In this paper and the companion paper [9] we describe a number of contrasts between the theory of linear orderings and the theory of two-dimensional partial orderings.

The notion of dimensionality for partial orderings was introduced by Dushnik and Miller [3], who defined a partial ordering 〈A, R〉 to be n-dimensional if there are n linear orderings of A, 〈A, L1〉, 〈A, L2〉 …, 〈A, Ln〉 such that R = L1 ∩ L2 ∩ … ∩ Ln. Thus, for example, if Q is the linear ordering of the rationals, then the (rational) plane Q × Q with the product ordering (〈x1, y1〉 ≤Q×Q 〈x2, y2, if and only if x1 ≤ x2 and y1 ≤ y2) is 2-dimensional, since ≤Q×Q is the intersection of the two lexicographic orderings of Q × Q. In fact, as shown by Dushnik and Miller, a countable partial ordering is n-dimensional if and only if it can be embedded as a subordering of Qn.

Two-dimensional partial orderings have attracted the attention of a number of combinatorialists in recent years. A basis result recently obtained, independently, by Kelly [7] and Trotter and Moore [10], describes explicitly a collection of finite partial orderings such that a partial ordering is a 2dpo if and only if it contains no element of as a subordering.

We prove independence results concerning the number of nonisomorphic models (using the S-chain condition and S-properness) and the consistency of “ there is a universal linear order of power ℵ1”. Most of these results were announced in [Sh 4], [Sh 5].

In subsequent papers we shall prove an analog f MA for forcing which does not destroy stationary subsets of ω1 investigate -properness for various filters and prove the consistency with G.C.H. of an axiom implying SH (for ℵ1), and connected results.

In this paper we examine the class of two-dimensional partial orderings from the perspective of undecidability. We shall see that from this perspective the class of 2dpo's is more similar to the class of all partial orderings than to its one-dimensional subclass, the class of all linear orderings. More specifically, we shall describe an argument which lends itself to proofs of the following four results:

(A) the theory of 2dpo's is undecidable:

(B) the theory of 2dpo's is recursively inseparable from the set of sentences refutable in some finite 2dpo;

(C) there is a sentence which is true in some 2dpo but which has no recursive model;

(D) the theory of planar lattices is undecidable.

It is known that the theory of linear orderings is decidable (Lauchli and Leonard [4]). On the other hand, the theories of partial orderings and lattices were shown to be undecidable by Tarski [14], and that each of these theories is recursively inseparable from its finitely refutable statements was shown by Taitslin [13]. Thus, the complexity of the theories of partial orderings and lattices is, by (A), (B) and (D), already reflected in the 2dpo's and planar lattices.

As pointed out by J. Schmerl, bipartite graphs can be coded into 2dpo's, so that (A) and (B) could also be obtained by applying a Rabin-Scott style argument [9] to Rogers' result [11] that the theory of bipartite graphs is undecidable and to Lavrov's result [5] that the theory of bipartite graphs is recursively inseparable from the set of sentences refutable in some finite bipartite graph. (However, (C) and (D) do not seem to follow from this type of argument.)

Monadic (second-order) theories of well-orderings were first studied by Büchi [1], [2], [3] using concepts of automata theory. There it was shown that the monadic theory of ω, the monadic theory of any countable ordinal, and the monadic theory of ω1 are decidable. Expansions of the well-ordering (ω, <) by further relations were considered in [4], [5], [8] and [9], for example. Concerning such expansions, Buchi and Landweber [4] asked whether there is a set P ⊂ ω such that the weak monadic theory of (ω, <, P) is decidable and the (strong) monadic theory of (ω, <, P) is undecidable. In this note we give a negative answer by proving the following general theorem: If α is an ordinal and an n-tuple of subsets of α, then the monadic theory of (α, <, ) is decidable provided the monadic theory of (cf (α), <), i.e. of the cofinality of α, and the bounded monadic theory of (or, <, ) are decidable. (In the bounded monadic theory the second-order variables range only over bounded subsets of α.) Also we show that in the bounded and the (strong) monadic theory of a structure (α, <, ) the same classes of subsets of α are definable. For the proofs we use a result of Shelah [7] and a suitable version of a combinatorial argument which was introduced by Büchi [1] and McNaughton [6] into the study of monadic theories.

