The role of interest groups in influencing policy decisions in Canada has received little close analysis, yet it is obviously important. Lobbying is inevitable when government regulations touch everyone's affairs; the only defence for those adversely affected is to seek to influence the government itself. Anti-combines legislation offers a particularly good example of this process because it is the case par excellence in which the interests of business, particularly big business, and those of the public, both as citizens concerned with freedom and as economically self-interested consumers, conflict. The 1960 amendments to the Canadian anti-combines legislation were implemented by a new government whose attitude on the combines question when it assumed office was not clear. Consequently those concerned with anti-combines questions set about converting the new government to their point of view. Fortunately for the researcher, the written submissions to the government on this question were tabled in the House of Commons, and of course the proceedings in Parliament and its committees are part of the public record. Consequently in this instance the general pattern of lobbying and its effects can be pieced together.

It is more than two years since the historic 22nd Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the dramatic repercussions in Eastern Europe of the 20th Congress five years earlier, the impact of the 1961 meeting was at first much less striking. The renewed assault on Stalin, this time open and unrestrained, did not generate a comparable intellectual ferment or unleash political forces capable of producing a crisis of the dimensions of 1956. No doubt Khrushchev and the other Eastern European leaders were anxious to avoid the disastrous consequences of that year, when the stability, and indeed the very existence, of communism hung in the balance, at least in Hungary and Poland. This time, certainly, their efforts carefully to control the direction and tempo of change were more successful, and the modest thaw did not produce a flood. None the less, there were serious consequences, often slow in manifesting themselves and differing substantially in each country, but having a long-run potential for modifying profoundly the shape and content of communism in Eastern Europe.

An entirely unforeseen result of 1956 had been the emergence of China as an influential force in world communism, challenging the hitherto predominant position of the Soviet Union. Her extraordinary intervention in the affairs of Eastern Europe during and after the Hungarian revolt had greatly contributed to the stabilizing of the situation, but had marked the emergence of a balance of power within the communist system and the beginning of a serious conflict of policy and doctrine between the two great communist states. Although the full effect of this Chinese challenge was at first somewhat obscured from view, it became increasingly clear that it would have an even more profound impact than earlier defiance by smaller states such as Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. At the 22nd Congress, only the tip of the iceberg of Sino-Soviet differences protruded in the form of the Chinese protest at Khrushchev's public denunciation of Albania. The full measure of the divergence was revealed in the subsequent two years, reaching a climax in the confrontation of mid-1963.