The three anterior thalamic nuclei and the nucleus reuniens are essential for spatial navigation, yet their exact role in this function remains elusive. Specifically, it remains to be answered whether the thalamus acts a simple relay of spatial and executive signals or whether it critically operates on its inputs to convey processed signals to its cortical targets. The anterior thalamus and nucleus reuniens are at the center stage of anatomical networks that share one common aspect: their association with the hippocampus. Here, I review the large body of literature, starting from the classic Papez circuits, which describe how these thalamic nuclei are interconnected with subcortical, medial cortex, and parahippocampal regions, as well as their neuromodulatory inputs. I then provide an overview of the spatial and other electrophysiological correlates of anterior thalamic and reuniens neurons and of how their firing and oscillatory properties depend on ongoing behavior. Finally, I discuss the clinical and experimental evidence pointing to the role of the thalamus in navigation and, specifically, how spatial and executive signals are processed in thalamocortical loops. I conclude by discussing how the same thalamic circuits may be at play in the processing of episodic memories during sleep.

The goal of the theory is characterized as presenting, in computationally tractable terms, a comprehensive account of the cognitive underpinnings of the human emotion system and of the cognitions in terms of which different emotion types can be distinguished. The theory proposes three broad groups of emotions, determined by the three major perspectives people can take on what’s going on around them. These three foci are seen as giving rise to reactions to events (things that happen), reactions to the actions of agents (things that agents do), and reactions to objects (things in general). A minimal definition of emotion is proposed, and the different kinds of evidence adduced to support claims about emotions are discussed. Emphasis is placed on the fact that emotion words are not isomorphic with distinct emotion types, so that although theorizing about emotions often depends on using linguistic labels, a general theory of human emotions should attempt to be culturally neutral and should minimize its dependence on emotion words.

There are surprisingly few experimental studies directly comparing the cognition of primate species representing distinct phylogenetic groupings, specialized foraging ecologies, or unique social structures. Although researchers have focused on the role of foraging and social ecology in predicting cognition, they have examined social and foraging strategies in a nuanced fashion that would permit an understanding of how specific aspects of a species’ natural environment might sculpt the evolution of specific forms of cognition. In the absence of such studies, and a clear consensus as to whether cognition should best be viewed as domain-general or domain-specific suites of abilities, it is challenging to draw conclusions as to (1) cognitive differences between primate families or (2) selection pressures responsible for shaping differences. We conclude, based on paltry but accumulating evidence, that there is little utility in postulating separate physical and social domains. In addition, we see little evidence that group-living species are cognitively advantaged compared to primates that exhibit other social structures. Lastly, we advocate for greater attention to reproductive and parental strategies and individual differences in ontogenetic experiences that may color species-level comparisons.

The seminal work on mirror self-recognition, theory of mind, and ape-language abilities beginning in the 1960s has stimulated a recent, significant body research on the cognitive abilities of animals. Because of their greater genetic, morphological, and neuroanatomical similarities with humans, research on cognition in nonhuman primates has held a particular fascination from scientific and public perspective. In this chapter, we present a summary of recent studies by our research group on the general intelligence of chimpanzees. We further present data on (1) the contribution of genetic and non-genetic factors in explaining individual variation in cognitive performance in the chimpanzees and (2) phenotypic, genetic, and environmental associations found between chimpanzee cognition and neuroanatomical organization. We end by discussing limitations in the study of cognition and emphasize the need to include individual as well as grouped data in the reporting of results. We also offer some suggestions for future research that would provide new insight into the evolution of human unique cognitive abilities.

When George John Romanes published his book Animal Intelligence in 1882, marking for many the beginning of the study of comparative cognition, he devoted chapter 17 to the mental life of “Monkeys, Apes, and Baboons.” His subsequent experiments on the mental powers of zoo chimpanzees would be published in Science (Romanes, 1889) and Nature (Romanes, 1890). Around the turn of the last century, Edward Thorndike of Columbia University and A. J. Kinnaman of Clark University conducted laboratory studies on the intelligence of capuchin and rhesus monkeys, respectively. Thus, from psychology’s earliest days as an experimental science, nonhuman primate cognition was a focus of interest and investigation. Many of the best-known and most influential psychologists in history – names like Watson, Yerkes, Köhler, Harlow, Lashley, Hebb, Premack, Rumbaugh, and countless others – made significant contributions to our understanding of learning and cognition through studies of monkeys and apes. Although the history of cognitive research with nonhuman primates is too long and too rich to be reviewed exhaustively in one chapter, the present introduction will highlight significant research themes and important milestones across the history of primate cognition research. The goal of this review is to show how contemporary comparative cognition research is intricately connected to its history, and how our understanding of primate cognition shows cumulative progress across the last 140 years of inquiry.

