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** http://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/234902.html; see also U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, (Mar. 13, 2015), http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/03/20150316314034.html#axzz3UsXW78hL; see also TF1, Kremlin.ru (June 4, 2014), http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/45832.Google Scholar

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⁵ Trenin, Dmitri, Welcome to Cold War Il, Foreign Policy, (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/04/welcome_to_cold_war_ii (emphasis added).Google Scholar

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⁸ See Umut Özsu, Ukraine, International Law, and the Political Economy of Self-Determination, 16 German L.J. 434, 435-39 (2015) (defining the “Ukraine crisis” as the “culmination of a broad trend over the past two decades to move away from the U.N. Charter's prioritization of territorial sovereignty and toward what many regard as a new species of liberal interventionism).Google Scholar

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¹⁰ Vigenin, Kristian, We Insist on a Thorough Investigation of the Events in Odessa, Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 3, 2014), http://www.mfa.bg/bg/events/6/1/2845/index.htm (demanding an investigation into May 2, 2014 Odessa Trade Unions House fire, which killed more than 40 anti-Maidan protesters who were trapped inside while the building was set alight) (in Bulgarian).Google Scholar

¹¹ NATO says Crimea Referendum Would Break International Law, Reuters (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUSBREA2D1NI20140314.Google Scholar

¹² Address by President of the Russian Federation, President of Russia (Mar. 18, 2014), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 (calling on the Duma to accept Crimea and Sevastopol as two new subjects of the Russian Federation).Google Scholar

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¹⁴ Monaghan, Andrew, The Ukraine Crisis and NATO-Russia Relations, NATO Review Magazine (2014), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Ukraine-crisis-NATO-Russiarelations/EN/index.htm (stating thatGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Greenwald, Glenn, No Place to Hide (2014); Whitehead, Tom, GCHQ's Internet Surveillance with US Ruled Unlawful, The Telegraph (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11394860/GCHQs-mass-lnternet-surveillance-ruled-unlawful.html.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See McKenzie, supra note 2.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Russia Relations: “Reset” Fact Sheet, (June 24, 2010), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet. For a provocative perspective on Russia's ability and willingness to abide by the “Western” language of international law, see, e.g., Dolidze, Anna, The Non-Native Speakers of International Law: the Case of Russia, 15 Baltic Y.B. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2015).Google Scholar

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¹⁹ See Mackey, Robert, Republicans’ Iran Letter Ignites Fierce ‘#47Traitors’ Debate Online, NY Times (Mar. 11, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/world/middleeast/republicans-iran-letter-ignites-fierce-47traitors-debate-online.html?_r=0.Google Scholar

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²¹ Id.; Laats, Alar, The Concept of the Third Rome and Its Political implications, in Religion and Politics in Multicultural Europe: Perspectives and Challenges 102 (Kilp, Alar & Andres Saumets eds., 2009) (tracing the doctrinal origins of Moscow as the Third Rome and arguing that the universalizing concept still sub-consciously animates Russian political discourse).Google Scholar

²² See Golovakha, supra note 20. For several leading accounts of the way in which international law furthers a Eurocentric civilizing mission, see Anghie, Antony, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (2005); see also Koskenniemi, Mariti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2002).Google Scholar

²³ Ukraine's culture of hospitality is legendary. In the political sphere, this includes, but of course is not limited to, the appointment of Scandinavian rulers—the Varangians—to rule Kievan Rus, just as Ukrainians have welcomed foreign-born cabinet ministers in the post-Yanukovich era. Paul R. Magocsi, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples 65–70 (2010); Ukraine's New US-Born Finance Chief Enduring Baptism by Fire, N.Y. Times (Mar. 1, 2015); Ukraine Goes Abroad for Government Ministers, The Wall St. J. (Dec. 2, 2014).Google Scholar

²⁴ The very etymology of the name “Ukraine,” it should be remembered, hearkens back to the Old Slavic (and contemporary Russian and Ukrainian) word krai, which means “border”—which, when combined with the prepositional u-, translates to “borderland.” Etymological Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language, Vol. 7 (O.S. Melnichyuk, ed., 1983). The space that Ukraine bordered, of course, and in relation to which it has always been defined, was none other than Moscovite Rus, that is, the place we know as contemporary Russia.Google Scholar