Since Birkhoff and von Neumann [2] a new area of logical investigation has grown up under the name of quantum logic. However it seems to me that many authors have been inclined to discuss algebraic semantics as such (mainly lattices of a certain kind) almost directly without presenting any axiomatic system, far from developing any proof theory of quantum logic. See, e.g., Gunson [9], Jauch [10], Varadarajan [15], Zeirler [16], etc. In this sense many works presented under the name of quantum logic are algebraic in essence rather than genuinely logical, though it is absurd to doubt the close relationship between algebraic and logical study on quantum mechanics.

The main purpose of this paper is to alter this situation by presenting an axiomatization of quantum logic as natural and as elegant as possible, which further proof-theoretical study is to be based on.

It is true that several axiomatizations of quantum logic are present now. Several authors have investigated the so-called material implication α → β ( = ¬α∨(α ∧ β)) very closely with due regard to its importance. See, e.g., Finch [5], Piziak [11], etc. Indeed material implication plays a predominant role in any axiomatization of a logic in Hilbert-style. Clark [4] has presented an axiomatization of quantum logic with negation ¬ and material implication → as primitive connectives. In this paper we do not follow this approach. First of all, this approach is greatly complicated because orthomodular lattices are only locally distributive.

Keisler, in [1], defined a set F(D) of infinite cardinals for every ultrafilter D on a set I, and, assuming GCH, gave a sufficient condition for a set C of infinite cardinals to have the form F(D) for suitable D and I. In this paper we prove a similar theorem (Theorem 1) under considerably weaker assumptions. Our main tool is a construction of elementary end extensions of Boolean ultrapowers of ω outlined by Shelah in [6, Exercise VI.3.35]. Hence this paper will mostly be concerned with Boolean ultrapowers of ω.

Determining the truth value of self-referential sentences is an interesting and often tricky problem. The Gödel sentence, asserting its own unprovability in P (Peano arithmetic), is clearly true in N(the standard model of P), and Löb showed that a sentence asserting its own provability in P is also true in N (see Smorynski [Sm, 4.1.1]). The problem is more difficult, and still unsolved, for sentences of the kind constructed by Kreisel [K1], which assert their own falsity in some model N* of P whose complete diagram is arithmetically defined. Such a sentence χ has the property that N ⊨ iff N* ⊭ χ (note that ¬χ has the same property).

We show in §1 that the truth value in N of such a sentence χ, after a certain normalization that breaks the symmetry between it and its negation, is determined by the parity of a natural number, called the rank of N, for the particular construction of N* used. The rank is the number of times the construction can be iterated starting from N and is finite for all the usual constructions. We also show that modifications of, e.g., Henkin's construction (in his completeness proof of predicate calculus) allow arbitrary finite values for the rank of N. Thus, on the one hand the truth value of χ in N, for a given “nice” construction of N*, is independent of the particular (normalized) choice of χ, and we shall see that χ is unique up to (provable) equivalence in P. On the other hand, the truth value in question is sensitive to minor changes in the definition of N* and its determination seems to be largely a combinatorial problem.

The main theorem of this paper states that if R is a ring and is a totally transcendental R-module, then has a unique decomposition as a direct sum of indecomposable R-modules. Natural examples of totally transcendental modules are injective modules over noetherian rings, artinian modules over commutative rings, projective modules over left-perfect, right-coherent rings, and arbitrary modules over Σ – α-gens rings. Therefore, our decomposition theorem yields as special cases the purely algebraic unique decomposition theorems for these four classes of modules due to Matlis; Warfield; Mueller, Eklof, and Sabbagh; and Shelah and Fisher. These results and a number of other corollaries about totally transcendental modules are covered in §1. In §2, I show how the results of § 1 can be used to give an improvement of Baur's classification of ω-categorical modules over countable rings. In §3, the decomposition theorem is used to study modules with quantifier elimination over noetherian rings.

