¹ VfSlg 19.632/2012. All quotes are taken from the judgment's English translation made available by the Verfassungsgerichtshof, http://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site/attachments/9/6/0/CH0006/CMS1353421369433/grundrechtecharta_english_u466-11.pdf.Google Scholar

² See Theo Öhlinger & Potacs, Michael, EU-Recht und staatliches Recht. Die Anwendung des Europarechts im innerstaatlichen Bereich 175 n. 706 (2014); Schäffer, Heinz, Österreich und die Europäische Union—Erfahrungen und Leistungen des österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs, 60 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 345, 378 (2005).Google Scholar

³ For the first referral by the Belgian (then) Cour d'arbitrage see Case C–93/97, Fédération belge des chambres syndicales de médecins ASBL v. Flemish Government, Government of the French Community, Council of Minister, 1998 E.C.R. I-04837, see Jan Komárek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 420, 432 (2013). The Cour d'arbitrage has been a member of the “Conference of European Constitutional Courts” since 1990 and was renamed Cour constitutionnelle in 2007. The Belgian Court's referral dates from 1997, the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof referred its first case two years later, see VfSlg 15.450/1999.Google Scholar

⁴ See Bapuly, Bedanna & Kohlegger, Gerhard, Die Implementierung des Gemeinschaftsrechts in Österreich 583–737 (2003); Rösler, Hannes, Die Vorlagepraxis der EU-Mitgliedstaaten—Eine statistische Analyse zur Nutzung des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens, 47 Europarecht 392, 398 (2012).Google Scholar

⁵ VfSlg 15.450/1999. The Constitutional Court had accepted the CJEU's supremacy case-law from the outset, see, in particular, VfSlg 14.886/1997.Google Scholar

⁶ See in detail, infra at C.Google Scholar

⁷ On this issue of “Präjudizialität,” cf. Michael Potacs, Die Bedeutung des Gemeinschaftsrechts für das verfassungsgerichtliche Normprüfungsverfahren, in Das verfassungsgerichtliche Verfahren in Steuersachen 245, 251 (Michael Holoubek & Michael Lang eds., 2010); Baumgartner, Gerhard, Verfassungsgerichtliche Normenkontrolle und EU-Recht, 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 295, 305 (2010).Google Scholar

⁸ See also for cases of individual complaints and differences from abstract review Öhlinger & Potacs, supra note 2, at 163–68.Google Scholar

⁹ VfSlg 16.050/2000, VfSlg 16.100/2001.Google Scholar

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¹⁴ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 33.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Id. at para. 41.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See VfSlg 14.886/1997 (as quoted in the English translation of VfSlg 19.632/2012).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Art. 92 Federal Constitutional Act (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, “B-VG”), cf. Eckhart Ratz, Der Oberste Gerichtshof in Österreich als Grundrechtsgericht, 73 Österreichisches Anwaltsblatt 274 (2013). See, however, the interlocutory proceedings for constitutionality review before the Verfassungsgerichtshof, Art. 89 para. 2 B-VG.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The “Subsidiarantrag auf Normenkontrolle” came into effect on 1 January 2015, Federal Law Gazette BGBl. I 114/2013.Google Scholar

¹⁹ On the impact of the “visibility” of Charter rights, cf. Daniel Thym, Die Reichweite der EU-Grundrechte-Charta— Zu viel Grundrechtsschutz?, 32 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 889 (2013).Google Scholar

²⁰ See Orator, Andreas, Herausforderungen der österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zur effektiven und legitimen Letztentscheidung unter Integrationsbedingungen, in Tagungsband 53. Assistententagung Öffentliches Recht “Das letzte Wort—Rechtsetzung und Rechtskontrolle in der Demokratie“ 237, 244 (Dominik Elser et al. eds., 2014).Google Scholar

²¹ On the scope of application of the Charter, see, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 375 (2012).Google Scholar

²² VfSlg 19.632/2012.Google Scholar

²³ Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, Official Journal L 304/12, 30 September 2004, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, Official Journal L 326/13, 13 December 2005.Google Scholar

²⁴ VfSlg 19.632/2012, paras. I-14.Google Scholar

²⁵ Id. at para. 16.Google Scholar

²⁶ On the traditional style of reasoning of the Verfassungsgerichtshof, which has been characterized as relatively “cautious” or “reserved,” see Heller, Kurt, Die Anwendung der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union durch den Verfassungsgerichtshof, 134 Juristische Blätter 675 (2012).Google Scholar