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²⁶ See, e.g., Butler, William E., Russia and the WTO System: Law, Regionalism, and Politics, 44 U. Mem. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2013) (“Whether the vision of a CIS common law comes to pass or not, the symbiotic role of the Russian legal system cannot fail to impress. Russian law and Russian legal concepts serve as the principal model for legal development within the CIS.”); see also Delcour, Laure & Kataryna, Wolczuk, Eurasian Economic Integration: Implications for the EU Eastern Policy, in Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics 179, 197 (Dragneva, Rilka & Kataryna Wolczuk eds., 2013) (describing Russian efforts to incentivile Ukrainian participation in the Eurasian Customs Union, including long history of gas disputes between Ukraine and Russia), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2430216.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Harasymiw, Bohdan, Post-Communist Ukraine 206 (2002) (discussing lack of differentiating markers between “Ukrainians” and “Russians”). The term “Ukrussia” is one of my choosing precisely to collapse this national distinction as a heuristic to facilitate describing particular aspects of the Ukraine crisis which do not depend on nationality.Google Scholar

²⁸ Here, “nation” is used in the narrow Slavic sense of the word “natsia,” as ethnos. This is the same ethnic sense of the word in which the modern Wilsonian right of “nations” to self-determination was formulated. Vladimir Putin, Concert Dedicated to the Reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia, President of Russia (Mar. 18, 2015), available at http://www.kremlin.ru/news/47878 (“In Russia, we have always thought that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. I think so now as well. Of course, extreme nationalism is always harmful and dangerous.”).Google Scholar

²⁹ Vitaly Churkin, Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Address to the United Nations Security Council 7253rd Meeting (Aug. 28, 2014), http://webtv.un.org/watch/ukraine-security-council-7253rd-meeting/3754452835001; Naryshkin, S. E., The Coup D'etat in Kiev in February 2014 and International Law, 2 Eurasian L. J. 8 (2015), http://www.eurasialaw.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7140:-2014-&catid=477:-2-81-2015&Itemid=796 (interview with Naryshkin Sergey Yevgenyevich, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) (In Russian).Google Scholar

³⁰ Roth, Brad, The Virtues of Bright Lines; Self-Determination, Secession, and External Intervention, 16 German L.J. 384, 388 (2015).Google Scholar

³¹ Id. at 415; Ohlin, Jens David, infra note 74 (discussing competing empirical theories for the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 and discussing international legal consequences of alleged Russian support for separatists).Google Scholar

³² See Naryshkin, supra note 29 (“I will leave the terminological games on their [Western] consciences, but will emphasize that facilitating an armed coup from abroad—in legal terms is called intervention into domestic affairs of Ukraine.”). On 20 March 2015, the United States announced that approximately 300 U.S. paratroopers will begin training Ukrainian National Guard units in Western Ukraine. Earlier in March 2015, the U.K. also announced that it would send additional non-lethal support in the form of advisory and training teams.Google Scholar

³³ See Özsu, supra note 8.Google Scholar

³⁴ Russian Bailout Masks Ukraine's Economic Mess, BBC News (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25430980.Google Scholar

³⁵ Id.; see also NATO Says Crimea Referendum Would Break International Law, supra note 11.Google Scholar

³⁶ Haskell, John D. & Mamlyuk, Boris N., Capitalism, Communism … and Colonialism? Revisiting “Transitology” as the Ideology of Informal Empire, 9 Global Jurist (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679246.Google Scholar

