Throughout the twentieth century, the tendency in the United States was to implement victory by mobilizing the state's resources against another state or coalition to resolve a fundamental problem or evil in international politics. Although this interpretation of the obligations imposed by victory was established formally by the conduct of World War II, it existed before that – clearly, at least, in the case of the American Civil War. What emerges is a lingering sense from American wars and particularly World War II that victory imposes significant obligations on the state, whereas other levels of victory – if they do not resolve the underlying problem – are incomplete by comparison. Furthermore, it is the fear of the United States' invoking those obligations that may make U.S. policymakers more hesitant to use military force. This principle of war, as observed by Henry Kissinger, was implemented by the United States during World War II and based on the principle that “We had brought to bear our superior resources and inflicted a terrible retribution. The enemy had been utterly defeated by a strategy of attrition unencumbered by political considerations.”

The question for policymakers and scholars is whether the prevailing U.S. experience with victory – as refined by the world wars and other conflicts waged during the twentieth century – provides useful guidance for making the decision to go to war and judging what victory will mean.