In 2021, the German and Namibian governments published a Joint Declaration as a result of their negotiations on reparations. Ovaherero and Nama representatives strongly criticized the violation of their participation rights during the negotiations and the reproduction of colonial racism. In 2023, a lawsuit was filed with the Namibian High Court. This litigation could become a milestone in the history of legal struggles for reparations for colonial crimes worldwide. In addition to the litigation, several United Nations Special Rapporteurs were contacted and published their joint communication in April 2023, essentially confirming the lack of effective participation and the obligation to grant reparations.

This Article gives an overview of the most important historical events during German colonial rule and the most significant efforts to legally come to terms with it since 2006. It analyzes the main legal issues in this context: Have the acts committed by German colonial troops violated the laws in force at the time? Is the current application of the doctrine of intertemporal law by the governments a reproduction of racism? Might it be a new act of racism? What challenges and limits do courts face when they attempt to retrospectively reconstruct legal systems and legal norms in force 100 years ago? Does the German state have a legal obligation to enter into negotiations over reparations? What participation rights do affected communities have in processes of legal reappraisal of colonialism?

In view of the growing demands for reparations worldwide, it is timely to deal with the underlying legal issues in an exemplary manner. The legal intervention of the German-Namibian reappraisal could set a precedent. The Article aims at establishing minimum legal standards for reparations processes for colonial crimes worldwide.

Populism is Janus-faced; simultaneously facing different directions. There is not a single form of populism, but rather a variety of different forms, each with profoundly different political consequences. Despite the current hegemony of authoritarian populism, a much different sort of populism is also possible: Democratic and anti-establishment populism, which combines elements of liberal and democratic convictions. Without understanding the political economy of the populist revolt, it is difficult to understand the true roots of populism, and consequently, to devise an appropriate democratic alternative to populism.

This Article critically analyzes seven elements of the Biden administration trade policy: (1) buy American; (2) tariffs; (3) World Trade Organization; (4) free trade agreements; (5) China; (6) technology; and (7) Russia. Although President Biden has made a clean break from Trump policies in many areas, this is not the case when it comes to international trade. Regretfully, Biden has chosen to keep in place most of the failed trade policies of his predecessor—the Trump tariffs and the China trade war. It is not too late to shift ground, to negotiate mutual abolition of the Trump tariffs, to open free trade negotiations with the EU and UK, to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, to adopt a multilateral strategy with allies to check Chinese trade excesses, and to reengage with the World Trade Organization. Topping the list of needed reforms of the multilateral trading system are: (1) subsidies; (2) state-owned enterprises; and (3) forced technology transfer. These are best addressed through a WTO plurilateral agreement and/or preferential trade agreements. The Biden administration should prioritize these urgent reforms. Rather than promoting “free” trade and multilateral trade reforms, the Biden administration continues its predecessor’s nationalistic policies so that trade serves domestic political ends. Such state intervention in trade policy consists of the strategic use of tariffs, subsidies, “buy American” rules, and regional trade arrangements without regard to the rules of the multilateral trading system. These new policies represent a decisive retreat from globalization and openness to trade.

The Congress, directed by the Biden administration, has adopted a far-reaching industrial policy in the form of four laws that subsidize key sectors of the U.S. economy: American Rescue Plan Act ($40 billion); Infrastructure and Jobs Act ($1.2 trillion); Inflation Reduction Act ($369 billion); and Chips Act ($252.7 billion). This subsidization coupled with “buy American” protectionism constitute a departure from the free trade ideal that has characterized U.S. policy since the end of World War II.

The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was widely lauded as a success with regard to the recognition and potential prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence. More than twenty years later, however, many observers are disillusioned with the ICC’s dire track record concerning the implementation of its progressive legal framework. In many cases, the Court and particularly its Prosecutor have been criticized for failing to adequately address and prioritize sexual violence, culminating in only a single final conviction since 2002. Nevertheless, the ICC’s emerging practice shows progress with regard to the conceptual understanding of conflict-related sexual violence and the realization of the Statute’s full potential in ensuring accountability for sexual crimes. Taking into account the evolving jurisprudence, the Article explores the persisting challenges and the perceived gap between aspirations and reality regarding the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICC.

This Article illustrates the functional and conceptual variances of law in different contexts. Whereas legal actors on the international level might normatively aim for law to have a similar effect to that of domestic law, the way in which international and supranational law can fulfill these potential functions is different. Accordingly, this Article argues that an awareness of the particularities and challenges that the potential functions of law encounter in the international and supranational context is needed. Moreover, it suggests an analytical lens to conceptually frame and locate current developments, offering a broader perspective on—or even an element of explication for—the apparent crisis that law is currently facing on the international and supranational scale. After describing the potential functions of law on an abstract scale and grouping them into analytical categories, the Article uses these categories as a lens in order to assess in which way international law can fulfill these potential functions, where priorities regarding certain functions might differ, and where some aspects of these functions are challenged when law is made and applied in the international and supranational sphere.

This Article argues that a) constitutional supremacy is affected by the legal tradition, which implies that it is a concept largely shaped by the legal context in which it is elaborated, and b) the common law version of constitutional supremacy determines a sort of cultural resistance to constitutional imperialism. In making its argument, this Article begins with the doctrine of sources of law with a view to unpack its operational logic within the common law and, therefore, to understand how the supremacy of constitutions is conceptualized. It then examines the embryonic conceptualization of constitutional supremacy in the British legal culture by addressing the “constitutional statutes.” It goes on to analyse how constitutional supremacy is safeguarded in jurisdictions that are affected by the British tradition and equipped with written constitutions, to show how constitutions concretely established themselves as supreme laws without neglecting the relevance of traditions pre-dating the constitutional texts. It then shows how the common law finds its way to be applied alongside or even instead of the constitution. Eventually, this Article offers some conclusions as to the implications of such a conceptualization of constitutional supremacy for comparative and global constitutional studies.

This article explores the challenges of the extraterritorial application of the right to be forgotten and, more broadly, of EU data protection law in light of the recent case law of the ECJ. The paper explains that there are good arguments for the EU to apply its high data protection standards outside its borders, but that such an extraterritorial application faces challenges, as it may clash with duties of international comity, legal diversity, or contrasting rulings delivered by courts in other jurisdictions. As the article points out from a comparative perspective, the protection of privacy in the digital age increasingly exposes a tension between efforts by legal systems to impose their high standards of data protection outside their borders – a dynamic which could be regarded as ‘imperialist’ – and claims by other legal systems to assert their own power over data – a dynamic which one could name ‘sovereigntist’. As the article suggests, navigating between the Scylla of imperialism and the Charybdis of sovereigntism will not be an easy task. In this context, greater convergence in the data protection framework of liberal democratic systems worldwide appears as the preferable path to secure privacy in the digital age.

Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.