³⁷ Ukrainian, In, moskali is a derogatory plural term to refer to ethnic Russians, Russian nationals, or Russian-allied Ukrainians, and is typically used to refer to chauvinistic or strong-arm conduct by Russians against Ukrainian interests, irrespective of context (art/culture, military, economic, etc.). Of many Russian equivalents to refer to Ukrainians, a term with similar derogatory meaning to moskali is ukrop, or baby dill spice. These linguistic nuances are significant because some of the rhetoric emanating from Maidan and its partisans has had eerie parallels to infamous utterances in the Rwanda genocide (Hutus referring to Tutsis as cockroaches and calling for their extermination). See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, (Sept. 2, 1998); The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-A, (Nov. 28 2007). Further, in the 2 May 2014 Odessa Trade Unions House fire reports showed that far-Right groups were chanting “burn kolorados” which is a double entendre reference to: (1) the orange and black colors of the Ribbon of St. George, a ribbon print that is used to widely commemorate Soviet victory in WWII and which serves as an identifying marker for pan-Soviet-space solidarity; (2) the typical summer Eastern European farm practice of manually gathering Colorado potato beetles (Leptinotarsa decemlineata) off potato plants to burn them in large farm fires. Furthermore, in the context of the Ukraine crisis, the ‘fifth-column’ internal threat may refer to, inter alia, the assertion that Ukrainian intelligence and state police services were penetrated and compromised by Russian intelligence, which was alleged to exert control over Ukrainian foreign affairs. See Trifonov, Denis, Russian Intelligence Presence in the CIS, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (Dec. 17, 2003), http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/8615-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2003-12-17-art-8615.html. Therefore, to fully defend sovereignty and actualize self-determination against Russia, one of the first acts of the post-Yanukovich government was “lustration” across all organs of public administration to remove perceived channels of Russian influence. Council of Europe Venice Commission: some provisions of Ukrainian lustration law should be revised, Interfax-Ukraine (Dec. 12, 2014), http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/239646.html.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Özsu, supra note 8.Google Scholar

³⁹ Santos, Alvaro, The World Bank's Use of the “Rule of Law” Promise, in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 275, 284 (Trubek, David M. & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&context=facpub; Ukraine's Bail Out, The Economist (Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21646214-loan-provides-sticking-plaster-stricken-war-weary-economy-when-relief-looks-barely-enough.Google Scholar

⁴ See Özsu, supra note 8, at 444 (explaining that in the context of the Ukraine crisis, self-determination “is to be understood primarily as the ability of the ‘Ukrainian people’ to ‘choose’ European integration over Russian hegemony, and only secondarily as the ability of the ‘peoples’ of Donetsk and Luhansk to conduct elections with an eye to autonomy or independence.”).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Roth, supra note 30.Google Scholar

⁴² As of 22 March 2015, 399 former government officials have been added to the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice lustration list. See Ukrainian Ministry of Justice, Lustration Committee, Unified Governmental Registry of Those Failing Within Ukrainian Law “On Cleansing [Lustration] of Government,” available at http://lustration.minjust.gov.ua/register (In Russian). Ukraine's law on lustration has been deemed overbroad and lacking in procedural due process by the Venice Commission, and is currently undergoing review. See Ukraine Ministry of Justice, Lustration Committee, Шзит Венец/ансько! KoMicii до УкрашиЮбговорення Проекту Зм/н До Закону Укра'ши “Про Очищения Влади,” (Feb. 17, 2015), available at http://lustration.minjust.gov.ua/article/read/53 [In Russian].Google Scholar

⁴³ Before actions in Crimea and Donbas, similar international legal arguments were deployed against Russia in connection with the highly-publicized Khodorkovsky affair (Russia violating liberal internationalist principles regarding the inviolability of private property) or in connection with its notorious anti-gay-propaganda law. Stanley Reed, Yukos Shareholders Awarded About $50 Billion in Court Ruling, N.Y. Times (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/business/international/yukos-shareholders-awarded-about-50-billion-in-court-ruling.html?_r=0.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Savery, Lynn, Engendering the State: The International Diffusion of Women's Human Rights (2007).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (2006).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Roth, supra note 30, at 400-03 (describing the tensions within international law's conception of the domaine réservé and, more generally, critiquing the Badinter practice of muddying doctrinal bright lines between, for example, constitutional and international law, with moral and political considerations).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Vidmar, Jure, The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the People, 16 German L.J. 365 (2015); see also Roth, supra note 30; Roth, Brad, Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement (2011).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Bowring, Bill, Positivism Versus Self-Determination: the Contradictions of Soviet International Law, in International Law on the Left: Re-Examining Marxist Legacies, 133 (2008); Mamlyuk, Boris N., Russian International Law and Indeterminacy: Cold War and Post-Soviet Dynamics, in The Legal Dimension in Cold War Interactions: Some Notes from the Field, 81, 84–87 (Borisova, Tatiana & William Simons, eds., 2012),Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Kotlyar, Vladimir S., International Law and Contemporary Strategic Conceptions of the USA and NATO, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Relations of Russian Federation (2007), http://www.dipacademy.ru/ (unpublished habilitation thesis) (In Russian).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Kerry's Interview with NBC News on Ukraine, Middle East, U.S. Dept. of State, (Mar. 2, 2014) available at http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/03/20140302295198.htmlftixzz3V3HK4Gir (“This is an act of aggression that is completely trumped up in terms of its pretext. It's really 19th century behavior in the 21st century …”).Google Scholar

