On the evening of April 15 and the morning of April 16, 1986, the United States launched a military raid using air strikes to destroy several political leadership and military targets in the Libyan cities of Tripoli (the capital) and Benghazi. These targets were selected because of their connection to the Libyan government's direct and active support of terrorist activities against the United States and its allies. The specific provocation for this raid was to retaliate for Libya's involvement in a terrorist attack in West Berlin that killed one U.S. serviceman and wounded several other Americans. The military raid was conducted with about a hundred Air Force and Navy aircraft, including bombers, electronic countermeasures (ECM) aircraft, air defense, and tankers for aerial refueling. This chapter considers the implication of the air strikes, known in the context Operation El Dorado Canyon, for the American experience with victory and this theoretical narrative of victory.

In comparative terms, Operation El Dorado Canyon is unique among the case studies in this book because it was essentially a small-scale military raid, but one in which the tactical use of military force had strategic consequences. Yet, this intervention, conducted toward the end of the Cold War, also has important lessons regarding the use of military power against so-called rogue states and its implications for the study of victory. The reason for the U.S. decision to attack Libya in April 1986 was to persuade Muammar al-Qaddafi that further support for terrorism could lead to military reprisals.