The goals of this section are to prove the decomposition theorem and to derive some of its immediate corollaries. I will begin with some notational conventions. R will denote a ring with an identity element. LR is the language of left R-modules described in [4, p. 251] and TR is the theory of left R-modules. “R-module” will mean “unital left R-module”. A formula will mean an LR-formula.

This paper is primarily concerned with ℵ0-categoricity of theories of partially ordered sets. It contains some general conjectures, a collection of known results and some new theorems on ℵ0-categoricity. Among the latter are the following.

Corollary 3.3. For every countable ℵ0-categoricalthere is a linear order of A such that (, <) is ℵ0-categorical.

Corollary 6.7. Every ℵ0-categorical theory of a partially ordered set of finite width has a decidable theory.

Theorem 7.7. Every ℵ0-categorical theory of reticles has a decidable theory.

There is a section dealing just with decidability of partially ordered sets, the main result of this section being

Theorem 8.2. If (P, <) is a finite partially ordered set and KP is the class of partially ordered sets which do not embed (P, <), then Th(KP) is decidable iff KP contains only reticles.

The theory of abstract computational complexity in ordinary recursion theory (ORT) was initiated by Rabin [7] and Blum [1]. Jacobs [5] generalized the notions to recursion theory on an admissible ordinal α(α-recursion theory) and proved in this setting certain main theorems such as Blum's Theorem and the Compression Theorem.

In ORT the notions of “finite” and “bounded” coincide. Thus when lifting a theorem from ORT to α-recursion theory, “finite” may be translated to either “bounded below α” or to the stronger and more natural “α-finite”. Jacobs conjectured that “bounded below α” was the best possible in the theorems mentioned above. In this paper we shall prove that the stronger version of these theorems are, in fact, true. Furthermore our constructions are uniform for all admissible α.

Rather than restricting ourselves to α-recursion theory we shall consider transitive rudimentarily closed structures M = 〈M, ∈, R〉 which admit what we call an acceptable prewellordering. The special case M = 〈Lα, ∈〉 and M = 〈Sβ, ∈〉 where α is admissible and β a limit ordinal constitute, respectively, α-recursion theory and β-recursion theory (see Friedman [4]).

Let T extend the theory P of Peano arithmetic, and suppose . Form from a model , in analogy to the way in which the ordered ring of integers is formed from the standard model of arithmetic. Let P′ and T′ be the corresponding analogues of P and T respectively. Now consider the group . In [5] MacDowell and Specker set out to determine the structure of such groups. (The precise statement in [5] refers to the ring of integers rather than the ordered ring. However, as pointed out to us by J. Knight, since Lagrange's Theorem that a positive integer is the sum of four squares is provable in the analogue of P′ for rings (see, for example, the proof in [7, p. 102]), the set of positive elements is definable in the ring, and consequently, so is the ordering. Thus, for the present purpose it makes no difference which of the two structures is used. Of course, one needs the ordering to discuss end extensions, as considered in [5]. On the other hand, one should be aware that in Pr′ one cannot define an ordering, where the theory Pr′ is the theory of the group of integers with distinguished element 1, 〈Z, +, 1〉. The constant 1 is needed so that divisibility mod n can be expressed. We will return to this point later.) In §1 we shall outline the results in this direction obtained in [5].

Lipshitz and Nadel, unaware that a similar question had been posed and investigated in [5] (though, of course aware that [5] contained the celebrated results on end extensions) set out to characterize those models 〈A, +〉 of Pr = Presburger Arithmetic (the complete theory of 〈ω, +〉) which can be expanded to models 〈A, +, ·, 0, 1, ≤〉 of P. They were able to give a complete characterization for countable models 〈A, +〉 in [4], which we describe in §2.

We consider the effect on decidability of adding, to the decidable theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero, relation symbols for algebraic independence or function symbols for differentiation. Our results show that the corresponding theories are usually undeeidable.

Let k and K be algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero. Let K be an extension of k of transcendence degree n over k. Since k has characteristic 0, we may assume that the rational field, Q, is a subfield of k.

Let Indn be the n-ary relation on K which holds for exactly those n-tuples from K which are algebraically independent over k.