²⁷ See Pöschl, Magdalena, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit nach Lissabon. Anmerkungen zum Charta-Erkenntnis, 67 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 587, 602 (2012).Google Scholar

²⁸ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 35.Google Scholar

²⁹ Holoubek, supra note 10, at 166 n. 38 (relativising the Court's use of the principle of equivalence served as a mere “starting point and occasion”); cf. Verfassungsgerichtshof, B 166/2013-17, 12 March 2014, at n. 22.Google Scholar

³⁰ Case C–326/96, B.S. Levez v. T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. I-07835, para. 18, with references to earlier case-law (italics not in original).Google Scholar

³¹ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 29.Google Scholar

³² Case C–63/08, Virginie Pontin v. T-Comalux SA, 2009 E.C.R. I-10467, para. 45.Google Scholar

³³ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 30.Google Scholar

³⁴ Federal Law Gazette BGBl. 59/1964.Google Scholar

³⁵ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 31.Google Scholar

³⁶ See the explanations to Article 47 CFR, Official Journal 2007 C 303/29.Google Scholar

³⁷ However, see the qualification, supra note 29.Google Scholar

³⁸ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 33 (“The system of legal protection set out in the Federal Constitutional Act provides in general for a concentration of claims for violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights with one instance, i.e. the Constitutional Court […]”).Google Scholar

³⁹ Kelsen, Hans, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 5 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer (1929) 26 (“negativer Gesetzgeber”).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 34.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Art. 144 B-VG as well as Arts. 139–140 B-VG.Google Scholar

⁴² See Merli, Franz, Umleitung der Rechtsgeschichte, 20 J. für Rechtspolitik 355, 355–356 (2012).Google Scholar

⁴³ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 25.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Id. at para. 35.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Id. at paras. 34, 36.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Id. at para. 38.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Pöschl, supra note 27, at 591–92.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 18.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ On those, see the earlier literary statement of Justice Müller, Rudolf, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Europäische Grundrechtecharta, 67 Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung 159 (2012).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Heller, supra note 26, at 675. It took the Court another year to actually invalidate a decision based on a violation of Charter rights, see infra, note 52.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Arts. 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, and 21 para. 1 CFR; cf. VfSlg 19.673/2012, VfSlg 19.702/2012, VfSlg 19.749/2013, Case B 166/2013.Google Scholar

⁵² See, e.g., Case U 1257/2012, 26 June 2013. Since the Charter decision, the Verfassungsgerichtshof has reversed about a dozen administrative decisions, so far almost exclusively on the grounds of violations of the right to an oral hearing under Article 47, paragraph 2 CFR. For the same reasons, on one occasion the Verfassungsgerichtshof declared unconstitutional an already expired provision of the Federal Asylum Tribunal Act, exercising general judicial review based on the Charter as a constitutional yardstick for the first time, Case G 86/2013, 27 February 2014.Google Scholar

⁵³ On other European Constitutional Courts, see Visser, Maartje De, National Constitutional Courts, the Court of Justice and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in a post-Charter Landscape, 14 Hum. Rts. Rev. 1 (2013).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 40.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, Case C–495/03, Intermodal Transports BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2005 E.CR. I–8151.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ VfSIg 19.632/2012, para. 44.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Pöschl, supra note 27, at 598.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Merli, supra note 42, at 356–57.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ VfSIg 19.632/2012, para. 29.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Merli, supra note 42, at 356.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Case C–63/08, Virginie Pontin v. T-Comalux SA, 2009 E.C.R. I-10467, para. 45, as cited in VfSIg 19.632/2012, para. 29.Google Scholar