This chapter presents an idealized path towards theory development (for all kinds of theories), called the “demarcation-explanation” cycle. The cycle comprised four stages: (a) the provisional demarcation of the explanandum in a working definition, (b) the proposal of different types of explanations, (c) the validation of explanations in empirical research, (d) and the proposal of a scientific definition flowing from these explanations. The chapter also takes a closer look at (a) different types of definitions (working vs. scientific, intensional vs. extensional/diviso) and ways to evaluate the adequacy of scientific definitions, (b) different types of explanations (constitutive, causal, mechanistic, teleological) and levels of analysis, and (c) ingredients of mechanistic explanations such as representations, operations, operating conditions (related to automaticity), and related notions of dual-process/system models, rationality, and cognition.

A review by the ManyPrimates project confirmed long-standing beliefs about the field of primate cognition. Namely, research is driven by a handful of species, often from the same study site, and inferences are limited by small sample sizes. However, the review did not address another common practice in primate cognition: sampling only adults. Whereas adult data have been useful for comparisons to human literature for understanding cognitive abilities on an evolutionary timescale, these studies do not allow investigators to ask questions about the developmental processes underlying primate cognition. The purpose of this secondary systematic review was to provide a state of the field on developmental primate cognition by answering the following questions about recent publications using the ManyPrimates dataset: (1) how often investigators sampled infants and/or juveniles separately from adults; (2) when infants and/or juveniles were included with adults, how often was age analyzed statistically; (3) how often were studies longitudinal; (4) what topics have been studied; and (5) what techniques have been used. Results revealed that the typical recent primate cognition study did not incorporate development. Practical challenges that may preclude investigators from pursuing developmental research questions in primate cognition are discussed with recommendations to guide future research.

What is the purpose of studies of primate cognition, and how should one best study primate cognition? This book answers those questions, and it highlights some of the most recent and compelling evidence regarding the cognitive abilities of primate species. This book describes the goals of studying primate cognition (historically, and in the present), and how such studies teach us about the minds of our closest living relatives, as well as about our own minds. Primate cognitive studies illustrate important aspects of the origins of human cognition, and they provide a measure of connectedness between humans and other primates. Topics range across nearly all those typically seen in a book of human cognition: perception, representation, categorization, memory, decision-making, communication and language, numerical cognition, metacognition, and theory of mind, among others. This book also describes the varied setting in which primates can be studied, and the range of experimental and observational approaches that are typically used. Some authors address questions about the ethics of working with nonhuman primates, as well as the concerns that have emerged about replication and reproducibility of results that are reported in primate cognitive research.

Working memory (WM) is our limited-capacity storage and processing (memory) system that permeates essential facets of our cognitive life such as arithmetic calculation, logical thinking, decision-making, prospective planning, language comprehension, and production. Since the very inception of WM in the early 1960s (Miller et al., 1960), its role in language acquisition and processing has been extensively investigated both empirically and theoretically by researchers from diverse fields of psychology and linguistics, accumulating an increasingly huge body of literature (e.g., see Baddeley, 2003; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993 for reviews of early studies). Notwithstanding, the field still lacks a comprehensive and updated profile of conceptualizing and implementing working memory in the broad domains of native and second language acquisition, processing, impairments, and training. In this chapter, we introduce a comprehensive handbook in which key areas of inquiry and practice in working memory and language are at the forefront and theoretical ingenuity and empirical robustness are integrated throughout.

This chapter focuses on resources, strategies, and interventions when working with older adults with low health literacy. Integrating practical ways of engaging this population can enhance and improve older adults’ health status, and enhance the interaction and relationships with health-care providers. As patients are asked to take a more active role in the management of their health, enabling participation and better communication, the patients’ involvement can have a dramatic effect in improving health outcomes and patient satisfaction. Health professionals can encourage clear health communication to promote the overall health and well-being of older adults.

Engaging and working with older adults with low health literacy is critical to improving health outcomes. For those with low health literacy, it's important to ensure health messages, both verbal and written, are communicated clearly so that patients can understand what they need to do, in order to achieve better health and make informed decisions about their care. Older adults may be more hesitant to ask questions of their health providers, or lack the skills to find, evaluate, and utilize health information online. Other factors, such as physical, cognitive, and social age-related changes, can also impact older adults’ ability to understand and process health information.

To conceptualize the communicative role of working memory (WM), the Ease-of-Language Understanding (ELU) model was proposed (e.g., Rönnberg, 2003; Rönnberg et al., 2008, 2013, 2019, 2020). The model states that ease of language understanding is determined by the speed and accuracy with which the signal is matched to existing multimodal language representations. When matching is fast and complete, language understanding is effortless; this process may be facilitated by predictions based on the contents of WM. However, when the contents of the language signal mismatches with existing representations, WM is triggered to access knowledge in semantic long-term memory (SLTM) and personal experience from episodic long-term memory (ELTM) – promoting inference-making and postdictions in WM. The interplay between WM and LTM is fundamental to language understanding; its efficiency becomes apparent in adverse conditions and its breakdown may explain cognitive decline and dementia. Empirical support, limitations, and future studies will be discussed.