters with peoples abroad. Yet racial violence also spurred organization and protest, from African American anti-lynching campaigns to civil rights activism in Latinx, Native American, and Asian American communities, the history of racial violence is necessarily a dual history of repression and resistance. In the early decades of the twenty-first century, continued resistance to racial reform and full equality expresses itself in highly destructive and deeply systemic forms of violence.
The aim of this article is to analyze three key issues in current Nicaraguan politics and in the political debate surrounding hybrid regimes: de-democratization, political protest, and the fall of presidencies. First, it analyzes the process of de-democratization that has been taking place in Nicaragua since 2000. It shows that the 2008 elections were not competitive but characteristic of an electoral authoritarian regime. Second, it reflects on the kind of regime created in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega’s mandate, focusing on the system’s inability to process any kind of protest and dissent. Third, it examines the extent to which the protests that broke out in April 2018 may predict the early end to Ortega’s presidency, or whether Nicaragua’s political crisis may lead to negotiations between the government and the opposition.
The afterword revisits the major themes of the book but also points to the particularly important role of Irish writers in articulating critiques of empire, unsurprising in view of their nation’s subject relation within the United Kingdom. This final section also addresses the question of slavery, now seen as the greatest contradiction in Enlightenment political thought and practice, noting that this issue becomes prominent politically and theatrically in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Early Whig hostility to extractive colonial policy, recently uncovered by Steven Pincus, suggests however that mainstream anti-slavery positions may have emerged earlier than previously believed, suggesting potential rethinking of such tragedies as Oroonoko and Young’s The Revenge.
The introduction provides a survey of recent scholarship on the English Enlightenment and situates this study in that context. Recognizing that there a plethora of “Enlightenments,” even within a particular state such as Britain, itself a composite monarchy of nations, I argue that late Stuart and Georgian drama included articulations of radical as well as conservative Enlightened positions, notably in regard to religious toleration, imperial oppression and social hierarchy. I link my analysis of Islamic and indigenous American voices within eighteenth-century plays to recent scholarship that identifies European dependence on non-European literary, theological and technological sources in the creation of Enlightenment.
The success of protests depends on whether they favorably affect public opinion: nonviolent resistance can win public support for a movement, but regimes counter by framing protest as violent and instigated by outsiders. The authors argue that public perceptions of whether a protest is violent shift based on the framing of the types of action and the identities of participants in those actions. The article distinguishes between three dimensions: (1) threat of harm, (2) bearing of arms and (3) identity of protesters. Using survey experiments in Israel and the United States, the study finds support for framing effects. Threat of harm has the largest positive effect on perceptions of violence and support for repression. Surprisingly, social out-groups are not perceived as more violent, but respondents favor repressing them anyway. Support for repressing a nonthreatening out-group is at least as large as support for repressing a threatening in-group. The findings link contentious action and public opinion, and demonstrate the susceptibility of this link to framing.
Autocrats use repression to deter opposition. Are they successful in the long run? The author argues that state repression can have long-lasting alienating effects on citizens’ political attitudes and coercive effects on their political behavior. The article evaluates this proposition by studying the long-term effects of state terror during China's Cultural Revolution. It shows that individuals who grew up in localities that were exposed to more state-sponsored violence in the late 1960s are less trusting of national political leaders and more critical of the country's political system today. These anti-regime attitudes are more likely to be passed down to the younger generation if family members discuss politics frequently than if they do not. Yet while state repression has created anti-regime attitudes, it has decreased citizens’ contentious behavior. These findings highlight the dilemma that authoritarian rulers face when they seek to consolidate their rule through repression.