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⁵² This refers to a notorious incident in which an intercepted recording of a telephone call between Victoria Nuland (United States Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs) and Geoffrey Pyatt (Ambassador of the United States to Ukraine) was leaked to news outlets. In the telephone call, where Nuland discusses her preferences for various high-level government positions in the immediate post-Yanukovich period, Nuland is overhead stating: “Fuck the EU…” The statement was not denied by the U.S. State Department, which referred to the interception and leak of the call as a new low in Russian tradecraft. For context on the EU's anxiety regarding U.S. politics vis-à-vis Ukraine and EU; See, e.g., Bolle, Michael & Fläschner, Oliver, The European Union: Stability Despite Challenges, 4 Baltic J. Eur. Stud. 20 (2014).Google Scholar

⁵³ The Budapest Memorandum was a four-party 1994 agreement between UK, US, Russia and Ukraine, pursuant to which Ukraine agreed to transfer its nuclear weapons (deployed and stockpiled) to Russia, in exchange for guarantees respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The status of the Memorandum under international law is unclear, although signatory states could make a very compelling argument that it is legally binding as a treaty. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, 2001 I.C.J. 40.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Simpson, supra note 1. On 28 July 2014, the U.S. government accused Russia of testing land-based cruised missiles in violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987); US Says Russia Breached Nuclear Treaty, The Guardian (July 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/us-says-russia-breached-nuclear-treaty.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Simma, Bruno, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1 (1999).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ For an overview of Russia's conception of hybrid war, see Korhonen, Outi, Deconstructing the Conflict in Ukraine: The Relevance of International Law to Hybrid States and Wars, 16 German L.J. 452 (2015); see also Bachmann, Sascha-Dominik & Gunneriusson, Håkan, Hybrid Wars: 21st Century's New Threats to Global Peace and Security, 43 S. Afr. J. Mil. Stud. 77 (2014), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506063.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Christo, George, European Union Security Logics to the East: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, 19 Eur. Sec. 413 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Kotlyar, supra note 49.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Ignatenko, G.V. & Tiunov, O.I., International Law: a Textbook for Higher Education Institutions 18, 96–99 (4th ed. 2005) (In Russian).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Id. at 9; Mälksoo, Lauri, Russian Approaches to International Law 109 (2015) (describing Tunkin's and other Soviet/post-Soviet Russian theorists rejection of Western blueprints for a “world state”).Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Ignatenko, supra note 59, at 11. The issue of whether Russia is a state successor or occupies a sui generis place as a ‘continuator’ of the Soviet Union is an incredibly complex and consequential matter under international law. See Crawford, James, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law 427 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing Russia's status as “continuator” of the Soviet Union in diplomatic practice, and particularly at the United Nations). I am grateful to William Butler for noting this crucial point.Google Scholar

⁶² Lavrov: US Escalated Ukraine Crisis at Every Stage, Blamed Russia, RT (Feb. 7, 2015), http://rt.com/news/230219-lavrov-munich-speech-ukraine/.Google Scholar

