Russia's absorption of Crimea violated the norm of territorial integrity, which protects states against involuntary loss of territory to other states. This article addresses two different arguments on how to deal with this violation: (1) That Ukraine lost Crimea for good and that this should be acknowledged, both politically and legally, if one seeks to forestall forcible change of interstate boundaries elsewhere; and (2) that third party countermeasures against Russia can roll back its territorial gains in Ukraine, but only if they are much more materially robustthanthey have been so far. Whilemutually incompatible, the arguments raise an important issue—how to uphold international legal norms in particular situations—an issue to which scholars of international law do not pay much detailed attention. Yet doing so is important because international legal norms leave governments with wider decision-making discretion than is commonly presumed, and different ways of upholding a norm are predisposed to generate different effects, including legal effects. Having examined the two approaches, the article argues that the best way to uphold the territorial integrity of Ukraine is by staking a middle ground between them, placing emphasis on the policy of non-recognition.

In this article, Lawrence Donnelly, an American born and trained attorney who is now a Lecturer & Director of Clinical Legal Education in the School of Law at the National University of Ireland, Galway, considers Professor Brian Tamanaha's seminal Failing Law Schools, a comprehensive critique of legal education in the United States. The article first thoroughly outlines and analyses the central lines of argument in Failing Law Schools and then evaluates the scholarship written in response to it. The article next compares and contrasts the state of play in legal education in the US with what is happening in Western Europe and posits that, for a variety of reasons, law schools on the eastern side of the Atlantic Ocean may actually be better – and more realistically – placed at present than their US counterparts. Lastly, the article urges that legal educators around the world continue an open dialogue on the “crisis” Professor Tamanaha presciently identifies in a concerted effort to ensure that law students receive the best possible training to equip them for working in legal careers that may not closely resemble those pursued by their predecessors in light of rapid globalization, ever-improving technology and consequent changes to how legal services are provided.

The need to fulfil treaty obligations in good faith bases both the principle of pacta sunt servanda under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principle of loyalty under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. This article seeks to understand the precise relationship between the two principles. It argues that the principles are different embodiments of the same root concept. In particular, it argues that loyalty is a more sophisticated and specific version of the concept, since it establishes that the relevant states and institutions must take account of each other's efforts to fulfill their obligations faithfully. While the Court of Justice of the European Union has observed the consequent need for greater flexibility when determining Member State liability, it has not done so consistently, especially in the context of EU external relations. Lastly, this article proposes that the presented conceptualization of loyalty and pacta sunt servanda could help us understand how other international subsystems might develop the basic concepts in general international law.

In one of his final press releases, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, urged that greater attention be given to the further deterioration of the human rights situation in Rakhine State. He submitted that the discrimination and persecution against the Rohingya community in Rakhine could amount to crimes against humanity. In his final report, prior to the end of his six-year mandate, Quintana states that “extrajudicial killing, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary detention, torture, and ill-treatment in detention, denial of due process and fair trial rights, and the forcible transfer and severe deprivation of liberty of populations has taken place on a large scale and has been directed against” the Rohingya Muslim population in Rakhine State. However, there is no sign that any of the alleged crimes are being adequately investigated by the competent domestic authorities. Furthermore, the ICC does not have jurisdiction as Myanmar is not a State Party to the Rome Statute.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has arrived! Gone are the days of hagiography, when in the eyes of the academy and informed observers the Court could do no wrong. The pendulum has finally swung the other way. The judicial darling, if there is one today, is Strasbourg, not Luxembourg. Not hours had passed before the Court's 258-paragraph long Opinion 2/13 on the Draft Agreement on EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights was condemned as “exceptionally poor.” Critical voices have mounted steadily ever since, leading to nothing short of widespread “outrage.”

Protocol n°16 expands the advisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) by introducing a mechanism of litigation-related opinions (“avis contentieux”). It affords the highest national courts and tribunals the ability to ask the ECtHR for an advisory opinion on questions of principle related to the interpretation and application of the rights and freedoms defined in the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter Convention) and the Protocols thereto.

Constitutional review of German tax laws has become a major area for the development of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, constitutional doctrine, and theory. This Article takes a recent decision in which the German Federal Constitutional Court declared parts of the inheritance tax statute unconstitutional as an example to demonstrate why tax law in particular has become such an interesting field in constitutional jurisprudence. The case is also noteworthy for the court's new views on equal protection, its deference to parliamentary discretion, and the abolishment of the so-called consequentiality doctrine (Folgerichtigkeit) it had introduced ten years before.

On 2 October 2013, Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). The protocol, that has so far been signed by sixteen States and ratified by Albania, Georgia, Lithuania, San Marino and Slovenia, will enter into force in case of ratification by at least ten Member States. If the protocol becomes effective, it will expand the European Court of Human Rights’ competence to give advisory opinions upon request by domestic high courts and tribunals.