⁶² Id. at para. 45.Google Scholar

⁶³ Potacs, Michael, Rechte der EU-Grundrechte-Charta als verfassungsgesetzlich gewährleistete Rechte, 134 Juristische Blätter 503, 511 (134); see also the reaction of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof in Case 2013/15/0196, 23 January 2013.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Pöschl, supra note 27, at 594–95.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See id. at 597.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ In particular, see the Court's fragmented citation of the Pontin case; cf. Merli, supra note 42, at 356 n. 2; further, see the relativization in the Constitutional Court's follow-up case-law, e.g. Case B 166/2013-17, 12 March 2014, para. 22; see Pöschl, supra note 27, at 603; Brenn, Christoph, VfGH versus Unionsrecht, 67 Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung, 1062, 1065 (2012).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ For a literary reaction, see, e.g., Ratz, supra note 17, at 278.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Order of the Oberster Gerichtshof for a preliminary ruling, 17 December 2012, 9 Ob 15/12i; see CJEU, Case C–112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. I–00000, para. 27 (“In the case of rules of procedural law under which the ordinary courts called upon to decide on the substance of cases are also required to examine whether legislation is unconstitutional but are not empowered to repeal legislation generally, this being reserved for a specially organised constitutional court, does the ‘principle of equivalence’ in the implementation of European Union law mean that, where legislation infringes [Art 47 CFR], the ordinary courts are also required, in the course of the proceedings, to request the constitutional court to set aside the legislation generally, and cannot simply refrain from applying that legislation in the particular case concerned?”).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Case C–112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. I–00000, para. 45, quoting from previous case-law (italics added).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ In its order for a preliminary ruling, the Oberster Gerichtshof cites from the Charter decision, see order of the Oberster Gerichtshof for a preliminary ruling, 17 December 2012, 9 Ob 15/12i, section 3.7.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Case C–112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. I–00000, para. 29.Google Scholar

⁷² Id. at para. 32.Google Scholar

⁷³ VfSlg 19.632/2012, para. 42.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Joined Cases C–188/10 and C–189/10, Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli, 2010 E.C.R. I–5665, para. 57.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Case C–106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R. 629, para. 24.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Case C–112/13, A v. B and Others, 2014 E.C.R. I–00000, para. 46.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ For a reaction of the other supreme court, see Verwaltungsgerichtshof, Case 2013/15/0196 of 23 January 2013.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ On the “guiding function” of the Constitutional Court, cf. Holoubek, supra note 10, at 166.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Already on similar “fears” after Austria's accession to the EU, see Schäffer, supra note 2, at 371.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Pöschl, supra note 27, at 590.Google Scholar

⁸¹ See Müller, supra note 49, at 167; Brenn, supra note 66, at 1065; Merli, supra note 42, at 359. Citing from that literature, one justice admits to these “explanations” for the Charter decision, see Holoubek, supra note 10, at 169.Google Scholar

⁸² Müller, surpa note 49, at 167. To the extent that these instruments developed through the Charter decision relate to an intensified relationship with the CJEU, see infra at G.Google Scholar

⁸³ However on this function of “Rechtsbereinigung,” i.e. “removal” of conflicting domestic law, see already VfSIg 19.632/2012, para. 33.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Brenn, supra note 66, at 1065.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Pöschl, supra note 27, at 596.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Merli, supra note 42, at 357.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ However, see the unaltered case law of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, Case 2013/15/0196, 23 January 2013.Google Scholar

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⁹⁰ See Komárek, supra note 3, at 422. On the function of “Solange” doctrines within the judicial dialogue of the CJEU and national courts, see Charles F. Sabel & Oliver Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order, 16 Eur. L. J. 511 (2010).Google Scholar

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⁹⁵ Heller, supra note 26, at 677; Grabenwarter, supra note 91, at 304.Google Scholar

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⁹⁹ See VfSlg 19.702/2012 and CJEU, Joined Cases C–293/12 and C–594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, 2014 E.C.R. I–00000, para. 21.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ VfSlg 19.702/2012, para. 27.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See, e.g., the first question: “In the light of the explanations relating to Article 8 of the Charter, which, according to Article 52(7) of the Charter, were drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of the Charter and to which regard must be given by the Verfassungsgerichtshof, must [Directive 95/46] and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 18 December 2000] on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [OJ 2001 L 8, p. 1] be taken into account, for the purposes of assessing the permissibility of interference, as being of equal standing to the conditions under Article 8(2) and Article 52(1) of the Charter?”, CJEU, Joined Cases C–293/12 and C–594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, 2014 E.C.R. I–00000, para. 21.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Mayr, supra note 88, at 409.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ This is to be contrasted with the “constitutionalization” of another European fundamental rights catalogue, the ECHR, through formal constitutional amendment. See Orator, supra note 20, at 248.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Another indication of the Constitutional Court's awareness for and willingness to use this dialogical function are the (prompt) publications of English translations of important judgments of the Verfassungsgerichtshof, see, e.g., VfSlg 19.632/2012 (Charter decision), VfSlg 19.702/2012 (referral of the Data Retention Directive case).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Andreas Voßkuhle, Der europäischer Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 29 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ In favor of such a “dialogue on the same subject in a common language,” see Holoubek, supra note 10, at 167.Google Scholar