⁶³ Moiseienko, Anton, What Do Russian Lawyers Say About Crimea?, Opinio Juris Blog (Sept. 24, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/24/guest-post-russian-lawyers-say-crimea/.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Fabry, Mikulas, How to Uphold the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, 16 German L.J. 416 (2015). For further reading an the arguments advanced by Russia, see the collections of essays in the Opinio Juris Ukraine Insta-Symposium (www.opiniojuris.org) and Oxford Public International Law Debate Map. Debate Map; Ukraine Use of Force, Oxford Uni. Press (Aug. 3, 2014), http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/ukraine-use-of-force-debate-map; see also Mamlyuk, Boris N., Intervention and Colonialism as Responses to Alleged Fascism, Opinio Juris Bloc (Mar. 17 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/17/ukraine-insta-symposium-intervention-colonialism-responses-alleged-fascism/; Mamlyuk, Boris N., Russia May Invoke Force Majeure Clause of New START in Response to Possible US Sanctions, Cambridge J. Int'l L& Comp. L. Blog (Mar. 9, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/03/09/russia-may-invoke-force-majeure-clause-new-start-response-possible-us-sanctions/; See Özsu, supra note 8.Google Scholar

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⁶⁶ G.A. Res. 68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RFS/68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014); See Roth, supra note 30, at 387 (noting the voting pattern at the UN General Assembly showed 100 votes affirming territorial integrity of Ukraine, eleven against, and expressing disappointment that fifty-eight members abstained, and twenty-four were absent from the vote).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Chinese Premier Won't Say If Crimea's Annexation Was Illegal, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/china-statement-crimea-annexation-anniversary/26901691.html.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), www.aiibank.org; New Development Bank (formerly BRICS Development Bank), available at: http://ndbbrics.org/.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Fabry, supra note 64.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Id. Google Scholar

⁷¹ See generally Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma (Malcolm Evans, ed., 1998); see also Gray, Christine D., Judicial Remedies in International Law (2002).Google Scholar

⁷² Koskenniemi, Martti, supra note 45, at 591-97; Koskenniemi, Martti, The Politics of International Law 339-42 (2011).Google Scholar

⁷³ Far a classic treatment of the fact/law distinction, and an analysis of fact-becoming-law processes, see Kelsen, Hans, A General Theory of Lawand State (Anders Wedberg trans., 2009).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Nuland, Victoria, TransAtlantic Security Challenges: Central and Eastern Europe (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.fareign.senate.gov/download/nuland-testimony-4-10-14; Cumming-Bruce, Nick, U.N. Cites Abuses in Crimea Before Russia Annexation Vote, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/world/eurape/un-cites-abuses-in-crimea.html (reporting on statement of then-United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, thatGoogle Scholar

** One of the most tragic, but by no means unique, instances of the politicization of fact-gathering processes in the Ukraine crisis has been the controversy regarding the downing of MH17 on 17 July 2014. See Excerpt of Address of Vitaly Churkin, Russia's Ambassador to the United Nations’ 7221th meeting (July 21, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhIJ4vjUI4Q (calling for impartial and independent international investigation into the MH17 incident through the framework of ICAO); Ohlin, Jens David, Control Matters: Ukraine & Russia and the Downing of Flight 17, Opinio Juris Blog (July 23, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/07/23/control-matters-ukraine-russia-downing-fligh-17/ (considering state responsibility arguments for holding Russia culpable/liable for downing of MH17 while acknowledging several conflicting empirical accounts regarding the shootdown).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Herszenhorn, David M., Russia Is Quick to Bend Truth About Ukraine, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/world/europe/russia-is-quick-to-bend-truth-about-ukraine.html; Russia Warns of Ukraine Gas Cuts; Nuland Touts “Truth-Telling Campaign,” Democracy Now (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.democracynow.org/2014/4/11/headlines (describing testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee). The way in which Russia is typically said to exert control over information is through state control over means of mass communication, including the English-language outlet, RT. But the Kremlin has also operationalized seemingly apolitical administrative agencies, such as Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, a federal agency with oversight over Russia's near-abroad), to shape the factual narrative over the Ukraine crisis, specifically to counter what Russia perceives as an information war against it. See, e.g., Rossotrudnichestvo, Information War Against Russia (translation of an article from El Nuevo Diario) (Mar. 18, 2015), http://rs.gov.ru/press/news/8091 (In Russian).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ On 2 December 2014, for instance, Ukraine established a Ministry of Information Policy, whose stated goal is to counter Russian propaganda in Ukraine. Supreme Council of Ukraine, MiHicmp /нформоц/йно/ пол/тики Укроти, (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=247789675&cat_id=247077361; RWB Opposes Creation of Information Ministry, Reporters Without Borders (Dec. 2, 2014), http://en.rsf.org/ukrainerwb-opposes-creation-of-02-12-2014,47325.html;, Store's Nuland at House Hearing on Situation in Ukraine, U.S. Depart. of State (Mar. 4, 2015), http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/03/20150304313897.html#ixzz3V482DdQ1 (Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs:Google Scholar