This article attempts to destabilize the assumption that self-determination can be restricted to a “purely legal” analysis of the sort to which most international legal scholars have conventionally confined themselves. It does so by focusing upon the conditions under which the legal rhetoric of collective self-determination came to be mobilized during the course of Russia's incursion into and subsequent annexation of Crimea in early 2014, as well as its ongoing deployment in the context of Russia's political, military, and financial support for self-declared “people's republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk. After briefly examining legal arguments in support of and in opposition to Russia's actions, the article argues that the Ukraine crisis problematizes the traditional reluctance of international lawyers to engage with the complex, and often counterintuitive, articulations of self-determination offered by participants in armed conflict. Recourse to self-determination cannot be understood without appreciating the concrete politico-economic pressures in response to which states are created and recreated. The alternately “lofty” and “cynical” formulations of self-determination that have characterized the ongoing struggle in and over Ukraine can only be understood in light of protracted competition between rival class projects that generate significantly different visions of world order. This compels us to confront the class dimensions of the concept of collective self-determination rather than continuing to conceive it as a purely national, or ethno-national, project of recognition or emancipation.

In Germany, the practice of forcing a person to marry against his or her own free will was not explicitly penalized and did not attract much political attention until the beginning of the new millennium. Since the mid-2000s, however, the German legislature has enacted a number of laws concerning forced marriage, possibly due to increased public and media interest in honor-related gender violence in immigrant communities. In 2011, the German Criminal Code (StGB) was amended to include “Forced Marriage,” thus making forcing someone to marry an offense in its own right. In light of similar recent developments criminalizing forced marriages in other European jurisdictions—such as England and Wales—this article aims to critically assess the German legislation and its potential impact on victims and offenders. First, this article considers the German criminal legislation in detail. Second, it contemplates the underlying question of whether the introduction of criminal law as a repressive measure effectively addresses the issue of forced marriage. Third, this article contemplates non-legislative measures that could contribute to affording more holistic protection. Finally, it concludes that improving the situation for victims of forced marriage in practice requires more than adopting criminal law on the matter.

In Germany, endowments and bequeathals are subject to between seven and fifty percent inheritance tax. Small and medium-sized family-run businesses are exempt from inheritance tax either partially or entirely. On 17 December 2014, Germany's Constitutional Court ruled that the present system of enabling businesses to “avoid paying” inheritance tax was in violation of the “rule of equal tax principal.” Furthermore, the inheritance tax law in its current form leaves plenty of leeway for variations in percentages of payments, which are difficult to justify. Thus, the Court ruled, existing laws are unconstitutional and must be reformed and replaced.

In this case note we argue from a socio-ethical viewpoint that inheritances taxes are in principle morally justified. One important key element of the tax system is trust. This trust can be strengthened by (1) creating sustainable laws that will stand the test of constitutional screening, (2) offering plausible justification for fiscal policies including exemptions on clear normative principles like subsidiarity, common good, freedom and simplicity, and (3) broadening the tax-paying basis without undercutting relevant human agency.

The following article aims to analyze the first German draft bill concerning a corporate criminal code. The draft bill, recently introduced by the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, led to a transformation of a theoretical academic discussion towards a specific proposal on potential future legislation. Firstly, the article introduces underlying reasons for the draft based on deficiencies of the current legislation. Current regulations solely provide corporate administrative responsibility for criminal offenses committed by a corporation's management (involving huge fines). Subsequently, the article reviews the content of the draft, specifically the multiplicity of proposed criminal and other penalties. The authors intend to demonstrate that the draft is often too vague or—especially with regard to penalties—simply over the top. The applicable sanctions – which may be combined- would lead to a more draconic punishment than in any other comparable legal system. Furthermore, regarding the principles of due process and strict legality the proposed procedural rules of the draft are not satisfying. After all, the proposed procedural measures to safeguard the proceedings and the rules on representation and defense counsel are deficient.

Opinion 2/13 is a sweeping blow. After four years of negotiations, it took the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or the Court) only a few paragraphs to pick to pieces the draft accession agreement on the EU's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), finding a conflict with the EU Treaties on ten grounds. The Court's message is clear: Accession, under the terms of the draft agreement, would risk undermining the very essence of the EU's constitutional system.

In Ukraine, spheres of political, military, and economic control are contested, non-transparent, and shifting. As the Ukrainian government lost control over the rebellious Eastern oblasts (regions) of the country, Russia denies its authority over various pro-Russian separatists and vigorously rejects any responsibility for the abuses by the unidentified “green men,” both before and after the annexation of Crimea. Even during the decades before this conflict, the rule of law in Ukraine was “thin” at best. Meaningful political control was sporadic and dispersed, often wielded by the mix of public, private, and other shady actors occupying the grey area between a functional and a dysfunctional state. If state actors never effectively took control over the events at the state-level during peaceful times, it is not surprising that it is more difficult once a “hot” conflict breaks out. It is not unreasonable to assume that Minsk agreements—signed in an effort to stop the hemorrhaging of the conflict—will not hold if the signatories do not effectively control the diverse public and private actors who possess the actual capacity to influence the dynamic on the ground. Before rendering any kind of juridical judgment, the complicated political and socioeconomic configuration of the conflict in Ukraine forces us to first confront a factual puzzle: Who and what influence the current situation? Which concrete actors really drive the conflict and what interests animate them?

