The literature on military strategy, policy, security, and diplomacy is filled with innumerable works written by and about the critical strategists and theorists of various eras. These works dissected the thinking about strategy, the historical and political context within which ideas about strategy were developed, and – most important – the impact of these ideas on how subsequent generations contemplated and conducted war and diplomacy. Even a partial list of the individual strategists and the scholars commenting on them, which could easily number in the hundreds, does not do justice to the magnitude of their efforts or the span of history – literally, thousands of years – that these works encompass. Suffice it to say that countless individuals have labored to understand central questions about victory: why states fight wars, what it takes for them to win, and – of paramount importance to the purpose of this study – what it means in terms of outcomes to win. The first two questions are commonly asked in the strategic-studies literature, whereas the latter question concerning strategic ends is less prevalent. Few theorists have explicitly asked and answered this question, whereas many have asked and offered implicit answers. With this latter question in mind, this chapter reviews the works and arguments about victory advanced by both well-known and lesser-known scholars and strategists.