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⁹⁴ Bershidsky, Leonid, Ukraine's Oligarchs Are at War (Again), BloombergView (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.blaombergview.com/articles/2015-03-20/ukraine-s-oligarchs-are-at-war-again-; Balmforth, Richard, Ukrainian Oligarch Under Fire After Night Raid on State Oil Firm, Reuters (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/20/us-ukraine-crisis-kalomaisky-idUSKBN0MG2A320150320. The conflict in issue in Kiev is an attempt by Igor Kolomoisky—an oligarch who was appointed by the post-Yanukovich government as governor of Dnipropetrovsk—to maintain control over a major energy pipeline operating company, which had recently been seized by representatives of the Poroshenko government.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁴ Pinchuk, (unreported) (Eng.), at paras. 1–2.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Koskenniemi, Martti, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 Mich, J. Int'l L. 455 (1995-1996), available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/mjil17&div=20&id=&page=.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁸ The most recent example of this could be China's recent announcement to begin air strikes or otherwise contributing to the anti-ISIS effort in Iraq, given that Iraq has recently overtaken Russia in volume of oil sold to China, second only to Angola.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Kratzke, William & Titoff, Dmitri, Russia and the WTO: Realpolitik by the Rules of Free Trade, 44 Mem. L. Rev. 633 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2461777.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Elsuwege, Peter Van, EU-Belarus Relations: Coping With the Reality of the Eurasian Economic Union, in The European Union and Republic of Belarus: Getting Closer for Better Future 256 (2014) (discussing place of Belarus in EU's Eastern Partnership Program, and prospect of concluding new bilateral association agreements, including provisions on the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), but noting that future of EU-Belarus integration hinges on issues of political compatibility).Google Scholar

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¹¹³ Anders Åslund, Sergey Giazyev and the Revival of Soviet Economics, 29 Post-Soviet Aff. 375 (2013), available at http://www.tandfonlinE.cam/dai/abs/10.1080/1060586X.2013.809199.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ As Gerry Simpson writes, our conceptions of the international legal order have always had inclusive (pluralist) and exclusive (anti-pluralist) streams, often, again, simultaneously. Simpson, supra note 1. States, in turn, may choose to isolate or ‘outlaw’ themselves (early Soviet autarky) or they may be Isolated by the international community because of the ultra vires nature of their creation (Iran, North Korea, etc.) or behavior—namely, Soviet Union as an outlaw state in the eyes of the West based on perceptions of aggression (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan), and anti-liberalism. A state may also declare itself to be an outlaw, or an anti-law state, as the early Soviet experience with international law makes clear. Simpson, supra note 1, at 261 (Nazis viewed the USSR as an anti-state). But as Simpson, Roth, and many others note, the move away from universalism/homogeneity towards a greater acceptance of pluralism typically occurs when an actor (such as the Soviet state vis-à-vis the League) shows Itself capable of maintaining a baseline level of effective control over a territory, or otherwise signals legitimism. Id.; Roth, supra note 30, at 412 n. 99 (“Successful revolution sooner or later begets its own legality.”) (quoting Stanley A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (1977)); Roth, Brad, Governmental Illegitimacy and International Law 136-50 (1999).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Taylor, Adam, Russia on Iraq: ‘We Told You So,' Wash. Post (June 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/06/12/russia-on-iraq-we-told-you-so/ (“[I]t's tempting to look at Russia's positions [against intervention] on various conflicts and wonder whether there was something to it. … Critics might also point out that in Iraq, Libya and Syria, Putin has been unusually vocal In his support of strongman leaders — like supports like, you could say.”).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., Knox, Rob, Strategy and Tactics, 21 Finnish Y.B. Int'l L. 193 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1921759.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Secretary-General, U.N., island of Palmas Case (Netherlands, USA), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829. (Apr. 4, 1928); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, 16; see also Stone, Julius, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice 494 (Stanford Univ. Press 1966) (“In the nature of things those who wielded the transitional state power [in Soviet society] would fix the time-table for this metamorphosis [from bourgeois legality to communism].”).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Oklopcic, supra note 102 (describing disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia from 1991 to Kosovo in 2008 as territorial fragmentation on “time-release”).Google Scholar

