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Pressure Groups in Canadian Politics: Recent Revisions of the Anti-Combines Legislation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

H. G. Thorburn
H. G. Thorburn*
Affiliation:
Queen's University
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Extract

The role of interest groups in influencing policy decisions in Canada has received little close analysis, yet it is obviously important. Lobbying is inevitable when government regulations touch everyone's affairs; the only defence for those adversely affected is to seek to influence the government itself. Anti-combines legislation offers a particularly good example of this process because it is the case par excellence in which the interests of business, particularly big business, and those of the public, both as citizens concerned with freedom and as economically self-interested consumers, conflict. The 1960 amendments to the Canadian anti-combines legislation were implemented by a new government whose attitude on the combines question when it assumed office was not clear. Consequently those concerned with anti-combines questions set about converting the new government to their point of view. Fortunately for the researcher, the written submissions to the government on this question were tabled in the House of Commons, and of course the proceedings in Parliament and its committees are part of the public record. Consequently in this instance the general pattern of lobbying and its effects can be pieced together.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , May 1964 , pp. 157 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1964

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References

1 For a fuller analysis of this, see Rosenbluth, G., and Thorburn, H. G., Canadian Anti-Combines Administration, 1952–1960 (Toronto, 1963).Google Scholar

2 House of Commons Debates, 1952, p. 2815.Google Scholar

3 Letter to Mr. David A. Gilbert, General Manager, Retail Merchants Association of Canada, dated April 2, 1957, quoted in the consolidation of the submissions presented by the Retail Merchants Association circulated to the Conservative caucus, June 17, 1960, and hereafter cited as RMA consolidation.

4 RMA consolidation.

5 The trade associations represented were: Canadian Retail Furniture Dealers Association, Canadian Jewellers Association, Retail Merchants Association of Canada, Inc., National Foods Division of the Retail Merchants Association of Canada, Inc., Canadian Pharmaceutical Association, Canadian Retail Hardware Association, Canadian Wholesale Council, Canadian Wholesale Tobacco and Confectionery Association, and Canadian Manufactureis Association (represented by L. W. Prestin of the Sunbeam Corporation of Canada). Source: ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 The written submissions received from the beginning of 1959 until May of 1960 were tabled and what follows is based on a reading of them. They are cited hereafter as Submissions.

11 This is the section of the Combines Investigations Act which bans resale price maintenance.

12 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1960, 147–51 (hereafter Proceedings).Google Scholar

13 Ibid., 148.

14 Ibid., 146.

15 Ibid., 147.

16 Ibid., 621–23.

17 See the submissions of the Vancouver Board of Trade, the British Columbia Loggers Association, the British Columbia Lumber Manufacturers Association, The Metropolitan Toronto Board of Trade, the Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Electrical Manufacturers Association, the Canadian Manufacturers Association, the Canadian Metal Mining Association, the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, the Investment Dealers Association of Canada, and the Plywood Manufacturers Association of British Columbia.

18 See the submissions of Vancouver Board of Trade, British Columbia Lumber Manufacturers Association, Canadian Bar Association, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Canadian Electrical Manufacturers Association, Canadian Manufacturers Association, Canadian Metal Mining Association, Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, and the Investment Dealers Association of Canada.

19 The Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Metal Mining Association.

20 See the submissions of the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Investment Dealers Association of Canada.

21 British Columbia Loggers Association, British Columbia Lumber Manufacturers Association, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Fisheries Association of British Columbia, and the Plywood Manufacturers Association of British Columbia.

22 Submissions.

23 The Canadian Breweries case was then before the courts.

24 Submissions.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Mr. Forget objected to certain offences such as price fixing being considered offences per se. He favoured a constitutional amendment that would permit a trade commission under the Minister of Trade and Commerce to order the cessation of unlawful practices without criminal proceedings. Alternatively he favoured deleting the prohibition against price discrimination and resale price maintenance, permitting mergers unless they reduce competition to the detriment of the public. He favoured the appointment of business leaders on a short-term basis to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, and sought to end the introduction of documents prepared by subordinates in firms as prima facie evidence of infractions.

28 He favoured the onus of proof falling on the Crown and opposed the government's 1959 bill which provided defences if the accused could prove his actions were of an approved type. He favoured exempting export trade from the Act, softening the definition of monopoly by adding “unduly.” Also he advocated a definition for “unduly” as “to the specific detriment or against the interest of the public,” and urged that privileges under the Patent Act not be subject to cancellation because of combines activities. He opposed proceedings by information in a criminal statute, and saw the proposal to add ad hoc members to the Commission as opening the door to packing it. He suggested the proposed prohibition against misleading advertising be made to apply to quality and performance as well as price.