In a landmark decision of 2012 on the relevance of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) in domestic constitutional adjudication, the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) substantially extended the applicable yardstick, according to which the constitutionality of ordinary laws and administrative action may be assessed, to certain Charter rights. At the same time, the Verfassungsgerichtshof claimed its active commitment to judicial dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the preliminary reference procedure pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to effectively protect Charter-based fundamental rights of individuals. Arguably, both the domestic and Union-wide ramifications of this “instant classic” case of a domestic constitutionalization of the Charter are substantial, delivering insight not least as to the transformative role of the Charter for domestic fundamental rights protection and the adaptations of domestic constitutional courts in such a changed environment.

The Ukraine crisis has, yet again, called into question the coherence and stability of international law both as a language for mediating particular types of international disputes—such as conflicts between the so-called Great Powers— and as a set of institutions capable of serving as fora for the resolution of these disputes. Given the scale and intensity of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the magnitude of its regional and global repercussions, a number of policymakers and historians have already made compelling arguments for why the conflict may be the most significant threat to global order since the end of the Cold War—perhaps even since the Cuban Missile Crisis. While policymakers in the U.S. and Russia have cautioned against drawing Cold War parallels, numerous analysts in both countries have proclaimed the start of a new Cold War in light of the rapid deterioration in relations between Moscow and Washington. Beyond bilateral U.S.–Russia relations, and in the words of Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Cold War Two (hereinafter “CWII”) has “effectively put an end to the interregnum of [post-Cold War] partnership and cooperation between the West and Russia.” While sharing the view that a new Cold War has erupted, this article suggest that its causes are far deeper and its likely battlegrounds are far wider than mere antagonism between the United States and Russia over the fate of Ukraine, To the extent that CWII has begun, it may mark a return to interbloc rivalry, East versus West, or even Great Game geopolitics. To complement these frames, the present conflict may also be understood by viewing it through the prism of political economy, particularly the study of “new-statism,” or the new developmental state within the broader context of the development of global capitalism. Thinking of CWII this way allows one to ask whether CWII is actually a war between Western liberal capitalism and various systems of state capitalism, of which Russia's is but one. To be even more precise, one can also ask whether the conflict is better thought of as a contest between different state capitalisms for control over key trade or transit routes, production locales, and markets. Tribes, states, and empires have always waged mortal combat over these material matters. CWII—whether it has started or soon will—will likely rest on similar considerations. And yet, despite the seriousness of the threat, there has been remarkably little academic discussion, and much less public debate, regarding the configuration of global power flows that has contributed to this crisis or the role, and limitations of law in structuring our political imaginations in response to these challenges. This Article is an attempt to call attention to several serious aspects of the Ukraine crisis which have hitherto been underanalyzed, namely the role of information warfare in exacerbating its magnitude.

On 18 December 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered Opinion 2/13 and stunned the legal world by declaring that the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (the Accession Agreement) was incompatible with the constituent treaties of the Union. Although some experts, admittedly, had been skeptical about certain aspects of Draft Accession Agreement, no one seems to have expected an opinion so critical and uncompromising. The opinion has consequently received widespread disapproval in the EU legal blogosphere.

In December 2014, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act unconstitutional. The following article presents and discusses the judgment. Instead of trying to comply by changing as little as possible, the legislator should consider a fundamental and consequent alternative: an inheritance and gift tax that treats everybody the same.

In the ongoing debate about preliminary references raised by constitutional courts, the Italian Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, hereafter, ICC) is apparently a latecomer. Despite its pivotal role in the founding era in which the relationships between Community law and national legal orders were assessed, its reluctance towards preliminary references to the ECJ (since 2009: Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU) has repeatedly been invoked as a standard in legal scholarship. Whereas from the early 1960s onwards it engaged dialectically with the CJEU, and contributed to some basic tenets of EC law vis-à-vis national law (direct effect, primacy, limits concerning basic constitutional principles, so-called counter-limits), it appeared for a long time to be almost silent on the crucial aspect concerning its ability to enter into a direct dialogue with the CJEU via the preliminary reference procedure. Although this ambivalence may appear contradictory, one should not forget that behind the scenes, dialogue took place along indirect or “hidden” channels. Either in response to claims raised by the judiciary in incidenter proceedings, or in adjudicating disputes between State and Regions in principaliter ones, the ICC often sent messages and alerts to the CJEU. In so doing, it indirectly contributed to shaping the relationships between EU law and domestic law. In the long run, the absence of the ICC's direct involvement in the relationships with the CJEU has, however, estranged its action from the core of EU law in favor of the partnership between the CJEU and the common judges (both ordinary and administrative).