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¹²² Schepers, Emile, Judge Withdraws from Ukraine Communist Trial Because Cops Raided His Office, People's World (Feb. 23, 2015), http://peopleswarld.org/judge-withdraws-fram-ukraine-cammunist-trial-bEcause-copsraided-his-office/. The Communist Party opposed armed action against Donbas and presumably would have opposed IMF bailouts because austerity measures would disproportionately impact its core constituents.Google Scholar

¹²³ Gudkov, Lev, Россия переживает рецидив тоталитаризма [Russia is Living Through Recidivism of Totalitarianism], Novoe Vremya (Dec. 16, 2014), http://nv.ua/opinion/Gudkov/rossiya-perezhivaet-recidiv-totalitarizma–25255.html. In Russian Lev Gudkav is the head of Russia's Levada Center, one of the most credible polling organizations in contemporary Russia.Google Scholar

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¹²⁸ To dampen populist Ukrainian hopes for European integration, Russia could sustain a “frozen conflict” in Luhansk/Donetsk, modeled on Transdniestria. Similarly, a frozen conflict could be advantageous to certain Western powers or Ukraine, as it may act as an obstacle to any future prospective integration with Russia or a Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union.Google Scholar

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¹³⁰ Kennedy, David, Of War and Law 41 (2006). In contrast to realists, liberal internationalists generally see international relations in positive-sum, versus zero-sum terms. See Feldman, Noah, Cool War: The Future of Global Competition 171–172 (2013); cf. Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 98–105 (1984).Google Scholar

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¹³² Cf. Carlson, Brian, Russia-China Gas Deal a Sign of Russian Weakness, Not New Alliance, Foreign Policy Inst., Johns Hopkins Univ., Sch. of Advanced Int'l Studies (June 4, 2014), available at http://www.fpi.sais-jhu.edu/#!RussiaChina-Gas-Deal-a-Sign-of-Russian-Weakness-Not-New-Alliance/clqvb/54c690900cf2ad5dc6e2cd8b.Google Scholar

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¹³⁷ See Pechatnov, Vladimir O., Soviet-American Relations Through The Cold War, in Oxford Handbook of the Cold War 107, 109 (Immerman, Richard & Petra Goedde eds., 2013) (describing competing Cold War strategies as resting on the ultimate objective of a complete military or economic defeat of the other).Google Scholar

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¹⁴⁰ Snyder, Timothy, Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine, in N.Y. Rev. of Books (2014).Google Scholar

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¹⁴² Chertok, Paula, Timothy Snyder: Ukraine is But One Aspect of a Much Larger Strategy that Threatens European Order, Euromaidan Press (Mar. 18, 2015), available at http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/03/18/timothy-snyder-ukraine-is-but-one-aspect-of-a-much-larger-strategy-that-threatens-european-order/.Google Scholar