29 There are exceptions here: e.g., the Canadian Metal Mining Association favoured the defence in resale price maintenance cases.

30 The Book Publishers Association supported the Retail Booksellers Association, and the Plywood Manufacturers Association of British Columbia supported the British Columbia Lumber Manufacturers Association. Five local BC chambers of commerce asked for delay in passing the 1959 amendments between July 3 and 11, 1959, when the Vancouver Board of Trade made a longer request to hold over the bill for study.

31 Organizations appearing were: Distributory Trades Advisory Committee (led by the R.M.A.), Canadian Association of Consumers, Canadian Electrical Manufacturers Association, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Fisheries Council of Canada, Council of the Forest Industries of British Columbia, Canadian Metal Mining Association, Canadian Manufacturers Association, National Automotive Trades Association, Metropolitan Toronto Board of Trade, Co-operative Union of Canada, Canadian Federation of Agriculture.

32 It favoured a proviso obliging the firm engaging in price discrimination to prove that the lower price represents an actual saving in costs. Proceedings, 1959, 353.Google Scholar

33 Ibid., 106–7.

34 Ibid., 411.

35 Signed by one, two, three, three, four, five, and twenty-eight persons respectively.

36 Letter from Professor S. Stykolt to the Minister of Justice, Sept. 1, 1959.

37 Letter from Professor H. C. Eastman to the Minister of Justice, Sept. 11, 1959.

38 He had been senior economist on the staff of the Director of Investigation and Research before coming to Queen's University.

39 Professors J. J. Deutsch, C. A. Curtis, M. C. Urquhart, and D. W. Slater.

40 Proceedings, 468 and 486–87.

41 Ibid., 500.

42 Ibid., 557.

43 Ibid., 559.

44 Ibid., 567.

45 Ibid., 575.

46 House of Commons, Debates 1960, pp. 4341–2.Google Scholar

47 A few weeks after the enactment of this bill, Canadian General Electric and the Sunbeam Corporation circularized their dealers warning them that their suppliers might be cut off if they sold at prices below those on an enclosed list. They cited recent amendments as authority for their action. This practice was subsequently investigated by the Director of Investigation and Research and was the subject of a report by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission dated Oct. 4, 1962. (Report Concerning the Distribution and Sale of Electrical Appliances, Electric Shavers and Accessory Products (Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Limited)). The commission found that Sunbeam's programme “must be construed as an attempt at resale price maintenance …,” and recommended that a court order be secured restraining Sunbeam from continuing this practice.

48 House of Commons, Debates, 1960, p. 4342.Google Scholar

49 Ibid., 1959, pp. 5577–79.

50 Ibid., 1960, p. 4552.

51 Ibid., 4354.

52 Ibid., 4374.

53 Ibid., 4431–2.

54 The Proceedings ran to 769 pages plus a 39-page appendix.

55 Proceedings, 1960, 193.Google Scholar

56 Ibid., 207.

57 Ibid., 394.

58 Ibid., 258.

59 Ibid., 502.

60 Ibid., 266–95, 301–2, 305–8, 310–11.

61 Ibid., 284.

62 Ibid., 747–64.

63 Ibid., 746.

64 Ibid., 654.

65 H. of C., Debates, 1960, pp. 6971–77, 7001–14, 7026–36.Google Scholar

66 Ibid., 7361.

67 Senate, , Debates, 1960, p. 1165.Google Scholar

68 Ibid., 1187.

69 Senate Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce, Proceedings, 1960, 98.Google Scholar

70 Senate, , Debates, 1960, 1196.Google Scholar

71 Winnipeg Free Press, May 18, 1960.

72 Ibid., May 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 28, 31, June 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, July 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, August 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12. All 1960.

73 As shown in the Commission's report on the Distribution and Sale of Electric Appliances, Electric Shavers and Accessory Products (Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Limited) (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1962).Google Scholar The Commission recommended that a court order be sought to restrain Sunbeam from continuing its “Minimum Profitable Resale Price” programme. This involved the circulating of two price lists to dealers, one the suggested resale prices, and the other the lowest profitable resale prices. If a dealer offered goods at lower prices he was to open his books to the Companys inspectors who would recommend that the dealer's supplies be cut off if he could not show that he was making a profit on the goods.