When I finished the manuscript for the previous edition ofVictory in War in the summer of 2006, the United States was fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These wars, particularly the case of Iraq, ignited fierce domestic debates about the reasons for intervention; whether policymakers had an exit strategy; and, ultimately, whether the United States could win and at what cost. One explanation for the complicated debates about the decisions to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan was persistent confusion about what victory means, how we define it, and whether U.S. society is willing to bear the costs to attain it, particularly in the face of a determined insurgency and significant American casualties. Since 2001, more than five thousand Americans have died in Afghanistan and Iraq. As I argued in the earlier edition of this book, the central challenge for scholars and policymakers is to define clearly and precisely what victory is and what it means for the state.

Historically, scholars and policymakers have failed to develop a theoretical framework that relates victory to real-world decisions about whether and under what circumstances it is prudent for the state to use military force. This failure was expressed by Andrew Bacevich when he noted that policymakers do not have “the foggiest notion of what victory would look like, how it would be won, and what it might cost….” The revised and expanded edition of this book fills a major gap in our theoretical and practical knowledge about the meaning of victory.