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¹⁴⁷ Russia was recognized as a “market economy” by the EU on 29 May 2002. The United States recognized Russia as a “market economy” on 7 June 2002. See Russian Democracy Act of 2002, H.R. 2121 (2002), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr2121/text; See EU Announces Formal Recognition of Russia as “Market Economy” in Major Milestone on Road to WTO Membership, European Commission (May 29, 2012), availible at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-775_en.pdf; Butler, W.E., Russian Foreign Relations and Investment Law (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ See generally, St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, http://www.forumspb.com/.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Butler, William E., supra note 147; Butler, William E., Foreign Investment Law in the Commonwealth of Independent States (2002); cf. Stanley Reed, Yukos Shareholders Awarded About $50 Billion in Court Ruling, N.Y. Times (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/business/international/yukos-shareholders-awarded-about-50-billion-in-court-ruling.html?_r=0.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Interview by Farber, Myron A., The Rule of Law Oral History Project 8: The Reminiscences of Scott Horton (Nov. 21, 2012).Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Cf. Lauri Malksoo, The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: A Civilizational Dialogue with Europe, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 211 (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁵² Harvey, David, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 76–77 (2005) (citations omitted).Google Scholar

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¹⁵⁴ See Korhonen, supra note 93 (“These suggestions disregard law's endemic symbiosis with power structures and come up with old catch-all explanations that … the more void of meaning [they are] the more ubiquitous they become, for example ‘the new cold war.'”); see also Feldman, supra note 130.Google Scholar

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¹⁵⁸ Simpson, supra note 1; Roth, supra note 30 (describing Russia's practice of still upholding a norm even as it violates it).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ Dunlap, Charles J., Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 Yale J. Int'l Aff. 146 (2008).Google Scholar

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¹⁶⁴ Haskell, John D., Taking Risks Ethically, 22 Florida J. Int'l L. 285 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ Far an analogous Expression of political will in the academic context, see Matthew Craven et al., We Are Teachers of International Low, 17 Leiden J. Int'l L. 363 (2004).Google Scholar

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¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014, S.2277 (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2277.Google Scholar

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¹⁷⁵ Miéville, China, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (2005) (“Between equal rights, force prevails.”).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ Mamlyuk, supra note 138.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ As a scholar focused on Russian approaches to international law and global governance, I have done research in Moscow's Institute of State and Law under the auspices of the U.S. Fulbright program, and my work generally tries to understand Soviet and Russian legal theory against broader historical and economic currents. I have been following developments in the post-Soviet space since my days in law school and travel to the region to conduct research, gather materials, and meet with scholars in effort to understand the social and legal contours of the respective societies.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Chotiner, Isaac, Meet Vladimir Putin's American Apologist, New Republic (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116820/vladimir-putin-defended-american-leftist.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Gutterman, Steve, Russian Professor Under Pressure over Nazi Comparison on Ukraine, Moscow Times (Mar. 4, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-professor-idUSBREA231SX20140304; Cohen, Stephen F., Cold War Book Reviewing?, N.Y. Times (June 4, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/04/books/1-cold-war-book-reviewing-087505.html (describing how U.S. Cold War-era academic and journalistic communities “imputed bad and even un-American thinking to scholars who dared rethink prevailing explanations of Soviet history”); Ivie, Robert, Cold War Dissent Revisited, 17 Rhetoric & Pub. Aff. 163 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ John N. Hazard, Recollections of a Pioneering Sovietologist (2d ed. 1987).Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Mamlyuk, Boris N. & Mattei, Ugo, Comparative international Law, 36 Brook. J. Int'l L. 385, 408 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁵² On May 1, 2014, Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) introduced the 2014 Russian Aggression Prevention Act, which would authorize, inter alia, up to $100 million in direct military aid for Ukraine. See supra note 168. Since then, the U.S. and other NATO states have announced various other military aid commitments to Ukraine.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ U.S. Department of the Treasury: Resource Center, Ukraine-Related Sanctions, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/ukraine.aspx Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ For instance, on August 7, 2014, Russia placed a one-year embargo on food imports from the United States, European Union, Australia, Canada and Norway, Roberto Ferdman, Russia's Ban on American Food imports is Going to Hit the U.S. Poultry, Pork and Nut Industries the Hardest, Wash. Post (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtanpost.cam/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/07/russias-ban-on-american-foad-imports-is-going-to-hit-the-u-s-poultry-pork-and-nut-industries-the-hardest/.Google Scholar