Let x1, …, xn be a transcendence base for K over k. For i = 1, 2, …, n, let Di: K → K be the partial differentiation function with respect to xi and this base.

Let KnInd = (K, +, ·, Indn), n ≤ 1 and let KnDiff = (K, +, ·, D1, …, Dn), n ≤ 1 where K has transcendence degree n over k.

We show that the theories of these structures are independent of k when k has infinite transcendence degree over Q, that KnDiff has undeeidable theory for n ≤ 1 and that KnInd has undeeidable theory for n ≤ 2. The theory of K1Ind is decidable.

The notion of a minimal form is defined as an extension of the notion of a normal form in λ-β-calculus and its meaning is discussed in a computational environment. The features of the Knuth-Gross reduction strategy are used to prove that to possess a minimal form, for a generic term, is a semidecidable predicate.

In classical first-order predicate logic CL1 (without equality) only tautologies and antitautologies satisfy nontautological schemas. I.e., if F[p, Q] is a nontautological formula (fl) in the predicate letters shown, with p prepositional, then ⊬ F[K, Q] for any sentence K not containing some Q ∈ Q, unless ⊢ K or ⊢ ¬K. This is an easy consequence of the Completeness Theorem. Clearly, the analogous statement fails for intuitionistic predicate logic IL1; already when Q is empty: (i) ¬¬ K for, e.g., K ≡ p ∨ ¬p; (ii) ¬¬K → K for, e.g., K ≡ ¬p.

Working in ZFC + Martin's Axiom we develop a generalization of the Barwise Compactness Theorem which holds in languages of cardinality less than . Next, using this compactness theorem, an omitting types theorem for fewer than types is proved. Finally, in ZFC, we prove that this compactness result implies Martin's Axiom (the Equivalence Theorem). Our compactness theorem applies to a new class of theories—ccΣ-theories—which generalize the countable Σ-theories of Barwise's theorem. The Omitting Types Theorem and the Equivalence Theorem serve as examples illustrating the use of ccΣ-theories.

Assume = (A, ε) or = (A, ε R1,…,Rm) where is admissible. L() is the first-order language with constants for elements of A and relation symbols for relations in . LA is A ⋂ L∞ω where the L of L∞ω is any language in A. A theory T in LA is consistent if there is no derivation in A of a contradiction from T. is LA with new constants ca for each a and A. The basic terms of consist of the constants of and the terms f(ca1,…,cam) built directly from constants using functions f of . The symbol t is used for basic terms. A theory T in LA is Σ if it is defined by a formula of L(). The formula φ⌝ is a logical equivalent of ¬φ defined by: (1) φ⌝ = ¬φ if φ is atomic; (2) (¬φ)⌝ = φ (3) (⋁φ∈Φ φ)⌝ = ⋀φ∈Φ φ⌝; (4) (⋀φ∈Φ φ) ⋁φ∈Φ φ⌝; (5) (∃χφ(x))⌝ ∀χφ⌝(x); ∀χφ(x))⌝ = ∃χφ⌝(x).

The usefulness of measurable cardinals in set theory arises in good part from the fact that an ultraproduct of wellfounded structures by a countably complete ultrafilter is wellfounded. In the standard proof of the wellfoundedness of such an ultraproduct, one first shows, without any use of the axiom of choice, that the ultraproduct contains no infinite descending chains. One then completes the proof by noting that, assuming the axiom of choice, any partial ordering with no infinite descending chain is wellfounded. In fact, the axiom of dependent choices (a weakened form of the axiom of choice) suffices. It is therefore of interest to ask whether some use of the axiom of choice is needed in order to prove the wellfoundedness of such ultraproducts or whether, on the other hand, their wellfoundedness can be proved in ZF alone. In Theorem 1, we show that the axiom of choice is needed for the proof (assuming the consistency of a strong partition relation). Theorem 1 also contains some related consistency results concerning infinite exponent partition relations. We then use Theorem 1 to show how to change the cofinality of a cardinal κ satisfying certain partition relations to any regular cardinal less than κ, while introducing no new bounded subsets of κ. This generalizes a theorem of Prikry [5].